feature prepyrus-disambiguation

absolute_bibliography.bib

@@ -57,6 +57,18 @@ @book{hegel1991logic
   address    = {Atlantic Highlands, N.J.}
 }
 
+@book{hegel1991enclogic,
+  title      = {The Encyclopaedia Logic: Part I of the
+                Encyclopaedia of Philosophical Sciences
+                with the Zusatze},
+  author     = {Hegel, G.W.F.},
+  translator = {Harris, H.S. and Suchting, W.A. and Geraets, T.F.},
+  year       = {1991},
+  address    = {Indianapolis/Cambridge},
+  publisher  = {Hackett Publishing Company Inc.},
+  isbn       = {0-87220-070-1}
+}
+
 @book{houlgate2022hegel,
   title     = {Hegel on Being},
   author    = {Houlgate, S.},

content/hegel/reference/mechanical-object/first-paragraph.mdx

@@ -20,7 +20,8 @@ conceptual structure that presents itself at the beginning of Mechanism. The
 first determination is described in the following terms:
 
 > The object is, as we have seen, the syllogism, whose mediation has been
-> sublated and has therefore become an immediate identity (Hegel 1991, 711).
+> sublated and has therefore become an immediate identity (@hegel1991logic,
+> 711).
 
 Let's unpack this initial thought, without trying to unpack the reference to the
 `syllogism`.
@@ -55,15 +56,15 @@ perceived. Now, obviously, the moments of the `mechanical object` do not
 perceive each other but they do relate to each other, and they relate to each
 other immediately and, as such, they relate to each other as identical moments.
 It is for these reasons that Hegel begins his account of the `mechanical object`
-by stating that its moments have “become an immediate identity” (Hegel 1991,
-711).
+by stating that its moments have “become an immediate identity”
+(@hegel1991logic, 711).
 
 What exactly are these moments of the `mechanical object` that have become an
 immediate identity? Hegel clarifies this in the following sentence:
 
 > It is therefore in and for itself a universal - universality not in the sense
 > of a community of properties, but a universality that pervades the
-> particularity and in it is immediate individuality (Hegel 1991, 711).
+> particularity and in it is immediate individuality (@hegel1991logic, 711).
 
 The moments of the `mechanical object` are the determinations of the `Concept` :
 `universal`, `particular`, and `individual`. It is these moments that are
@@ -74,11 +75,11 @@ finds its essence instantiated in particular and individual objects. It is not,
 for example, like the universal concept of a chair that states that a chair must
 be "so and so" and that serves as the essence of armchairs and swivel chairs,
 alike. It is not, as Hegel writes, a universal “in the sense of a community of
-properties” (Hegel 1991, 711). Rather, it is a universal that is immediately
-identical to the particular and the individual. In other words, the general
-concept of a chair is identical to all particular and individual chairs - there
-are not some chairs that are short and some that are long, or some chairs that
-offer good lumbar support and others that do not, rather, all chairs are
-identical to each other. The moments of the `mechanical object`, then, are
-treated as identical to each other, there is no distinction in conceiving of the
-`mechanical object` as universal or as individual.
+properties” (@hegel1991logic, 711). Rather, it is a universal that is
+immediately identical to the particular and the individual. In other words, the
+general concept of a chair is identical to all particular and individual
+chairs - there are not some chairs that are short and some that are long, or
+some chairs that offer good lumbar support and others that do not, rather, all
+chairs are identical to each other. The moments of the `mechanical object`,
+then, are treated as identical to each other, there is no distinction in
+conceiving of the `mechanical object` as universal or as individual.

content/hegel/reference/mechanical-object/section-1.mdx

@@ -31,26 +31,27 @@ This unity of form and matter is what constitutes the rock as a
 critiquing the form-matter distinction, he writes, “such an abstract difference
 of individuality and universality is excluded by the Notion of object” (Hegel
 1991, 712). The difference between form (universality) and matter
-(individuality) is a kind of difference that is “excluded” (Hegel 1991, 712) by
-the very concept of a `mechanical object`. Why is that? To answer this question
-we need only to cast our minds back to the first paragraph of Mechanism, where
-the `mechanical object` is explained to be an “immediate identity” (Hegel
-1991, 711) such that it is a “universality that pervades the particularity and
-in it is immediate individuality” (Hegel 1991, 711). In other words, it is
-incongruent with the concept of the `mechanical object` to conceive of it as
-having the difference of anything as the foundation for its being. What it is
-for it to be a `mechanical object` to be is for it to be an immediate identity.
-What is an immediate identity? The determinations of the `Concept` that
-constitute the `mechanical object`. One cannot conceptually distinguish the
-universal moment from the individual moment of the `mechanical object` because
-they are taken as identical to each other. The first sentence of the second
-paragraph of Section 1 attests to this clearly: “The object is therefore in the
-first instance _indeterminate_, in so far as it has no determinate opposition in
-it; for it is the mediation that has collapsed into immediate identity” (Hegel
-1991, 712). The fact that the determinations of the `Concept` are immediately
-identical to each other and not mediated means that the `mechanical object` is
-indeterminate. In other words, it lacks determinacy because there is no
-difference within it for any determinacy to be established.
+(individuality) is a kind of difference that is “excluded”
+(@hegel1991logic, 712) by the very concept of a `mechanical object`. Why is
+that? To answer this question we need only to cast our minds back to the first
+paragraph of Mechanism, where the `mechanical object` is explained to be an
+“immediate identity” (@hegel1991logic, 711) such that it is a “universality that
+pervades the particularity and in it is immediate individuality”
+(@hegel1991logic, 711). In other words, it is incongruent with the concept of
+the `mechanical object` to conceive of it as having the difference of anything
+as the foundation for its being. What it is for it to be a `mechanical object`
+to be is for it to be an immediate identity. What is an immediate identity? The
+determinations of the `Concept` that constitute the `mechanical object`. One
+cannot conceptually distinguish the universal moment from the individual moment
+of the `mechanical object` because they are taken as identical to each other.
+The first sentence of the second paragraph of Section 1 attests to this clearly:
+“The object is therefore in the first instance _indeterminate_, in so far as it
+has no determinate opposition in it; for it is the mediation that has collapsed
+into immediate identity” (@hegel1991logic, 712). The fact that the
+determinations of the `Concept` are immediately identical to each other and not
+mediated means that the `mechanical object` is indeterminate. In other words, it
+lacks determinacy because there is no difference within it for any determinacy
+to be established.
 
 A natural question to arise from the above discussion that warns against any
 notion of difference within the `mechanical object` is the following: is it not
@@ -63,38 +64,38 @@ Hegel writes: “Insofar as the _Notion is essentially determinate_, the object
 possesses determinateness as a _manifoldness_ which though complete is otherwise
 _indeterminate_, that is, _contains no relationships_, and which constitutes a
 totality that at first is similarly no further determined; _sides_ or _parts_
-that may be distinguished in it belong to an external reflection” (Hegel 1991,
-712). Hegel is trying to square the circle of expressing the `mechanical object`
-as an indeterminate, immediate identity, on the one hand, and on the other hand,
-as being essentially a further development of the determinations of the
-`Concept`, which requires us to think of the `mechanical object` as the unity of
-the three determinations (`universality`, `particularity`, and `individuality`)
-of the `Concept`.
+that may be distinguished in it belong to an external reflection”
+(@hegel1991logic, 712). Hegel is trying to square the circle of expressing the
+`mechanical object` as an indeterminate, immediate identity, on the one hand,
+and on the other hand, as being essentially a further development of the
+determinations of the `Concept`, which requires us to think of the
+`mechanical object` as the unity of the three determinations (`universality`,
+`particularity`, and `individuality`) of the `Concept`.
 
 Hegel achieves this geometric feat by grasping the `mechanical object` as an
-“indeterminate difference” (Hegel 1991, 712). I think that we can treat
-"indeterminate difference" (Hegel 1991, 712) as equivalent to "the immediate
-identity" (Hegel 1991, 711) of the determinations of the Concept. Because it is
-the three determinations of the `Concept` that express the difference, and their
-immediate identity that expresses their indeterminacy. The reason why there can
-be difference and indeterminacy in the same breath is because the difference
-between the determinations of the `Concept` is a merely formal one. They are
-different insofar as one is the `universal` and the other is the `particular`
-but they are not different _in relation to each other_. This is what Hegel means
-when he refers to the difference as “only that there are a _number_ of objects”
-(Hegel 1991, 712). In other words, they are different insofar as there are three
-different determinations of the `Concept`. Hegel goes on to write that each
-object (each of the determinations of the `Concept`) “contains its
-determinateness reflected into its universality and does not reflect itself
-_outwards_” (Hegel 1991, 712). This is one of those tricky turns of phrase that
-Hegel uses, and understanding it is crucial to understanding the logical
-structure of the `mechanical object`. The first thing to clarify is what Hegel
-means by "its determinateness" (Hegel 1991, 712). The moment of `universality`
-is the core of the object's identity and that is a moment of self-relating
-negativity. When the determination of `universality` was examined in the
-beginning of the Doctrine of the Concept it was comprehended as being a
-self-relating negativity . This negativity that remains within the `universal`
-is the determinateness [*Bestimmtheit*] of the `universal`.
+“indeterminate difference” (@hegel1991logic, 712). I think that we can treat
+"indeterminate difference" (@hegel1991logic, 712) as equivalent to "the
+immediate identity" (@hegel1991logic, 711) of the determinations of the Concept.
+Because it is the three determinations of the `Concept` that express the
+difference, and their immediate identity that expresses their indeterminacy. The
+reason why there can be difference and indeterminacy in the same breath is
+because the difference between the determinations of the `Concept` is a merely
+formal one. They are different insofar as one is the `universal` and the other
+is the `particular` but they are not different _in relation to each other_. This
+is what Hegel means when he refers to the difference as “only that there are a
+_number_ of objects” (@hegel1991logic, 712). In other words, they are different
+insofar as there are three different determinations of the `Concept`. Hegel goes
+on to write that each object (each of the determinations of the `Concept`)
+“contains its determinateness reflected into its universality and does not
+reflect itself _outwards_” (@hegel1991logic, 712). This is one of those tricky
+turns of phrase that Hegel uses, and understanding it is crucial to
+understanding the logical structure of the `mechanical object`. The first thing
+to clarify is what Hegel means by "its determinateness" (@hegel1991logic, 712).
+The moment of `universality` is the core of the object's identity and that is a
+moment of self-relating negativity. When the determination of `universality` was
+examined in the beginning of the Doctrine of the Concept it was comprehended as
+being a self-relating negativity . This negativity that remains within the
+`universal` is the determinateness [*Bestimmtheit*] of the `universal`.
 
 Next, we have to clarify what Hegel means by "its universality" (Hegel
 1991, 712) because I have already stated that the `mechanical object` is not
@@ -107,8 +108,8 @@ abstract determinations also refer to their moment of universality as the source
 of their identity. Thus, in the case of the `mechanical object`, when Hegel
 refers to "its universality" he is referring to its basic source of identity.
 Now that we have clarified what Hegel means by "its determinateness" and "its
-universality" (Hegel 1991, 712), we are in a good position to understand the
-rest of that sentence. The determinateness, i.e. the negativity, of the
+universality" (@hegel1991logic, 712), we are in a good position to understand
+the rest of that sentence. The determinateness, i.e. the negativity, of the
 `mechanical object` does not reflect outwards. In other words, it does not
 relate to anything that is outside of itself. Rather, it is reflected into its
 `universality`, i.e. it is reflected into its own source of identity. One
@@ -124,15 +125,15 @@ self-relating it is, effectively, relating to itself as the immediate identity
 of the determinations of the `Concept`. It is for this reason that Hegel writes
 the following: “Because this indeterminate determinateness is essential to the
 object, the latter is within itself a _plurality_ of this kind, and must
-therefore be regarded as a _composite_ or _aggregate_” (Hegel 1991, 712). What
-it is for the `mechanical object` to be is for it to relate to itself as the
-immediate identity of other objects (the determinations of the `Concept`). In
-other words, what it is for it to be itself is for it to be itself through other
-objects that are taken to be identical to itself.
+therefore be regarded as a _composite_ or _aggregate_” (@hegel1991logic, 712).
+What it is for the `mechanical object` to be is for it to relate to itself as
+the immediate identity of other objects (the determinations of the `Concept`).
+In other words, what it is for it to be itself is for it to be itself through
+other objects that are taken to be identical to itself.
 
 In a somewhat throwaway remark at the end of this conceptual discussion, Hegel
 writes that the `mechanical object` “does not consist of _atoms_, for these are
-not objects because they are not totalities” (Hegel 1991, 712). It is worth
+not objects because they are not totalities” (@hegel1991logic, 712). It is worth
 musing on this brief remark because it reveals a lot about how Hegel
 conceptualises the wider significance of his account of the `mechanical object`.
 Hegel clearly has some mechanistic, in particular atomistic, worldviews in his
@@ -162,7 +163,7 @@ writes:
 > determinations of its merely _implicit_ totality-lies _outside it_, and partly
 > also in that it is indifferent to the monad that it constitutes an object
 > _along with others_; it is thus in fact not _exclusive_ or _determined for
-> itself_ (Hegel 1991, 712).
+> itself_ (@hegel1991logic, 712).
 
 import { Stub } from "lib/components/ui/Stub";
 

content/hegel/reference/mechanical-object/section-2.mdx

@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ found in the
 However, despite the indeterminacy of the `mechanical object`, again, owing to
 the lack of difference within or between the determinations of the `Concept`,
 there is the vaguest notion of determinateness. Determinateness remains as a
-"manifoldness" (Hegel 1991, 712); in other words, there is determinateness
+"manifoldness" (@hegel1991logic, 712); in other words, there is determinateness
 simply because there are the three determinations of the `Concept` that are
 immediately identical to each other. This is a formal, meagre, superficial
 determinateness. It is the kind of difference that exists between three rocks
@@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ have both determinateness and be indeterminate:
 > but the form that constitutes their difference and combines them into a unity
 > is an external, indifferent one; whether it be a mixture, or again an order, a
 > certain arrangement of parts and sides, all these are combinations that are
-> indifferent to what is so related (Hegel 1991, 713).
+> indifferent to what is so related (@hegel1991logic, 713).
 
 The determinateness of the `mechanical object`, then, is not constituted by
 something "inner". In other words, the `mechanical object` does not posit the
@@ -89,7 +89,7 @@ the next paragraph:
 > progression to infinity must indeed likewise be assumed and represented as a
 > totality, a world; but that world is nothing but the universality that is
 > confined within itself by indeterminate individuality, that is, a universe
-> (Hegel 1991, 713).
+> (@hegel1991logic, 713).
 
 Hegel conceptualises this infinite regression of successive external
 determinateness's as the “world”, in its universal form, and as the “universe”,
@@ -135,7 +135,7 @@ the indeterminate individuality of the `universe`. To grasp the move that Hegel
 makes here, from universal `world` to individual `universe`, we need to remind
 ourselves of a feature of Mechanism. The `mechanical object` is the
 “universality that pervades the particularity and in it is immediate
-individuality" (Hegel 1991, 710); in other words, the universal `world` is
+individuality" (@hegel1991logic, 710); in other words, the universal `world` is
 immediately the individual `universe`, because we are within the sphere of
 Mechanism where `universality` is immediately `individuality`. When we
 conceptualise the `universe`, for Hegel, we are folding into itself the `world`
@@ -159,7 +159,7 @@ external determinateness:
 > involves the progression to infinity; it can halt and be satisfied at any
 > point at will, because the object it has reached in its progress, being a
 > formal totality, is shut up within itself and indifferent to its being
-> determined by another (Hegel 1991, 713).
+> determined by another (@hegel1991logic, 713).
 
 It is interesting that Hegel connects the indeterminacy of determinism to the
 infinite regression of determinism because the infinite regress plays no role in
@@ -175,7 +175,7 @@ indifferent determination. As such, it is because of the indeterminacy of the
 infinite progression, and it explains why determinism doesn't offer a
 determinate explanation of things. Because what it offers by way of explanation
 is merely the same explanation for every single moment, which is what prompts
-Hegel to call it an “empty word” (Hegel 1991, 714).
+Hegel to call it an “empty word” (@hegel1991logic, 714).
 
 Crucially, the above is not a disproof of determinism or a criticism of it. It
 is Hegel's account of determinism. Determinism is part of the unfolding of the