π‘οΈ Sentinel: [CRITICAL/HIGH] Fix timing attack vulnerability in token validation#279
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π¨ Severity: HIGH
π‘ Vulnerability: A timing attack vulnerability in Bearer token validation where checking
tokenBuffer.length === authTokenBuffer.lengthcreates a short-circuit fast path, leaking the length of the secret token.π― Impact: An attacker can deduce the length of the authentication token by measuring response times, significantly reducing the search space for brute-forcing the token.
π§ Fix: Hashed both the provided token and the expected token using SHA-256 before comparison to ensure true constant-time evaluation and avoid leaking token length.
β Verification: Ran unit tests for the CLI serve command and the full test suite to ensure token validation functions properly and securely.
PR created automatically by Jules for task 12217375062568890813 started by @YoungSx