🔒 Security fix: prevent command injection in PlatformShellService#30
🔒 Security fix: prevent command injection in PlatformShellService#30google-labs-jules[bot] wants to merge 5 commits into
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🎯 **What:** The vulnerability fixed was a potential Command Injection in PlatformShellService due to unescaped arguments passed to `Process.Start()` when handling `open` or `xdg-open` commands on OSX and Linux respectively.⚠️ **Risk:** If a malicious path containing shell metacharacters or flags was passed to these methods, it could lead to arbitrary command execution with the privileges of the application. 🛡️ **Solution:** Used `ProcessStartInfo` with `UseShellExecute = false` and `ArgumentList` to safely pass the path argument without shell expansion. Additionally, prepended `./` to paths starting with `-` to prevent argument injection flags.
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🎯 **What:** The vulnerability fixed was a potential Command Injection in PlatformShellService due to unescaped arguments passed to `Process.Start()` when handling `open` or `xdg-open` commands on OSX and Linux respectively.⚠️ **Risk:** If a malicious path containing shell metacharacters or flags was passed to these methods, it could lead to arbitrary command execution with the privileges of the application. 🛡️ **Solution:** Used `ProcessStartInfo` with `UseShellExecute = false` and `ArgumentList` to safely pass the path argument without shell expansion. Additionally, prepended `./` to paths starting with `-` to prevent argument injection flags.
🎯 **What:** The vulnerability fixed was a potential Command Injection in PlatformShellService due to unescaped arguments passed to `Process.Start()` when handling `open` or `xdg-open` commands on OSX and Linux respectively.⚠️ **Risk:** If a malicious path containing shell metacharacters or flags was passed to these methods, it could lead to arbitrary command execution with the privileges of the application. 🛡️ **Solution:** Used `ProcessStartInfo` with `UseShellExecute = false` and `ArgumentList` to safely pass the path argument without shell expansion. Additionally, prepended `./` to paths starting with `-` to prevent argument injection flags.
🎯 **What:** The vulnerability fixed was a potential Command Injection in PlatformShellService due to unescaped arguments passed to `Process.Start()` when handling `open` or `xdg-open` commands on OSX and Linux respectively.⚠️ **Risk:** If a malicious path containing shell metacharacters or flags was passed to these methods, it could lead to arbitrary command execution with the privileges of the application. 🛡️ **Solution:** Used `ProcessStartInfo` with `UseShellExecute = false` and `ArgumentList` to safely pass the path argument without shell expansion. Additionally, prepended `./` to paths starting with `-` to prevent argument injection flags.
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The security issue is real and worth fixing, but this PR should not be merged in its current form. Please resubmit as a focused PlatformShellService change against the current src/SalmonEgg.Infrastructure.Desktop implementation. The new PR should avoid workflow/global.json/csproj/formatting churn, avoid unrelated converter/UI edits, and include tests around argument construction for paths/URIs that begin with '-' or contain shell metacharacters. Prefer ProcessStartInfo with ArgumentList so the target is passed as an argument rather than a shell-expanded string, while preserving the existing platform capability boundary. |
🎯 **What:** The vulnerability fixed was a potential Command Injection in PlatformShellService due to unescaped arguments passed to `Process.Start()` when handling `open` or `xdg-open` commands on OSX and Linux respectively.⚠️ **Risk:** If a malicious path containing shell metacharacters or flags was passed to these methods, it could lead to arbitrary command execution with the privileges of the application. 🛡️ **Solution:** Used `ProcessStartInfo` with `UseShellExecute = false` and `ArgumentList` to safely pass the path argument without shell expansion. Additionally, prepended `./` to paths starting with `-` to prevent argument injection flags.
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🎯 What: The vulnerability fixed was a potential Command Injection in PlatformShellService due to unescaped arguments passed to
⚠️ Risk: If a malicious path containing shell metacharacters or flags was passed to these methods, it could lead to arbitrary command execution with the privileges of the application.
Process.Start()when handlingopenorxdg-opencommands on OSX and Linux respectively.🛡️ Solution: Used
ProcessStartInfowithUseShellExecute = falseandArgumentListto safely pass the path argument without shell expansion. Additionally, prepended./to paths starting with-to prevent argument injection flags.PR created automatically by Jules for task 15526915261680762051 started by @YoungSx