wickra-timemachine connects to live markets and, once explicitly enabled, can
place authenticated orders through the Wickra exchange layer. In that mode it
handles secret key material and order flow, so security is a first-class
concern. Please read THREAT_MODEL.md for the asset inventory,
trust boundaries and the split between the native and browser renderers.
Security fixes land on main and ship in the next release. 0.2.1 is the
first published release; no earlier version exists to support.
| Version | Supported |
|---|---|
| 0.2.1 (latest) | ✅ |
Please do not open a public issue, pull request or discussion for security problems. Report privately through either channel:
- GitHub → the repository's Security tab → Report a vulnerability (private advisory), or
- email support@wickra.org.
Include a description, affected version/commit, reproduction steps and impact. Never include real API keys, secrets or signed request payloads — redact them.
We aim to acknowledge within a few days, agree a disclosure timeline, and credit reporters who wish to be named once a fix ships.
In scope: leakage of secret material (logs, errors, memory) on the native execution path, order-rounding/validation flaws that could mis-size or mis-route an order, and any path that would let the browser renderer obtain a secret key. Both renderers default to read-only / paper mode. Out of scope: vulnerabilities in third-party exchanges themselves, and any deployment that puts secret keys in a browser or other untrusted client (explicitly unsupported — see the threat model).