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PRD metadata (titles, IDs, etc.) flows through format_string into shell commands via run_shell. Malicious PRD titles like "$(rm -rf /)" or "foo; rm -rf /" could inject arbitrary commands. Add shell_escape param using shlex.quote to neutralize metacharacters when values are destined for shell execution.
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Summary
format_stringinto shell commands was not escaped, allowing malicious PRD titles like$(rm -rf /)orfoo; rm -rf /to inject arbitrary shell commandsshell_escapeparameter toRunContext.format_string()usingshlex.quote, enabled in_run_shell()so all shell-bound substitutions are safely quotedTest plan
pytest python/darkfactory/workflow/_core_test.py— verify all shell-escape tests passformat_stringcall sites destined for shell use passshell_escape=True