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Security: tintupratap/Android-MCP-go

Security

SECURITY.md

Android-MCP-go Security Policy & Architecture

Repository: https://github.com/tintupratap/Android-MCP-go
Author: Ranapratap (tintupratap@gmail.com)

Android-MCP-go acts as a high-privilege bridge between AI agents (via standard stdio JSON-RPC 2.0) and physical Android hardware (via ADB). This document details our security boundaries, archive extraction validation, command execution rules, and data privacy safeguards.

1. Security Architecture & Threat Model

┌───────────────────────────┐         stdio (JSON-RPC 2.0)        ┌───────────────────────────┐
│        AI Agent           │ ──────────────────────────────────> │     Android-MCP-go        │
│ (Claude / Cursor / IDE)   │ <────────────────────────────────── │     (Host Boundary)       │
└───────────────────────────┘                                     └─────────────┬─────────────┘
                                                                                │ Managed ADB
                                                                                ▼
                                                                  ┌───────────────────────────┐
                                                                  │      Android Device       │
                                                                  │ (SELinux Sandbox Boundary)│
                                                                  └───────────────────────────┘

2. Security Safeguards

A. Official HTTPS Download Verification

  • Platform-Tools: Downloaded exclusively from official Google HTTPS endpoints (https://dl.google.com/android/repository/platform-tools-latest-*.zip).
  • Managed scrcpy: Downloaded exclusively from official GitHub Releases (https://github.com/Genymobile/scrcpy).
  • Integrity Verification: SHA-256 digests are calculated and checked against published release checksum assets before extraction.

B. Zip & Tar Slip Path Traversal Protection

Archive extraction routines (extractZipSecurely & extractTarGzSecurely) inspect every header entry path before extraction to guarantee entries cannot traverse outside extraction target directories:

filePath := filepath.Join(destDir, header.Name)
if !strings.HasPrefix(filepath.Clean(filePath), filepath.Clean(destDir)) {
    return fmt.Errorf("Zip/Tar Slip path traversal attempt detected: %s", header.Name)
}

C. Direct Slice Execution (No sh -c)

Android-MCP-go NEVER invokes sh -c, cmd /c, or raw shell string evaluation. All commands use exec.CommandContext(ctx, binary, args...) with explicit, unescaped string slices to prevent command injection.

D. Sensitive Data Redaction

Real-time desktop notifications under --debug automatically redact sensitive parameters (passwords, OTPs, authentication tokens, secret keys) before sending system alerts.

E. Atomic Persistence Security

Persistent state updates to ~/.android-mcp/android-mcp.json are written to temporary files (android-mcp.json.tmp.*) and flushed before performing atomic filesystem renames, preventing partial state corruption.

3. Reporting Security Vulnerabilities

Please report security issues directly to author Ranapratap at tintupratap@gmail.com. Reports will receive initial response within 24 hours.

There aren't any published security advisories