Code for the paper “Envy-Free and Pareto-Optimal Allocations for Asymmetric Agents” by Yushi Bai and Paul Gölz.
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Updated
May 3, 2022 - Mathematica
Code for the paper “Envy-Free and Pareto-Optimal Allocations for Asymmetric Agents” by Yushi Bai and Paul Gölz.
PreTeXt code for college course on Mathematics of Democracy
Splitting of groups with equivalent averages based of list of names and scores
Simulations for the paper Fairly Dividing Non-identical Random Items: Just Sample or Match
Agent skills that settle everyday splits (rent, bills, rides, votes, chores, lotteries, gift exchanges, shared stuff) with textbook fair-division mechanisms.
Fairly distribute weighted items into capacity-bounded bins.
Split the rent fairly: envy-free rent, cake and chore division with Sperner's lemma. Flatmates only answer which room they would take at given prices.
Lean 4 formalization of exact Hill shares and simultaneous allocation guarantees.
Fair rent and chore splitter: envy-free room prices (Hungarian + LP), Sperner rental harmony, EF1 chore rotation. Runs in your browser.
Fair division of household chores using EF1 algorithms. Live demo.
Solutions, code, and documentation for the Economic Algorithms (course 5785) module at Ariel University.
Offline, single-file clone of the NYT 2014 'Divide Your Rent Fairly' calculator. Envy-free rent division via Sperner's Lemma (Su 1999).
Lean 4 formalization: strong EFX allocations exist when every agent values at most two goods
Shapley value cooperative game attribution and coalitional marginal contribution calculation
Shapley value cooperative game theory engine computing axiomatic fair profit allocation across collaborating agents.
Splitting Planar Necklaces with Few Straight Cuts
Some functions to algorithmically check whether an allocation is envy-free.
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