The catalog is untrusted content. A manifest passing validation doesn't make a resource safe, which is why every merge also needs human review.
Report privately through GitHub Security Advisories. Please don't open a public issue. We aim to acknowledge reports within 72 hours.
- executables, binaries, shell scripts, install hooks, or symlinks (
safety.contains_scriptsmust befalse) - credentials, tokens, private keys, customer records, or personal data
- instructions to bypass platform permissions or security controls, or to produce exploit code or attack payloads
- destructive commands presented as routine steps
- content you have no right to license
Allowed file extensions only; limits of 512 KB per file, 2 MB and 60 files per package; no symlinks or executable bits; secret patterns (cloud keys, tokens, private keys); unsafe HTML tags (<script>, <iframe>, <object>, <embed>, <form>, <style>, <link>, <meta>); links with schemes other than http(s) (e.g. javascript:, file:); leftover template placeholders; compatibility claims capped by the registry; disclaimers in regulated domains. The validator only parses YAML and Markdown. It never imports or executes anything from a package.
- Package content is data. Nothing from a package is ever executed, and the app spawns no processes.
- Markdown is rendered by a built-in parser that never interprets HTML. Only
httpslinks can be opened. - Every file and every resource is checked against the catalog's SHA-256 when the catalog loads, and resources that don't match are quarantined. Downloaded bundles must match the size and SHA-256 in
latest.json, and a bundle that fails is discarded while the current catalog stays. - Install paths come from the compatibility registry, never from the package. Package-relative paths are rejected if they're absolute, contain
..,~, or backslashes, or resolve through a symlink. - Every install is previewed first. Existing files are never overwritten silently: the user chooses cancel or backup-and-replace (backups go under
~/Library/Application Support/Skilldeck/Backups). Written files are hash-verified, and a failed install rolls back. - Uninstall moves files to the Trash and keeps any file the user has modified.
- GitHub logins are validated before any API call. Profile responses are cached and rate limits respected.
validate-submission.yml runs on pull requests with contents: read, no secrets, and persist-credentials: false. Only the publish job of release-catalog.yml gets contents: write. It runs in the catalog-release environment, which requires approval from the owner or an authorized maintainer and only deploys from protected branches, so the latest.json the app trusts can't change without a maintainer's sign-off. main is protected: changes need a pull request that passes validation, and force-pushes are blocked. All third-party actions are pinned to full commit SHAs.