π‘οΈ Sentinel: [CRITICAL] Fix Timing Attack in Bearer Token Validation#268
π‘οΈ Sentinel: [CRITICAL] Fix Timing Attack in Bearer Token Validation#268google-labs-jules[bot] wants to merge 1 commit into
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π¨ Severity: CRITICAL
π‘ Vulnerability: The authentication middleware short-circuited token comparisons by checking length before calling
crypto.timingSafeEqual, which leaks the length of the valid token.π― Impact: Attackers can incrementally guess the token length by measuring response times, significantly reducing the search space to brute-force the actual token.
π§ Fix: Hashed both the provided token and the configured authentication token to a fixed-length digest (SHA-256) before comparison, ensuring constant-time evaluation regardless of the input length.
β Verification: Ran unit and integration tests successfully.
PR created automatically by Jules for task 8397989675660668138 started by @YoungSx