wickra-synth generates synthetic market data from a data-driven spec. It holds
no secret material, opens no network connections, and places no orders. The
attack surface is therefore narrow — principally the parsing of an untrusted
GenSpec as it crosses the C ABI and WASM boundary. Note also that the built-in
PRNG is a fast non-cryptographic generator for reproducible simulation and
must never be used for any security purpose. See
THREAT_MODEL.md for the asset inventory and trust boundaries.
This project is pre-release. Security fixes target the main branch and the most
recent published version once a release exists.
| Version | Supported |
|---|---|
main |
✅ |
0.2.1 (upcoming) |
✅ |
Please do not open a public issue, pull request or discussion for security problems. Report privately through either channel:
- GitHub → the repository's Security tab → Report a vulnerability (private advisory), or
- email support@wickra.org.
Include a description, affected version/commit, reproduction steps and impact.
We aim to acknowledge within a few days, agree a disclosure timeline, and credit reporters who wish to be named once a fix ships.
In scope: memory-safety or panic-across-FFI flaws in the C ABI hub and its
buffer protocol; a GenSpec that passes GenSpec::validate and then panics,
wraps, or produces a non-deterministic or malformed result; and any input that
makes one binding disagree with another for the same seed.
Out of scope: incorrect generation mathematics (a functional bug, not a
vulnerability); advisories in third-party crates that are already tracked and
triaged in osv-scanner.toml; and the memory a spec asks
for. That last one is worth stating plainly rather than leaving as an implied
promise: bars and book_depth are the caller's own numbers, and generating a
billion bars allocates a billion bars. The library rejects a spec that cannot
work — a timeline that overflows i64, a zero depth, a non-finite parameter —
and it does not second-guess a spec that merely asks for a lot. A process that
accepts specs from an untrusted source has to bound them itself, the same way it
would bound any other size it was handed.
This repository ships a machine-readable VEX record in
osv-scanner.toml, kept in lock-step with the cargo-deny
advisory ignore list in deny.toml. Any advisory assessed as not
affecting wickra-synth is documented there with a reason, so downstream
scanners see an explicit, auditable justification rather than an unexplained
suppression.