Aldine is pre-1.0. Only the latest release (and main) receives security fixes.

Please do not open a public issue for security problems.

Use GitHub private vulnerability reporting ("Report a vulnerability" on the repo's Security tab). You'll get an initial response within 72 hours. Coordinated disclosure is appreciated; we'll credit you in the fix's release notes unless you prefer otherwise.

• Aldine's compiler container is sandboxed (no network egress, dropped capabilities, CPU/memory/PID limits, restricted shell-escape), but LaTeX is a Turing-complete language processing untrusted input. Treat the compiler container as semi-trusted and keep the isolation that ships in both docker-compose.yml and docker-compose.full.yml: the internal: true backend network, cap_drop: [ALL], no-new-privileges, and the memory/PID bounds (the full file adds a CPU cap). If you write your own compose file, carry them over.
• Auth is off by default (single-tenant). Before exposing an instance to the internet, set AUTH_ENABLED=1 and serve over HTTPS (the tls profile in docker-compose.full.yml ships a Caddy config that gets certificates for you).
• Session cookies are HTTP-only and revocable server-side; passwords are scrypt-hashed. Set COOKIE_SECURE=1 behind HTTPS.
• Single sign-on never signs into an existing account that merely shares an email address: not a password account, not another provider's, not another OIDC identity. With OpenID Connect the address is used only when the IdP marks it verified; OIDC_EMAIL_VERIFIED=trust drops that check and is safe only where users cannot edit their address at the IdP (docs/OIDC.md).
• Single-sign-on accounts have no password and cannot be given one, so a person the IdP disables (or OIDC_ALLOWED_GROUPS stops admitting) cannot sign in again. Existing sessions end at their expiry (30 days) unless an operator removes them; docs/OIDC.md shows how.

Reporters of validated vulnerabilities are listed here. Nothing yet — be the first.