π‘οΈ Sentinel: [HIGH] Fix timing attack vulnerability in Bearer token validation#286
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Replaced short-circuit length checks and raw buffer comparisons with SHA-256 hashes to ensure constant-time token comparison via crypto.timingSafeEqual.
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π¨ Severity: HIGH
π‘ Vulnerability: The Bearer token validation logic checked the length of the provided token against the expected token before calling
crypto.timingSafeEqual. This short-circuit leaks the expected token's length via timing differences.π― Impact: Attackers could potentially determine the length of the expected token by measuring the response time, which is a step towards brute-forcing the token.
π§ Fix: Modified the validation logic to hash both the provided token and expected token to a fixed length using SHA-256 before comparing them with
crypto.timingSafeEqual, ensuring true constant-time evaluation.β Verification: Ran unit tests for
serve.tsand the full test suite to ensure the authentication logic still works correctly and no regressions were introduced.PR created automatically by Jules for task 10220569216953200062 started by @YoungSx