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Security: wickra-lib/wickra-synth

SECURITY.md

Security Policy

wickra-synth generates synthetic market data from a data-driven spec. It holds no secret material, opens no network connections, and places no orders. The attack surface is therefore narrow — principally the parsing of an untrusted GenSpec as it crosses the C ABI and WASM boundary. Note also that the built-in PRNG is a fast non-cryptographic generator for reproducible simulation and must never be used for any security purpose. See THREAT_MODEL.md for the asset inventory and trust boundaries.

Supported versions

This project is pre-release. Security fixes target the main branch and the most recent published version once a release exists.

Version Supported
main ✅
0.2.1 (upcoming) ✅

Reporting a vulnerability

Please do not open a public issue, pull request or discussion for security problems. Report privately through either channel:

  • GitHub → the repository's Security tab → Report a vulnerability (private advisory), or
  • email support@wickra.org.

Include a description, affected version/commit, reproduction steps and impact.

We aim to acknowledge within a few days, agree a disclosure timeline, and credit reporters who wish to be named once a fix ships.

Scope

In scope: memory-safety or panic-across-FFI flaws in the C ABI hub and its buffer protocol; a GenSpec that passes GenSpec::validate and then panics, wraps, or produces a non-deterministic or malformed result; and any input that makes one binding disagree with another for the same seed.

Out of scope: incorrect generation mathematics (a functional bug, not a vulnerability); advisories in third-party crates that are already tracked and triaged in osv-scanner.toml; and the memory a spec asks for. That last one is worth stating plainly rather than leaving as an implied promise: bars and book_depth are the caller's own numbers, and generating a billion bars allocates a billion bars. The library rejects a spec that cannot work — a timeline that overflows i64, a zero depth, a non-finite parameter — and it does not second-guess a spec that merely asks for a lot. A process that accepts specs from an untrusted source has to bound them itself, the same way it would bound any other size it was handed.

Vulnerability disclosure (VEX)

This repository ships a machine-readable VEX record in osv-scanner.toml, kept in lock-step with the cargo-deny advisory ignore list in deny.toml. Any advisory assessed as not affecting wickra-synth is documented there with a reason, so downstream scanners see an explicit, auditable justification rather than an unexplained suppression.

There aren't any published security advisories