π‘οΈ Sentinel: [CRITICAL] Fix timing attack in Bearer token validation#273
π‘οΈ Sentinel: [CRITICAL] Fix timing attack in Bearer token validation#273google-labs-jules[bot] wants to merge 1 commit into
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Hashed both the provided token and the configured authentication tokens to a fixed length using SHA-256 before comparing them with `crypto.timingSafeEqual`. This ensures true constant-time evaluation and prevents leaking the secret's length via timing differences.
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π¨ Severity: CRITICAL
π‘ Vulnerability: Checking buffer lengths before calling
crypto.timingSafeEqualcreates a short-circuit fast path that leaks the secret's length via timing differences.π― Impact: Attackers can deduce the length of authentication tokens and bypass security checks through a timing attack.
π§ Fix: Hashed both the provided token and the configured authentication tokens to a fixed length using SHA-256 before comparing them with
crypto.timingSafeEqual. This ensures true constant-time evaluation.β Verification: Ran targeted tests and
bun run test:fulland confirmed all tests pass.PR created automatically by Jules for task 16217012809027846588 started by @YoungSx