Only the latest minor release receives security fixes. Older tags are archived, not maintained.

Use GitHub Security Advisories — private by default. Do not open a public issue for a suspected vulnerability.

Include:

• affected version and host platform version
• what an attacker gains, not only what misbehaves
• reproduction steps, ideally against a clean install

Expected response: an acknowledgement within 7 days, an assessment within 30. This is a spare-time project, not a vendor with an on-call rotation — that is the honest number, not a target.

• A tool argument that reaches the ExtendScript source as code rather than as data. Escaping is the property this project exists to provide; a payload that leaves its string literal is a real finding.
• A file operation that escapes INDESIGN_ALLOWED_DIRS, including through symlinks, UNC paths, alternate data streams or path normalisation.
• Reaching execute_indesign_code without INDESIGN_ALLOW_ARBITRARY_CODE being set.
• A temp file that is readable or writable by another local user, or that survives process exit with document content in it.
• Command injection into the PowerShell or osascript runner, including through the undo label the driver passes to DoScript.
• A property path, enum reference or method name that leaves its allow-list in set_properties or call_method. Those tools pass data, never statements; anything that turns one into a statement is the same finding as an escaped string literal.

A proof of concept is expected: the generated script text is enough, runtime execution is not required.

• The capabilities of the tools themselves. Anything reachable through this server can create, open, export and delete documents. That is what the server is for. Restricting it is the operator's job, through INDESIGN_ALLOWED_DIRS and by not running the server unattended.
• execute_indesign_code with INDESIGN_ALLOW_ARBITRARY_CODE set. That switch exists to run arbitrary ExtendScript. It bypasses every check here by design, which is why it is off unless explicitly enabled.
• Tools acting on app.activeDocument. There is no document selection; a call can hit whichever document is in front. Documented, not a finding.
• Anything requiring an already-compromised account, or InDesign itself being compromised.
• Vulnerabilities in Adobe InDesign or in ExtendScript - report those to Adobe.
• Scanner output without a working proof of concept.

No credentials belong in this repository — not in tests, not commented out, not in fixtures. A secret that reached a commit is rotated first and removed second. The history stays readable either way.

Coordinated. A fix ships first, the advisory follows once a patched release is available. Reporters are credited unless they ask not to be.