feat: public-key fingerprints, pqfe recipient commands, and full-coverage supply chain - #81
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…l nine packages - Pin NuGetPackageValidation (2.0.6) and CycloneDX (6.2.0) in the release job — the last floating third-party code that executed there — and set persist-credentials: false on both release checkouts. - Attest .snupkg symbol packages and the SBOM files alongside .nupkg (the docs previously promised snupkg verification that failed by construction; now the claim and the pipeline agree, forward from the next tag). - Add the Analyzers package's missing SBOM. - Extend post-release reproducibility verification from 4 to all 9 lockstep packages (matrix + script cases). - Enable binary package validation in Aws/AzureKeyVault/Gcp against the published 1.7.1 baseline (stale pre-first-publish opt-out removed; all three verified packing clean against the live baseline). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Sym7RJ7ehNhbMXytE5rMmS
Public-key fingerprints (both external reviews' convergent ask — the
key-substitution defense): PqHybridPublicKey.GetFingerprint() and
PqSigningPublicKey.GetFingerprint() return pqfp1: + URL-safe Base64 SHA-256
over a domain prefix, purpose tag (recipient/signing can never collide), and
the exported key bytes. Rendering frozen for the pqfp1: prefix; pinned by
FingerprintTests with precomputed vectors. Shared internal helper in the core.
pqfe recipient — the library's defining post-quantum path, usable end-to-end
from the shipped tool for the first time:
recipient keygen <keyfile> [--encrypt] X25519+ML-KEM-768 pair; PQKF opt-in;
prints the fingerprint; 0600, CreateNew,
half-pair cleanup like signing keygen
recipient encrypt <in> <out> --recipient p [--recipient p2 ...] multi-recipient
recipient decrypt <in> <out> --identity k [--untrusted] PQKF auto-detected
recipient fingerprint <pub> stdout, for scripts
Both keygen commands now print the fingerprint and warn on unencrypted keys.
Claim-based overwrite refusal and the unified fail-closed message flow through
unchanged (verified by an end-to-end smoke run: PQKF + raw identities,
2-recipient container, wrong-key rejection leaves no output file).
KEY-MANAGEMENT.md gains the fingerprint-verification section; CLI README and
usage updated; PublicAPI.Unshipped entries added. AOT closure unchanged in
kind (Signing already carried BouncyCastle).
Verified: 321x2 tests green, build clean, live CLI smoke test.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Sym7RJ7ehNhbMXytE5rMmS
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Two commits, both freeze-safe (no byte meaning or reader acceptance changes):
1. Supply-chain hardening (the items unblocked by #76)
persist-credentials: falseon both release checkouts..nupkg+.snupkg+ the SBOM files (the docs previously promised snupkg verification that failed by construction). Analyzers gets its missing SBOM.2. Fingerprints +
pqfe recipient(both external reviews' top feature asks)GetFingerprint()on hybrid-recipient and signing public keys:pqfp1:+ URL-safe Base64 SHA-256 over domain prefix + purpose tag + key bytes. Purpose-separated (recipient/signing can never collide), stable, safe to log/pin, frozen rendering pinned by precomputed test vectors. Documented in KEY-MANAGEMENT.md as the key-substitution defense.recipient keygen(PQKF opt-in, 0600, CreateNew, prints fingerprint),recipient encrypt(multi-recipient),recipient decrypt(--identity, PQKF auto-detect,--untrusted),recipient fingerprint. Inherits the claim-based overwrite refusal and the unified fail-closed error contract.Verification
🤖 Generated with Claude Code
https://claude.ai/code/session_01Sym7RJ7ehNhbMXytE5rMmS