🛡️ Sentinel: [CRITICAL] Fix timing attack vulnerability in A2A token validation#289
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…validation Signed-off-by: Jules <jules@example.com>
…validation Signed-off-by: Jules <jules@example.com>
🚨 Severity: CRITICAL
💡 Vulnerability: The A2A token validation in the express middleware had a length check before calling
crypto.timingSafeEqual. This created a short-circuit fast path that could leak the length of the secret token via timing differences.🎯 Impact: An attacker could perform a timing attack to guess the length of the valid authorization token, which reduces the search space and might aid in bruteforcing the token.
🔧 Fix: Both the incoming token and the expected token are now hashed using SHA-256 before comparison. This ensures the inputs to
timingSafeEqualare always the same length and evaluation is truly constant-time, eliminating the vulnerability while avoiding length mismatch errors.✅ Verification: Verified using
bun run test:fulland by checking that tests for the A2A server pass.PR created automatically by Jules for task 16171780010719966223 started by @YoungSx