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Security: rudalabs/TeamCraft

Security

SECURITY.md

Security policy

Supported versions

TeamCraft has no release yet. Security fixes go into the main branch only; there are no maintained release branches.

Version Supported
main (0.1.x, pre-release) yes – fixes land here
older commits, forks, snapshots no

TeamCraft has not had an independent security review. Until there is a stable release:

  • run it only on trusted networks, or behind a reverse proxy with TLS;
  • keep it up to date with main;
  • keep backups of the database and the vault, as described in Operations.

Reporting a vulnerability

Please do not open a public issue for security problems. Report them privately on GitHub: Report a vulnerability (Security tab → Advisories → Report a vulnerability).

Please include:

  • the affected part: web UI, REST API, desktop app, file parsers or packaging;
  • the commit you tested (git rev-parse --short HEAD);
  • steps to reproduce or a proof of concept;
  • the impact you expect.

Do not include real secrets or other people's data.

TeamCraft is a volunteer project, so there is no guaranteed response time. Every report is answered as soon as possible. We agree on a fix and a disclosure date with you, and credit you in the advisory unless you prefer otherwise.

Scope

In scope:

  • authentication: passwords, sessions, API tokens, OpenID Connect – including a back-channel logout token that TeamCraft accepts without the provider's signature, or that ends another user's sessions;
  • permission checks: roles, project groups, check-out locks, released data;
  • read visibility of restricted project groups: any way for a non-member to read an item, file, preview, BOM line, change, request, notification, webhook payload or assistant answer of a restricted group, or to tell a hidden object from a missing one beyond the residual oracles listed there (unique numbers and codes, the shared number counter, where-used counts, response times);
  • CSRF, XSS and the Content Security Policy;
  • uploads and the parsers for CAD, mesh, point-cloud and BOM table files. This includes files that crash or hang the server, or that get around the time limit of the preview process;
  • path traversal in the vault or in the desktop workspace;
  • event webhooks that reach a target the target guard should refuse, or signatures that can be forged without the secret.

Out of scope:

  • attacks that need administrator rights, or access to the server's file system or database;
  • deployments that ignore the documentation, for example ones that expose the server without TLS;
  • denial of service by plain request flooding;
  • restricted data that a member already read: files copied to a desktop working folder stay there after access ends, audit entries from before migration 0024 are shown as written, backups and the command line contain everything, and the assistant sends what a member reads to the configured model provider.
  • what a user's own AI agent does with their token: a local agent (the desktop app's Agent view, an MCP client set up by hand) sends what it reads to its own provider. TEAMCRAFT_LOCAL_AGENTS=off closes the MCP endpoint for every token and the desktop's Agent view then runs on the server-side assistant, so only that remains; the REST API stays reachable with a user's own token; an mcp_only token cannot reach it and a read_only token can only read through it (see Local agents). A call to POST /api/v1/mcp that gets through while the setting is off is in scope. The desktop app answers a local agent's permission requests for TeamCraft's read-only MCP tools without a prompt (the server checks the user's rights on every call); a request it allows that is not a read-only tool of the TeamCraft server it registered – another server's tool, a write tool, the agent's own file or terminal tool – is in scope (desktop/src/autoallow.rs).

There aren't any published security advisories