🛡️ Sentinel: [HIGH] Fix XSS vulnerabilities in dashboard rendering#4
🛡️ Sentinel: [HIGH] Fix XSS vulnerabilities in dashboard rendering#4tody-agent wants to merge 1 commit into
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* 🚨 Severity: HIGH * 💡 Vulnerability: Unescaped variables (`projectName`, `l.agent`, `d.agent`, `phaseClass`) injected directly into DOM via `innerHTML` in `public/dashboard/app.js` (specifically in the "Brain" tab rendering logic). * 🎯 Impact: Allows Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) if the data source contains malicious script tags (e.g., a project name like `<img src=x onerror=alert(1)>`). * 🔧 Fix: Wrapped the vulnerable variables with the existing `esc()` function to properly HTML-escape them before DOM injection. * ✅ Verification: Ran the full test suite (`npm run test:gate`) and visually verified the dashboard with Playwright screenshots. Added a journal entry to `.jules/sentinel.md` to document the pattern. Co-authored-by: tody-agent <176348101+tody-agent@users.noreply.github.com>
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This pull request addresses High-severity Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerabilities found in the local Mission Control dashboard (
public/dashboard/app.js).Vulnerability:
Several variables (
projectName,l.agent,d.agent,phaseClass,phase) were being injected directly into the DOM via template literals assigned toinnerHTMLwithout prior HTML escaping. This was specifically present in the newly added "Brain" (Continuity) tab rendering logic.Impact:
If an attacker could manipulate the local Kanban data file or send crafted API requests (e.g., creating a project with a malicious name), they could execute arbitrary JavaScript in the context of the user's dashboard.
Fix:
I applied the existing
esc()helper function to properly encode the HTML entities of these variables before they are injected into the DOM.Verification:
gatetest suite to ensure no syntax or business logic regressions.esc()wrapper in place..jules/sentinel.mdas required by my directives.PR created automatically by Jules for task 17228830416318910202 started by @tody-agent