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fix(server): address the run-2 findings of the #818 auth review - #821
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The macOS access control list hints from #818 could mislead: - Removing allow entries one by one with `chmod -a# <number>` renumbers the entries after each removal, so following the hint as written can remove an inherited deny entry. The directory hint now says to remove each allow entry by its text with `chmod -a "<entry>"`, without its number or the word inherited. - The token file hint offered `chmod -N` as an equal alternative to deleting a token that others may have read. It now leads with deleting the file to get a new token and says that `chmod -N` keeps the current one. - Paths in every suggested command, including the existing `chmod 700` and `chmod 600` hints, are quoted with `shlex.quote`, so a path with a space does not split. - The README pointed at `ls -le`, which lists the entries of a directory's contents; `ls -led` lists a directory's own. The macOS tests added `everyone deny delete` entries to their temporary directories and never removed them, so a second run with the same `--basetemp` failed in setup and pytest could not prune old base temps. A fixture now adds the entries and removes every entry under the test's temporary directory afterwards.
The IPC socket is protected only by its mode, 0600. On macOS a socket inherits the inheritable entries of its directory's access control list, and connect needs only write permission, so with SIE_IPC_SOCKET_PATH in a directory that carries an inheritable allow entry, other local accounts could connect to the socket that the mode is meant to keep private. The server starts this socket on every `sie-server serve`. On macOS the server now refuses to create the socket in a directory whose access control list has an entry that allows access, using the same rule as the token directory: any entry other than a deny entry is refused, and a list that cannot be read is refused. The default directory, /tmp, carries no access control list. The ACL reader is split so that it raises OSError and the token checks keep their TokenFileError message. The sidecar's local-ingest socket has the same shape on macOS. Its README now states the requirement for SIE_SIDECAR_LOCAL_SOCKET; the sidecar ships as a Linux image, where the 0600 mode also limits inherited POSIX ACL entries through the ACL mask.
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Check name Status Explanation Description Check Check skipped - CodeRabbit’s high-level summary is enabled. Title check The title clearly identifies this as a server fix addressing findings from the #818authentication review. It does not describe every change, but it accurately summarizes the pull request’s purpose.Linked Issues check Check skipped because no linked issues were found for this pull request. Out of Scope Changes check Check skipped because no linked issues were found for this pull request.
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Review comments at @packages/sie_server/src/sie_server/ipc_server.py:
- Around line 310-311: In start(), run _refuse_shared_socket_directory on the
socket path’s parent before the existing-socket cleanup can unlink the socket,
so a rejected startup leaves another server’s socket intact.
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e6a8f3f1-42a3-4fbc-aa02-0915bd176f84
📒 Files selected for processing: 6
packages/sie_server/README.mdpackages/sie_server/src/sie_server/core/server_auth.pypackages/sie_server/src/sie_server/ipc_server.pypackages/sie_server/tests/core/test_server_auth.pypackages/sie_server/tests/test_ipc_server.pypackages/sie_server_sidecar/README.md
…ocket start() removed an existing socket at the path before the new access control list check ran. When the check then refused to start, another server still running on that path lost its socket name. The check now runs first, so a refused start leaves the directory untouched.
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Independent adversarial review, run 1 (agent-generated)This change touches the server's token checks and adds an access check on the local IPC socket, so it follows the authentication and authorization review gate. Review record
Reviewer prompt, verbatimThe agent was started with this prompt: The brief file, verbatim: Reviewer report, uneditedAgent-generated adversarial review Reviewed head and range
Abuse cases considered
Test evidence
Run 2's findings 1 to 3
New findings
Items the PR lists as not fixed
Sibling sweep
Blocking findings: 0 |
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Follow-up to #818. Its second independent review (comment) reported three non-blocking findings. This PR fixes all three.
1. Tests: the macOS tests left access control list entries behind
Before. Three macOS tests in
test_server_auth.pyaddedeveryone deny deleteto their temporary directories and never removed it.--basetempfailed in setup with 56 errors.garbage-*directories piled up under the per-user pytest root, and every run logged a warning about them.Now. An
add_acl_entryfixture adds the entries. After the test it runs/bin/chmod -RNon the test'stmp_path. Every macOS test that adds an entry uses it.Evidence (macOS 15.7.7, Python 3.12.12):
--basetemp: 167 passed, then 167 passed. No access control list entry is left under the base temp.2. Server: remediation hints that were unsafe to follow
a. Directory hint.
chmod -a# <number>" is unsafe as written. Each removal renumbers the entries after it, so the next number can name an inherited deny entry.chmod -a "<entry>" <dir>, with the entry's text as listed but without its number or the word inherited.chmod -arejects that word ("Unknown tag type"). Without it, the inherited entry is matched and removed.b. Token file hint. It offered
chmod -N <path>as an equal alternative to deleting a token that others may have read. It now leads with deleting the file (rm <path>), after which the server generates a new token. It says plainly thatchmod -Nkeeps the current token.c. README.
ls -lelists the entries of a directory's contents. The README now saysls -led <path>, which lists the directory's or file's own entries.d. Quoting. Every suggested command in
server_auth.pynow quotes the path withshlex.quote:chmod 700,chmod 600,ls -led,chmod -a,rmandchmod -N. A path such as~/Library/Application Support/sieno longer splits.Tests:
test_removing_each_allow_entry_by_its_text_keeps_the_deny_entriesfollows the new hint. Its directory has two explicit allow entries, an inherited allow entry and an inherited deny entry. Afterwards only the inherited deny entry is left, and the token is created.chmod 700andchmod 600tests, which run on every platform3. Server: the IPC socket on macOS
Before. The IPC socket (
SIE_IPC_SOCKET_PATH, default/tmp/sie-ipc.sock) is protected only by its mode, 0600.sie-server servecreates it on every start.On macOS a socket inherits the inheritable entries of its directory's access control list. Checked on this machine:
Inheritance. A socket was bound in a directory with
everyone allow read,write,file_inherit, then set to 0600. It lists assrw-------with0: group:everyone inherited allow read,write.What decides connect. The entries decide connect, not only the mode. With the socket at mode 0000, connect from the same account:
EACCESwhen there is no access control listThis used one account, so it was not repeated from a second account.
Now. On macOS,
IpcServer.startrefuses the socket directory before binding if its access control list has an entry that allows access.acl_allows_access): any entry other than a deny entry is refused, and so is a list that cannot be read.ls -ledcommand and suggests anotherSIE_IPC_SOCKET_PATH.OSError. The token checks wrap it, so theirTokenFileErrormessages are unchanged./private/tmp, the default socket directory, has no access control list, so the default is unaffected.Checked through the real path:
SIE_IPC_SOCKET_PATH=<directory with an allow entry>/ipc.sock sie-server servestops with thePermissionErrorand "Application startup failed".srw-------.Tests (macOS):
everyone allow read,write,file_inheritis refused, and no socket is created.everyone deny deleteis accepted, and the socket is 0600.Sidecar. The sidecar's local-ingest socket (
SIE_SIDECAR_LOCAL_SOCKET,local_ingest.rs) has the same shape on macOS. This PR documents the requirement in the sidecar README instead of adding a check, because:python:3.12-slimcontainer:nobodyread and writenobody's connect fails withEACCESSibling sweep
Checked for the same shape, a socket or secret file protected only by its mode:
ipc_server.py). Fixed here._ipc_test_harness.pygoes through the sameIpcServer.start.sie-server-rust(packages/sie_server_rust/src/ipc.rs). BindsSIE_IPC_SOCKET_PATHwithout setting a mode. See "Not changed here"./tmp/sie-ipc.sock. No access control list on/private/tmp. Its shared directory is a different issue. See "Not changed here".ipc_client.rs,ipc_mux.rs,config_subscriber.rs,adapter_pool.rsandhealth_publisher.rs.serving_artifacts.py, which uses modes for immutabilitysie_audio_prep/build_wheel.pyandtools/, which are build toolsNot changed here
sie-server-rustsets no mode on its IPC socket.0777 & ~umask. With the default umask 022 that is 0755, and other accounts cannot connect to it./tmp/sie-ipc.sockis in a shared directory.Validation
mise run lint: passes.mise run typecheck: passes.mise run test -- packages/sie_server/tests/core/test_server_auth.py: 167 passed. Two runs with the same--basetempalso passed (see 1).packages/sie_server/tests/test_ipc_server.pytest_cli_auth.pyapp/test_app_factory.pytest_local_ingest_client.pyMutation checks, each applied alone on macOS:
acl_allows_accessreturns false on an unreadable ACLchmod -a# <number>chmod -Nas an equal alternativeOn Linux CI only the quoting mutations are caught, because the other tests are macOS-only.