task-pipeline ships markdown doctrine plus two small installers. There is no server, no network client and no runtime service. The executable surface is:

The skill's doctrine, however, is instructions an agent will act on inside your repository — including running your test and lint commands and, at stage 7, your deploy. Treat a change to references/*.md with the same care as a change to a deploy script.

The latest released version is supported. Fixes ship in a new release rather than as patches to older tags.

Do not open a public issue for a security problem.

• Preferred: GitHub private vulnerability reporting (Security → Report a vulnerability).
• Alternative: Telegram @sshlg.

Please include what you found, how to reproduce it, and the impact you see. You'll get an acknowledgement within 72 hours and a fix or a decision with reasoning within 14 days for anything confirmed. Coordinated disclosure is welcome — tell me the timeline you'd like and I'll work to it.

• The installers writing outside ~/.claude/skills/task-pipeline and ~/.claude/commands/task-pipeline.md, or overwriting files without --force.
• Anything in the shipped doctrine that would lead an agent to exfiltrate secrets, push to a repository the task never named, deploy without the operator's go, or bypass a gate that exists to require one.
• Command injection or path traversal through the validator or the workflows.
• A CI workflow that could be made to leak repository secrets.

• The behavior of the AI agent that reads the skill. Agents are non-deterministic; a model ignoring an instruction is a doctrine-quality bug — please file it as a normal issue.
• Third-party companions (super-ux, context7, obsidian-wiki). Report those to their own maintainers.
• Anything requiring an attacker who already controls the operator's machine or their agent's configuration.

• Deploy authorization has a floor by design. The pipeline treats deploy, publish and PR-opening as outward actions that need an explicit go, or a standing authorization that names the target and the preconditions. Do not record a blanket "do everything" in a brief — it is specifically rejected.
• Writes to another repository are always proposal + PR, never a direct push.
• The build stage keeps its scratch state in a git-ignored .task-pipeline/ directory; confirm that directory is ignored before you run it in a repo with strict commit hooks.