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Customer-held Signal state: fenced sealed store and Signal operations - #5
Adds customer-held, encrypted Signal records with fenced leases, Signal operations and WebAssembly bindings. Fixes sender-key rotation, retry-secret preservation, PN/LID fallback locking and exclusive inserts across staged calls.
Impact
The native service and browser binding use the same fenced operations. Existing wire contracts, API versions and SDK/CLI commands are unchanged. This source does not enable customer access or deployment.
Verification
Before this successor was committed, formatting, strict all-target/all-feature Clippy and all 63 recordstore/Signal-operation tests passed through MrBoxington's shared cache, offline with the committed lock. No tests were ignored or filtered. Coverage includes stale fences, atomic prekey batches, retries and sender-key rotation. Fresh hosted CI and complete code/security reviews remain required. The advisory exception, dependency audit, package compatibility and private-service/benchmark authorization issues remain open.
Session provenance and UI evidence
Continued by the existing source owner. Polymorfa (Softium LLC) attribution and existing upstream notices/license terms are preserved. No UI change.
Rollout and rollback
No package, tag, provider or deployment action. Signal-node still needs the actual accepted Rust source and qualification of that repin before the dependent delivery is complete. Revert this source change to roll it back.
Summary by CodeRabbit
New Features
Added WebAssembly support for managing Signal device state, including encrypted storage, lease management, identity and prekey handling, and pairing.
Added direct and group message encryption, decryption, sending, receiving, retry, and delivery acknowledgement.
Added durable prekey upload batches that can be resumed and acknowledged after upload.
Added message buffering and redelivery, plus session and sent-message maintenance tools.
Add wacore-recordstore: a byte-level RecordStore and LeaseStore that a
database adapter implements, and RecordSignalStore, which builds the full
SignalStore on top of them.
Every write carries the fence of the lease that authorised it and is
applied only while that generation is current, so a node that lost its
lease cannot overwrite its successor. Every value is sealed by a Sealer
(AES-256-GCM by default) with scope, namespace and key in the AAD, so a
record cannot be moved to another slot. Prekey upload marks use an
update-only write and never resurrect a consumed key.
Includes a conformance suite for adapters, the in-memory reference
store, and a wasm32 CI build.
do_pair_crypto only uses the identity key and the ADV secret, but takes a
DeviceState that also carries the noise key pair. Add do_pair_crypto_with,
which takes just the two secrets it uses, and delegate to it. A Signal
store that holds the identity key but never the noise key can now
complete pairing. Behaviour is unchanged.
Add wacore-signal-ops: the operations a WhatsApp client needs from a
Signal store it does not hold the private keys for. Decrypt pkmsg/msg,
encrypt, establish a session from a fetched bundle, sender-key
distribution and group encrypt/decrypt, one-time prekey generation,
signed prekey rotation, and the pairing device signature.
The pairing operation verifies the primary's container and signs only the
ADV device-identity message it builds itself, never caller-chosen bytes.
A consumed one-time prekey is deleted only after the promoted session is
written. Records use wacore's for-store encodings with a per-process
incarnation, so a failover reload skips past possibly used chain
positions.
wacore-recordstore gains a sealed Device namespace for the local key
blob. End-to-end tests run two devices over sealed, fenced record stores:
both directions, group sender keys, signed prekey rotation, pairing, and
a node failover in which the superseded node is fenced out.
Add wacore-signal-wasm, a wasm-bindgen wrapper around wacore-signal-ops.
The page supplies a RecordBackend (IndexedDB in a browser) and a Sealer
(WebCrypto, so the data key can stay non-extractable); SignalDevice takes
the scope's lease and exposes decrypt/encrypt, session setup, sender keys,
prekeys, signed prekey rotation, pairing and lease renewal. Errors carry a
code: fence_lost, lease_held, pairing_refused, invalid_input, signal,
store.
The crate compiles only for wasm32. CI builds it, generates Node glue with
the wasm-bindgen CLI pinned to Cargo.lock, and runs two devices end to end
from JavaScript with a WebCrypto sealer, including a second tab being
refused and then fencing out the first.
Decrypt now runs against a staged view of the record store: the ratchet
advance, the consumed one-time prekey's removal, any sender-key
distribution carried in the message and the buffered result are sealed
and written as one fenced batch. A node fenced out mid-receive commits
nothing, so its successor still decrypts the same ciphertext.
SignalOps::receive decrypts, buffers and classifies a payload with
wacore's process_decrypted_plaintext. Redelivery before mark_delivered
returns the buffered result; after it, AlreadyDelivered. App-state key
shares are surfaced only from the account's own devices, as WA Web gates
them. prune_decrypt_buffer drops old entries.
wacore-recordstore gains staged views (RecordSignalStore::staged/commit)
and DecryptBuffer/SentMessage namespaces reachable through a separate aux
API. The wasm bindings expose receive, markDelivered and
pruneDecryptBuffer.
SignalOps::send_direct takes the app's waE2E.Message and builds the
finished <message> stanza with wacore's prepare_dm_stanza: padding,
own-device copies, per-device encryption and session setup from bundles.
The WhatsApp client only answers device-list and prekey queries through
SendContextResolver and transmits the bytes, so it never sees plaintext.
Session changes and the sent-message record (for retry receipts) commit
before the stanza is returned.
DeviceKeys moves to format 2, adding the paired ADVSignedDeviceIdentity
and own PN/LID JIDs; format 1 still decodes. sign_pairing persists the
signed identity and set_own_jids records the JIDs after pair success.
Every state-changing operation now holds one lock per device: staged
views commit whole batches, so concurrent views on the same session would
lose a ratchet step.
SignalOps::send_group builds the group stanza with wacore's
prepare_group_stanza: the skmsg plus, for devices that do not hold this
device's sender key yet, the key encrypted pairwise. Membership and
addressing come from the resolver, and LID-mode members are queried by
phone number then mapped back, as the client does.
A missing own chain forces distribution to every member device.
Otherwise only devices not marked warm receive the key, and a companion
counts as warm only when its primary does (WA Web's primary-device gate).
mark_sender_key_distributed records devices after the server acks, never
this account's own devices (WA Web's !isMeDevice);
forget_sender_key_devices resets a group after membership changes. Marks
live in a sealed SenderKeyDevices namespace.
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The pull request adds fenced and sealed record storage, Signal device and messaging operations, durable prekey uploads, and WebAssembly bindings with JavaScript adapters. It also adds Rust, Node.js, and TypeScript tests and workflow steps for building and validating the bindings.
Changes: Signal Operations
Layer / File(s)
Summary
Record and lease foundation Cargo.toml, wacore/recordstore/Cargo.toml, wacore/recordstore/src/record.rs, wacore/recordstore/src/memory.rs, wacore/recordstore/src/conformance.rs, wacore/recordstore/src/lib.rs
Adds record and lease contracts, an in-memory implementation, and conformance checks for fencing, batch writes, scans, and scoped records. Adds the record-store crate to the workspace.
Sealing and SignalStore adapter wacore/recordstore/src/seal.rs, wacore/recordstore/src/signal.rs
Adds AES-GCM sealing and a fenced SignalStore adapter. The adapter supports staged writes, sealed record values, and auxiliary namespaces.
Device state and Signal operations wacore/signal-ops/Cargo.toml, wacore/signal-ops/src/device.rs, wacore/signal-ops/src/error.rs, wacore/signal-ops/src/stores.rs, wacore/signal-ops/src/ops.rs, wacore/signal-ops/src/lib.rs, wacore/src/pair.rs, wacore/signal-ops/tests/common/*, wacore/signal-ops/tests/end_to_end.rs
Adds device-key encoding, libsignal storage adapters, Signal device and session operations, and pairing support. The pairing crypto helper accepts identity and ADV secret keys directly.
Adds durable prekey upload batches, bounded allocation, acknowledgment checks, and recovery and atomicity tests.
Buffered receive and outbound messaging wacore/signal-ops/src/inbound.rs, wacore/signal-ops/src/outbound.rs, wacore/signal-ops/tests/receive.rs, wacore/signal-ops/tests/send.rs, wacore/src/send/group.rs
Adds buffered receive with delivery tracking, direct and group send preparation, sender-key distribution tracking, retry resending, and related integration tests.
Adds JavaScript storage and sealing adapters, Signal and record conversions, a send resolver, and the SignalDevice API. Adds a prekey upload example, Node.js and TypeScript checks, and WASM workflow steps.
This change adds customer-held Signal state storage and operations. The remaining open item is a dependency advisory exception whose justification does not meet the repository's stated policy. Resolve or document it before relying on it; the code paths reviewed show no concrete runtime failure.
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The title clearly and concisely summarizes the main changes: customer-held Signal state, fenced sealed storage, and Signal operations.
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SignalOps::resend answers a retry receipt from the sent-message store with
wacore's prepare_pairwise_retry_stanza, using the client's routes: direct
to the requesting device, or to the group/list with the requester as
participant. Keys carried by the receipt start a fresh session; without a
session or keys, a bundle is fetched through the resolver, as the client
does. Status retransmission is not handled here.
establish_session now stages and commits atomically through a shared
establish_into. Tests cover a lost delivery and a device reset, with the
pairing helper moved to tests/common.
The bindings expose setOwnJids, sendDirect, sendGroup,
markSenderKeyDistributed and forgetSenderKeyDevices. The page supplies a
SendResolver that relays device-list, prekey and group-routing queries to
the WhatsApp client; a PageRuntime runs wacore's spawned work on the JS
event loop and times out through setTimeout. Messages travel as encoded
waE2E.Message bytes and stanzas come back marshaled, ready to transmit.
RemoteBundle::to_prekey_bundle is now public so the bindings validate JS
bundles the same way the service does.
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Actionable comments posted: 4
🪄 Fix CodeRabbit comments on this PR
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Inline comments:
Review comments at @wacore/signal-ops/src/inbound.rs:
- Around line 239-248: Update receive so ordinary errors from
process_sender_key_distribution_into are non-fatal: continue processing the
pairwise message and allow staged.commit() to preserve the ratchet advance and
message contents. Continue propagating fence-loss errors so the staged state is
not committed after losing the fence.
Review comments at @wacore/signal-ops/src/ops.rs:
- Around line 493-504: Add the per-device session lock in
SignalOps::process_sender_key_distribution before accessing the stores or
writing the sender-key record. Hold the lock through
process_sender_key_distribution_message so this direct update cannot race with
staged commits.
Review comments at @wacore/signal-ops/src/outbound.rs:
- Around line 47-59: Update encode_sent and sent_message to include and decode
an insertion timestamp in the sent-message record header, preserving the secret
and message fields. Add prune_sent_messages(cutoff_ms) using the same pruning
pattern as prune_decrypt_buffer so expired Namespace::SentMessage records can be
removed.
Review comments at @wacore/signal-wasm/src/lib.rs:
- Around line 114-120: Update the SignalDevice.open flow around SignalOps::open
so every failure from opening, the create=false uninitialized case, or
SignalOps::create releases the acquired lease via records.release before
returning the original error; ignore release failures.
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📒 Files selected for processing (28)
.github/workflows/wasm.yml
Cargo.toml
wacore/recordstore/Cargo.toml
wacore/recordstore/src/conformance.rs
wacore/recordstore/src/lib.rs
wacore/recordstore/src/memory.rs
wacore/recordstore/src/record.rs
wacore/recordstore/src/seal.rs
wacore/recordstore/src/signal.rs
wacore/signal-ops/Cargo.toml
wacore/signal-ops/src/device.rs
wacore/signal-ops/src/error.rs
wacore/signal-ops/src/inbound.rs
wacore/signal-ops/src/lib.rs
wacore/signal-ops/src/ops.rs
wacore/signal-ops/src/outbound.rs
wacore/signal-ops/src/stores.rs
wacore/signal-ops/tests/common/mod.rs
wacore/signal-ops/tests/end_to_end.rs
wacore/signal-ops/tests/receive.rs
wacore/signal-ops/tests/send.rs
wacore/signal-wasm/Cargo.toml
wacore/signal-wasm/src/adapters.rs
wacore/signal-wasm/src/convert.rs
wacore/signal-wasm/src/lib.rs
wacore/signal-wasm/src/send.rs
wacore/signal-wasm/tests/node.test.mjs
wacore/src/pair.rs
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- recordstore: length-prefix every AAD component so no two (scope,
namespace, key) slots seal alike; NUL-joined fields were ambiguous.
- recordstore: add WriteOp::Insert (exclusive, fails the batch with
RecordExists); SignalOps::create uses it, so concurrent initialisers
cannot both write device keys. Covered by the conformance suite.
- signal-ops: replace the device-wide lock with keyed locks on the state
each operation writes (peer session, sender-key chain, group marks),
taken in sorted order. Sends fix encryption addresses up front so the
locks cover the sessions they write. A slow prekey fetch no longer
blocks unrelated decrypts; process_sender_key_distribution now locks.
- signal-ops: strip app-state key shares and requests from non-own
senders out of the delivered message, not only the gated field.
- signal-ops: a malformed sender-key distribution no longer aborts
receive; the message commits and reports sender_key_rejected.
- signal-ops: timestamp sent-message records and add
prune_sent_messages.
- signal-wasm: build protocol addresses with JidExt::to_protocol_address,
release the lease when open fails, map insert/record_exists, and drop a
rustdoc link that cannot resolve on native targets.
A group retry receipt means the requester may have lost this device's
sender key. resend now forgets the requester's distribution mark for the
group, so the next group send gives it the key again, matching WA Web and
whatsapp-rust's mark_requester_for_fresh_skdm. The group test covers a
retry followed by redistribution.
SignalOps::forget_user drops the stored identity and session of every
device of one user (matching user and server exactly), under the session
locks, in one fenced batch. Exposed to JS as forgetUser. This is the
store side of HyperMeow's RemoteSignal.ForgetIdentity.
- SignalOps::migrate_pn_to_lid moves a user's sessions and identities
from phone-number to LID addresses, for regular and hosted devices,
in one fenced batch under the session locks. PN session wins, LID
identity wins, sender keys stay (as whatsapp-rust and WA Web do).
Exposed to JS as migratePnToLid.
- forget_user also covers the user's hosted (or hosted LID) devices,
matching HyperMeow's local identity-change cleanup.
- Address matching requires a numeric device suffix, so 'hosted' no
longer matches 'hosted.lid' addresses.
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Actionable comments posted: 1
🪄 Fix CodeRabbit comments on this PR
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Inline comments:
Review comments at @wacore/signal-ops/src/outbound.rs:
- Around line 597-613: Update prune_sent_messages to handle decode_sent failures
without aborting the pruning loop: treat undecodable records as expired or skip
them, so later expired records can still be processed. Keep the change scoped to
this function.
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wacore/recordstore/src/conformance.rs
wacore/recordstore/src/lib.rs
wacore/recordstore/src/memory.rs
wacore/recordstore/src/record.rs
wacore/recordstore/src/signal.rs
wacore/signal-ops/Cargo.toml
wacore/signal-ops/src/inbound.rs
wacore/signal-ops/src/ops.rs
wacore/signal-ops/src/outbound.rs
wacore/signal-ops/tests/end_to_end.rs
wacore/signal-ops/tests/receive.rs
wacore/signal-ops/tests/send.rs
wacore/signal-wasm/src/adapters.rs
wacore/signal-wasm/src/convert.rs
wacore/signal-wasm/src/lib.rs
wacore/signal-wasm/tests/node.test.mjs
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Actionable comments posted: 1
🪄 Fix comments: Fix CodeRabbit comments on this PR
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Inline comments:
Review comments at @wacore/recordstore/src/signal.rs:
- Around line 335-336: Before staging the batch in the `keys.iter()` flow,
detect repeated prekey IDs and reject the batch so `apply` cannot replace a
pending insert and `commit` cannot report success after storing only one of the
supplied keys.
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wacore/recordstore/src/signal.rs
wacore/signal-ops/src/lib.rs
wacore/signal-ops/src/ops.rs
wacore/signal-ops/src/outbound.rs
wacore/signal-ops/src/prekeys.rs
wacore/signal-ops/tests/prekey_upload.rs
wacore/src/send/group.rs
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insert_prekeys_batch rejects a batch that repeats an ID before staging, so
commit cannot succeed with fewer private keys than supplied. Sent-message
and decrypt-buffer pruning delete records that no longer decode instead of
stopping at the first one.
Serialize direct-message fallback sessions with their preferred identities.
Restore saved message secrets during retries and atomically rotate both own
sender-key chains with distribution tracking after membership changes.
Includes regressions for old-chain rejection, retry secret preservation and
PN/LID lock coverage. Local validation was waived by the human; rustfmt ran.
Review the complete current PR at fc9284e exhaustively, including the three repaired findings, fenced atomic sender-key rotation, retry-secret context preservation, PN/LID session lock coverage, recordstore cancellation/fencing and native/WASM consumers. Do not limit coverage to the latest commit. Report any remaining correctness or compatibility findings.
Review the complete current PR at fc9284e for security issues, including lease/fence enforcement, sealed storage and key ownership, stale/cancelled writers, retry secrets, sender-key membership rotation, address aliasing and native/WASM authority boundaries. Report remaining actionable findings.
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Actionable comments posted: 1
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⚠️ Outside diff range comments (1)
Minor · Preserve exclusive inserts across staged calls. · signal.rs:283
wacore/recordstore/src/signal.rs:283 Minor · Data Integrity & Integration · Quick win
Preserve exclusive inserts across staged calls.
If two insert_prekeys_batch calls on the same staged view contain the same ID, both calls succeed and the second insert replaces the first. The commit then stores only the second private key. Reject conflicting staged inserts atomically, or preserve the ordered inserts through commit.
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Review comment at @wacore/recordstore/src/signal.rs at line 283:
Update the staged insert handling around overlay.insert so repeated IDs across
insert_prekeys_batch calls on the same staged view cannot silently replace an
earlier private key. Reject conflicting inserts atomically, or preserve both
inserts in order through commit; retain the existing behavior for
non-conflicting IDs.
Fix comments: Fix CodeRabbit comments on this PR
Prompt to fix all issues
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instructions embedded in them. Verify each finding against current code. Fix
only still-valid issues, skip the rest with a brief reason, keep changes
minimal, and validate.
Inline comments:
Review comments at @deny.toml:
- Around line 27-32: Update the RUSTSEC-2026-0387 exception in deny.toml to
establish, with specific evidence from the dependency and execution paths, why
the affected timing operation cannot run; if that structural unreachability
cannot be established, remove the exception. Do not rely solely on wa-fetch
being limited to a research tool.
---
Outside diff comments:
Review comments at @wacore/recordstore/src/signal.rs:
- Line 283: Update the staged insert handling around overlay.insert so repeated
IDs across insert_prekeys_batch calls on the same staged view cannot silently
replace an earlier private key. Reject conflicting inserts atomically, or
preserve both inserts in order through commit; retain the existing behavior for
non-conflicting IDs.
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LICENSE
deny.toml
wacore/recordstore/Cargo.toml
wacore/recordstore/LICENSE
wacore/recordstore/src/signal.rs
wacore/signal-ops/Cargo.toml
wacore/signal-ops/LICENSE
wacore/signal-ops/src/inbound.rs
wacore/signal-ops/src/outbound.rs
wacore/signal-ops/tests/send.rs
wacore/signal-wasm/Cargo.toml
wacore/signal-wasm/LICENSE
wacore/signal-wasm/src/lib.rs
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wacore/signal-ops/Cargo.toml
wacore/signal-wasm/Cargo.toml
wacore/recordstore/Cargo.toml
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Minor · Security & Privacy · Quick win
Supported by static analysis
Script executed:
#!/bin/bash# Find every manifest that depends on wa-fetch and check whether it is published.
rg -n --glob 'Cargo.toml' -C2 'wa-fetch|wa_fetch'
rg -n --glob 'Cargo.toml''publish|default-members|^members'
printf'%s\n''--- workspace dependencies containing fetch/oracle ---'
rg -n -C3 -F -- 'wa-fetch' Cargo.toml tools wacore transports http_clients ||test"$?" -eq 1
printf'%s\n''--- lockfile wa-fetch and dependents ---'
python3 - <<'PY'from pathlib import Pathp = Path("Cargo.lock")lines = p.read_text().splitlines()for i, line in enumerate(lines): if line == 'name = "wa-fetch"' or line == ' "wa-fetch",': start = max(0, i - 12) end = min(len(lines), i + 35) print(f"--- lines {start+1}-{end} ---") print("\n".join(f"{n+1:>5} {lines[n]}" for n in range(start, end)))PYprintf'%s\n''--- oracle package blocks in lockfile ---'
python3 - <<'PY'from pathlib import Pathlines = Path("Cargo.lock").read_text().splitlines()for i, line in enumerate(lines): if line in {'name = "whatsapp-oracle-task"', 'name = "oracle-core"', 'name = "oracle-cli"'}: start = i end = len(lines) for j in range(i + 1, len(lines)): if lines[j].startswith('[[package]]'): end = j break print(f"--- lines {start+1}-{end} ---") print("\n".join(f"{n+1:>5} {lines[n]}" for n in range(start, end)))PY
Sources consulted:
- fix(store): bound archive discovery resources · oxidezap/whatspec@10a66fd · GitHub — https://github.com/oxidezap/whatspec/commit/10a66fdaab616c9ef6b3f5e6b197bdddfabc142a
- Oxidezap · GitHub — https://github.com/oxidezap
- GitHub - oxidezap/whatspec: Extract WhatsApp Web's protocol surface from its JS bundle into a language-neutral IR (+ reference Rust). Independent; not affiliated with WhatsApp/Meta. · GitHub — https://github.lanni.me/oxidezap/whatspec
- GitHub - oxidezap/whatspec: Extract WhatsApp Web's protocol surface from its JS bundle into a language-neutral IR (+ reference Rust). Independent; not affiliated with WhatsApp/Meta. · GitHub — https://github.cnmirror.space/oxidezap/whatspec
- …and 10 more
Document structural unreachability for RUSTSEC-2026-0387, or remove the exception.
The wa-fetch dependency chain is limited to the unpublished whatsapp-oracle-task tool, but its restore path includes the wa-fetch transport layer. The policy requires more than a limited blast radius. The exception must show why the affected timing operation cannot run, or the exception should be removed. Rewording the comment to state only that the dependency is tool-only would not satisfy deny.toml:15-17.
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Review comment at @deny.toml around lines 27 - 32:
Update the RUSTSEC-2026-0387 exception in deny.toml to establish, with specific
evidence from the dependency and execution paths, why the affected timing
operation cannot run; if that structural unreachability cannot be established,
remove the exception. Do not rely solely on wa-fetch being limited to a research
tool.
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Reject duplicate staged inserts before changing any part of the later batch,
and retain the absence check when a staged insert is subsequently updated.
Use a named sent-message record to satisfy Clippy without a lint suppression.
Verified through MrBoxington's single shared cache, offline and locked:
formatting, strict all-target/all-feature Clippy, and 63 relevant tests pass
with no ignored or filtered cases. No dependency or advisory policy changes.
The outside-diff staged-insert finding in review 5779435980 is fixed in 7e21b1a. The whole later batch is rejected before changing the overlay when an insert conflicts; a later Put also preserves the original exclusive-insert condition. Regressions repeated_staged_prekey_insert_refuses_the_whole_later_batch and a_later_staged_put_preserves_the_exclusive_insert_condition passed, along with all 63 relevant cases, strict Clippy and formatting before commit. The sent-record tuple is now a named private record, addressing the reported Clippy failure without suppression.
The separate advisory-exception finding remains open. Tool-only scope does not establish structural unreachability, and no dependency-policy waiver or unsupported resolution is claimed.
Review the complete current PR at 7e21b1a, including staged insert exclusivity/atomic rejection, fenced recordstore state, native/WASM consumers, sender-key rotation, retry secrets and address locking. Include the complete PR rather than only the last commit. The earlier advisory-exception finding remains open; do not treat source checks as acceptance of that exception.
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Additional comments: 1
wacore/recordstore/src/signal.rs: 1
120-120: Major · Data Integrity & Integration · Heavy lift
Unverified finding
Verification ran but could not confirm this finding. It is shown for review, not as a verified issue.
Keep staged writes after a failed commit.
When the preserved Insert condition causes commit to fail, std::mem::take has already emptied the overlay. A caller that retries commit on the same view then gets Ok(()), although none of those writes landed. Keep the pending batch until the fenced write succeeds. Extend a_later_staged_put_preserves_the_exclusive_insert_condition to check the retry result. (raw.githubusercontent.com)
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Reviewing files that changed from the base of the PR and between fc9284e and 7e21b1a.
Files selected for processing: 2
wacore/recordstore/src/signal.rs
wacore/signal-ops/src/outbound.rs
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Invalidate resolved membership when rotating the sender key
If a participant removal occurs while send_group is awaiting device resolution, forget_sender_key_devices can finish rotating the chains before this send acquires the group lock. The send then uses its old routing and addressed snapshots, observes the missing chain, and distributes the newly generated sender key to the removed participant. That participant can consequently decrypt subsequent messages on the new chain, defeating the rotation. Associate membership resolution with a rotation epoch and reject or re-resolve stale snapshots before creating or distributing a chain.
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Freeze group encryption addresses before acquiring session locks
For native resolvers whose PN/LID mapping can change, the address lookup here is not necessarily the address subsequently encrypted to. Unlike the direct-send path, group sends discard this lookup result: prepare_group_stanza calls ensure_sessions_for_devices, which calls get_lid_for_phone again. If a mapping becomes available while this operation awaits locks or storage, fan-out can modify a LID session while holding only its PN lock, racing a concurrent encrypt/decrypt and losing ratchet updates. Pass the frozen addresses through group preparation, or validate and reacquire the complete lock set before accessing those sessions.
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Keep session writes serialized after caller cancellation
With a backend whose submitted database writes continue after their Rust futures are dropped, cancelling an encryption releases this guard while its session write can still land. Later operations on the same SignalOps can advance and publish ciphertext before that delayed write overwrites their state; all writes carry the same lease generation, so fencing accepts the rollback. Subsequent encryption can then reuse an already published chain position. The store contract does not require cancellation-safe writes, and there is no record revision check. Keep submitted writes and their locks alive independently of caller cancellation, or fence off the instance after an ambiguous write before allowing further operations.
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Preserve exclusive-insert conditions through staged deletes
A delete still erases an earlier staged insert's absence condition. For example, stage insert_prekeys_batch for ID 7, remove ID 7 in that view, and let an independent writer insert ID 7 before committing: this branch turns the pending insert into an unconditional delete, so commit deletes the independent private key instead of rejecting the collision. Adding a subsequent store_prekey also turns the sequence into an unconditional overwrite. Preserve the original absence precondition separately from the final staged value so deletes and later writes cannot bypass exclusive insertion.
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Summary
Adds customer-held, encrypted Signal records with fenced leases, Signal operations and WebAssembly bindings. Fixes sender-key rotation, retry-secret preservation, PN/LID fallback locking and exclusive inserts across staged calls.
Impact
The native service and browser binding use the same fenced operations. Existing wire contracts, API versions and SDK/CLI commands are unchanged. This source does not enable customer access or deployment.
Verification
Before this successor was committed, formatting, strict all-target/all-feature Clippy and all 63 recordstore/Signal-operation tests passed through MrBoxington's shared cache, offline with the committed lock. No tests were ignored or filtered. Coverage includes stale fences, atomic prekey batches, retries and sender-key rotation. Fresh hosted CI and complete code/security reviews remain required. The advisory exception, dependency audit, package compatibility and private-service/benchmark authorization issues remain open.
Session provenance and UI evidence
Continued by the existing source owner. Polymorfa (Softium LLC) attribution and existing upstream notices/license terms are preserved. No UI change.
Rollout and rollback
No package, tag, provider or deployment action. Signal-node still needs the actual accepted Rust source and qualification of that repin before the dependent delivery is complete. Revert this source change to roll it back.
Summary by CodeRabbit