Give the agent root in the cell, not on your host.
rootcell gives a coding agent disposable NixOS VMs where it can use root without
touching your host filesystem. All outbound traffic passes through a separate
firewall VM with DNS, HTTPS, and SSH allowlists. HTTPS is routed through a
transparent decrypting proxy, so rootcell can enforce host policy and
./rootcell spy can show formatted Bedrock Runtime traffic when you need to see
what the agent is sending.
rootcell is provider-backed: the same agent/firewall model can run locally on macOS with Lima or remotely in AWS EC2.
rootcell is early and intentionally narrow. Today it supports:
| Area | Current support |
|---|---|
| VM providers | lima for local macOS + Lima, and aws-ec2 for AWS EC2 |
| Guest OS | AARCH64 NixOS agent and firewall VMs |
| Coding harness | Pi inside the agent VM |
| Network policy | DNS, HTTPS, and SSH egress through the firewall VM |
| Secrets | Host-side secret providers, including macOS Keychain and AWS Secrets Manager |
Provider-specific setup and operational details live in:
Coding agents are most useful when they can run commands, install tools, and edit files. That's a lot of trust to hand to a process with network access.
rootcell gives you a workspace where an agent can exercise root inside the VM without receiving broad access to your host:
- A fresh NixOS VM for the agent's shell and tools.
- No host-home mount in the agent VM.
- A separate firewall VM with the only public internet route.
- DNS, HTTPS, and SSH allowlists you can review and hot-reload.
- A per-VM SSH key for Git pushes.
- Provider secrets read from host-side secret providers at runtime, not stored in the VM or the Nix store.
Use it when you want the agent to do real work inside a VM while keeping an explicit network boundary around that work.
flowchart LR
Internet(("Internet"))
Host["Host<br/>repo, secrets, ./rootcell"]
Provider["VM provider<br/>Lima or AWS EC2"]
Firewall["Firewall VM<br/>DNS, HTTPS, SSH policy"]
Agent["Agent VM<br/>shell, tools, workspace"]
Host -->|creates, provisions, enters| Provider
Provider --> Firewall
Provider --> Agent
Host -->|SSH to firewall| Firewall
Firewall -->|private SSH leg to agent| Agent
Agent -->|DNS, HTTPS, SSH egress| Firewall
Firewall -->|allowlisted egress| Internet
rootcell deliberately does not use a direct Host-to-Agent path. Host sessions reach the agent by connecting to the firewall first; SSH ProxyJump then carries the agent session through the provider's private network path. The agent VM also uses that private path for all DNS, HTTPS, and SSH egress; it has no direct public route.
The provider owns how those VMs and networks exist:
- macOS + Lima uses two local Lima VMs and a Lima user-v2 private network.
- AWS EC2 uses two EC2 instances, a dedicated VPC, and OpenTofu-managed networking.
The two VMs have the same roles in either provider:
| Piece | What it does |
|---|---|
agent VM |
Runs the coding harness, shell commands, Git, build tools, and project work. It has root inside the VM, but no direct public internet route. |
firewall VM |
Owns the public egress path. It runs dnsmasq for DNS allowlisting and mitmproxy for HTTPS interception and SSH CONNECT policy. |
./rootcell |
Host-side wrapper that creates, provisions, updates, and enters the VMs. It also syncs allowlists and injects configured provider secrets for each session. |
Rootcell supports named instances. Plain ./rootcell uses the default
instance and creates VMs named agent and firewall. ./rootcell --instance dev creates agent-dev and firewall-dev, with separate CA material,
allowlists, secret mappings, provider state, and private network configuration.
HTTPS egress is transparent from inside the agent VM. A normal command like
curl https://github.com either works because the host is allowlisted, or fails
because the firewall denies it. SSH is explicit because SSH has no SNI; the
agent VM's SSH config tunnels it through the firewall so hostnames can still be
allowlisted.
Cleartext HTTP is denied. All egress is expected to be HTTPS or SSH.
You need the common host tools:
- Bun for the TypeScript CLI.
curl,ssh,scp,ssh-keygen, andopenssl.- Provider-specific tools from the provider README.
On macOS with Homebrew:
brew tap oven-sh/bun
brew install bun
brew install lima # for the macOS + Lima provider
brew install opentofu # for the AWS EC2 provider
chmod +x ./rootcell
bun install --frozen-lockfileOn macOS with Nix:
nix profile install .#hostTools
chmod +x ./rootcell
bun install --frozen-lockfileFor a one-off shell instead of a profile install:
nix shell .#hostTools --command bun install --frozen-lockfile
nix shell .#hostTools --command ./rootcellIf your host Nix install has not enabled flakes and the new CLI yet, add
--extra-experimental-features 'nix-command flakes' to the host-side nix
commands above.
Choose a provider before first use.
The local Lima provider is the default:
./rootcell --init-env macos-lima
# Store the default Bedrock provider key in Keychain.
security add-generic-password -a "$USER" -s aws-bedrock-api-key -w "<your-key>"
./rootcellSee macOS + Lima provider for Lima requirements, Nix host-tool setup, state layout, and architecture notes.
Initialize the instance .env before the first run:
./rootcell -i aws-dev --init-env aws-ec2
./rootcell -i aws-dev edit env
./rootcell -i aws-devSee AWS EC2 provider for the OpenTofu/Terraform layout, AWS resource ownership, AMI selection, and IAM isolation details.
First run creates the provider resources and provisions both VMs. Provisioning uses Nix inside the VMs, but you do not need Nix installed on the host unless you choose a Nix-based host-tool setup for the Lima provider.
Later runs normally take seconds unless the VMs were stopped or provisioning inputs changed.
rootcell does not install or build host tools at runtime. It expects provider tools to be available from your chosen package manager or an override environment variable:
ROOTCELL_LIMACTL=/path/to/limactl # Lima provider
ROOTCELL_TERRAFORM=/path/to/tofu # AWS EC2 providerThe AWS EC2 provider uses OpenTofu's tofu command by default. Set
ROOTCELL_TERRAFORM=/path/to/terraform if you want to use a Terraform binary
you installed yourself.
Per-instance state defaults to instances/<name> under the current repo. Set
ROOTCELL_STATE_DIR=/path/to/rootcell-instances to use a different persistent
state root.
./rootcell # open a bash shell inside the agent VM
./rootcell pi # run pi directly
./rootcell -- nix flake update # run any command inside the agent VM
./rootcell edit env # edit the instance .env in $EDITOR
./rootcell edit http # edit the HTTPS allowlist in $EDITOR
./rootcell edit dns # edit the DNS allowlist in $EDITOR
./rootcell edit ssh # edit the SSH allowlist in $EDITOR
./rootcell allow # reload network allowlists after editing them
./rootcell provision # rebuild/re-provision after VM Nix or pi config edits
./rootcell pubkey # print the agent VM's SSH public key
./rootcell list # list rootcell VMs and their current state
./rootcell stop --instance dev # stop the dev instance VMs
./rootcell remove --instance dev # stop dev and delete its provider VM state
./rootcell spy # tail formatted Bedrock Runtime traffic
./rootcell spy --raw # include sanitized raw JSON bodies too
./rootcell spy --tui # browse Bedrock Runtime traffic interactively
./rootcell -i aws-dev --init-env aws-ec2 # initialize a provider-specific instance .env
./rootcell -i local --init-env macos-lima # initialize an explicit local Lima .env
./rootcell --instance dev # open the dev instance shell
./rootcell --instance dev edit env # edit the dev instance environment
./rootcell --instance dev edit dns # edit the dev instance DNS allowlist
./rootcell --instance dev allow # reload only the dev instance allowlistsNetwork policy is per instance. On first run, ./rootcell copies each tracked
proxy/*.defaults file to <instance-dir>/proxy/:
<instance-dir>/proxy/allowed-dns.txtcontrols which hostnames can resolve.<instance-dir>/proxy/allowed-https.txtcontrols which HTTPS hosts can be reached.<instance-dir>/proxy/allowed-ssh.txtcontrols which SSH hosts can be reached.
For most HTTPS access, add the host to both DNS and HTTPS, then reload:
./rootcell edit dns
./rootcell edit http
./rootcell allowallowed-https.txt can also scope a host with a Python regular expression
matched against METHOD /path?query. For example, this allows HTTPS Git access
to only three repositories on github.com:
github.com ^(GET|POST) /rootcell-ai/(rootcell|docs|website)\.git/
For Git over SSH, add the host to the instance's allowed-ssh.txt and run
./rootcell allow. GitHub, GitLab, Bitbucket, and Azure DevOps are included in
the default SSH allowlist. Git-over-SSH cannot be scoped to individual
repositories by HTTPS request regexes because the firewall only sees
CONNECT host:22.
Reloading allowlists takes about a second and does not rebuild either VM. To
reset a live allowlist to project defaults, delete the live file and run
./rootcell; it will be re-seeded from its .defaults sibling. For a named
instance, use the same paths under that instance's state directory and run
./rootcell --instance <name> allow.
After editing these files, run ./rootcell provision:
flake.nix,common.nix,agent-vm.nix,firewall-vm.nix, orhome.nix- Anything under
pi/ - The checked-in allowlist defaults
For live allowlist edits only, use ./rootcell allow.
Edit home.packages in home.nix, then run:
./rootcell provisionThe agent VM is preconfigured to run Pi. Support for other coding harnesses is on the roadmap.
Everything under pi/agent/ on the host is symlinked into ~/.pi/agent/ inside
the agent VM.
pi/agent/AGENTS.mdbecomes the global instruction file.pi/agent/skills/<name>/SKILL.mdbecomes a global pi skill.
Add or edit files there, then run ./rootcell provision.
Per-project rules still belong in an AGENTS.md or CLAUDE.md at the root of
the project you are working on inside the VM.
The agent VM generates its own RSA SSH keypair on first provision. The private key stays in the VM; the public key is meant to be registered with GitHub, GitLab, Bitbucket, Azure DevOps, or a deploy key.
./rootcell pubkeyAfter registering the key, git push works from inside the agent VM as long as
the host is on that instance's allowed-ssh.txt.
rootcell is designed to reduce accidental and routine agent egress, not to be a complete data-loss-prevention system.
What it does:
- Keeps the host filesystem out of the VM by avoiding host-home mounts.
- Gives the agent VM only a private link to the firewall VM.
- Routes DNS through a suffix allowlist.
- Intercepts HTTPS at the firewall and checks TLS SNI, HTTP
Host, and optional request regexes. - Validates the upstream certificate before sending bytes onward.
- Denies cleartext HTTP instead of allowlisting unauthenticated
Hostheaders. - Reads mapped secrets on the host at session start and injects them as process environment variables only for the command being run.
What remains your responsibility:
- Be careful with broad wildcards such as
*.cloudfront.netor*.githubusercontent.com; allowed shared infrastructure can become an exfil path. - Avoid allowlisting DNS-over-HTTPS endpoints unless you really need them.
- Treat any allowed writeable service as a possible outbound channel.
- Remember that network policy cannot prevent timing channels or encoded data in legitimate requests.
Known technical gaps and operational debugging notes live in proxy/README.md.
rootcell's current goal is to harden the shared agent/firewall contract across the supported Lima and AWS providers. Planned expansion includes:
- Host compatibility: broaden host support beyond the current macOS-focused development path.
- LLM providers: add first-class OpenAI and Anthropic workflows alongside Amazon Bedrock.
- Coding harnesses: support Codex CLI and Claude Code CLI alongside Pi.
The long-term shape is a provider- and harness-pluggable VM boundary, with the same explicit network policy model across supported hosts.
rootcell host entry point for VM lifecycle and commands
src/ Bun TypeScript implementation for migrated entrypoints
src/rootcell/providers/ VM, network, and provider-specific README files
flake.nix Nix inputs, guest VM configs, and optional host tools
common.nix shared NixOS config for both VMs
agent-vm.nix agent VM network and trust-store config
firewall-vm.nix firewall VM services and nftables rules
home.nix pi, Git, SSH, and developer tools for the agent VM
network.nix default inter-VM network settings
.env.defaults seed values for per-instance `.env`
secrets.env.defaults seed provider-qualified secret mappings for per-instance `secrets.env`
instances/
per-instance state, allowlists, CA, SSH keys, and generated files
proxy/ allowlists and mitmproxy/dnsmasq firewall code
agent_spy.py Bedrock Runtime formatter for `./rootcell spy`
agent_spy_tui.py Textual browser for `./rootcell spy --tui`
pi/agent/ global pi instructions, skills, and extensions
Per-instance state lives under instances/<name>/ by default. rootcell's
provider metadata lives under v/; the host control key and generated SSH
config live under ssh/.
Provider state is intentionally provider-specific:
- macOS + Lima writes generated Lima YAML and VM state under
v/a/andv/f/and keeps Lima's own VM state under normalLIMA_HOME. - AWS EC2 writes a generated Terraform-compatible module and state under
v/aws-ec2/.
Use ./rootcell list to show known VMs and their state. ./rootcell stop
stops the selected instance's VMs, and ./rootcell remove stops the selected
instance and deletes its provider VM state or cloud resources. Instance-local
configuration such as allowlists, secret mappings, CA files, and subnet
allocation remains in the instance state directory so the next start keeps the
same instance settings.
Use ./rootcell -i <name> --init-env <provider-type> to create the selected
instance directory, seed allowlists and secret mappings, and write a
provider-specific <instance-dir>/.env:
./rootcell -i local --init-env macos-lima
./rootcell -i aws-dev --init-env aws-ec2The supported provider types are macos-lima and aws-ec2. macos-lima
writes ROOTCELL_VM_PROVIDER=lima; aws-ec2 writes ROOTCELL_VM_PROVIDER=aws-ec2
plus ROOTCELL_AWS_PROFILE, ROOTCELL_AWS_REGION, and
ROOTCELL_AWS_CONTROL_CIDR. The AWS profile and region default from your
current host environment when available, otherwise to default and us-east-1.
Normal ./rootcell entry also seeds <instance-dir>/.env from .env.defaults
on first run if it does not already exist. Edit that file for instance-local
settings such as these, or run ./rootcell -i <name> edit env to open it in
$EDITOR:
ROOTCELL_VM_PROVIDER=lima
ROOTCELL_SUBNET_POOL_START=192.168.100.0
ROOTCELL_SUBNET_POOL_END=192.168.254.0
ROOTCELL_AWS_SECRETS_MANAGER_PROVIDERS={"aws-prod":{"aws_profile":"prod","aws_region":"us-west-2"},"aws-dev":{"aws_profile":"dev"}}ROOTCELL_VM_PROVIDER defaults to lima. Set it to aws-ec2 and add the
required AWS provider variables when using AWS.
The first run also writes <instance-dir>/state.json with the instance's
allocated /24. By default, rootcell chooses the first free subnet from
192.168.100.0/24 through 192.168.254.0/24, uses .10 for the firewall, and
uses .11 for the agent. Existing state is not recalculated if you later edit
the pool values.
To pin a new instance to a specific subnet before first run, set both IPs in
that instance's .env:
FIREWALL_IP=192.168.109.10
AGENT_IP=192.168.109.11
NETWORK_PREFIX=24Provider-specific environment variables are documented in the provider READMEs.
./rootcell also seeds <instance-dir>/secrets.env from
secrets.env.defaults on first run. This file maps agent VM environment
variable names to provider-qualified secret references; it does not contain the
secret values themselves. The provider id is required on each line, so different
secrets may come from different providers:
AWS_BEARER_TOKEN_BEDROCK=macos-keychain:aws-bedrock-api-key
OTHER_TOKEN=aws-prod:other-token-a1b2c3For macOS Keychain-backed secrets:
security add-generic-password -a "$USER" -s anthropic-api-key -w "<your-key>"
echo 'ANTHROPIC_API_KEY=macos-keychain:anthropic-api-key' >> "$INSTANCE_DIR/secrets.env"AWS Secrets Manager providers are registered in <instance-dir>/.env with
ROOTCELL_AWS_SECRETS_MANAGER_PROVIDERS. The JSON object keys are provider ids;
each value includes aws_profile and optional aws_region. If aws_region is
omitted, rootcell uses the region configured for that AWS profile in
~/.aws/config, then AWS_REGION or AWS_DEFAULT_REGION. The secrets.env
reference is the secret resource name only, such as name-a1b2c3, not the full
ARN.
If you want to use Anthropic or OpenAI subscriptions, you can log in from inside the VM.
Do not put provider keys in home.nix; the Nix store is world-readable.
rootcell completion prints the yargs-generated completion script. Generate it
from the installed rootcell command so completions stay in sync with the
version on PATH.
For zsh, after compinit:
rootcell completion >> ~/.zshrcFor bash:
rootcell completion >> ~/.bashrcNamed instances are isolated from each other:
./rootcell --instance dev
./rootcell --instance reviewEach instance gets its own VMs, state directory, CA, allowlists, secret mapping
file, control SSH key, private network state, and /24.
The default instance still seeds from legacy repo-local .env, secrets.env,
proxy/allowed-*.txt, and pki/ files when present. Named instances seed from
the checked-in defaults.
See formatted Bedrock Runtime requests and responses:
./rootcell spy
./rootcell spy --raw
./rootcell spy --tuiCheck that firewall services are listening:
INSTANCE_DIR="${ROOTCELL_STATE_DIR:-$PWD/instances}/default"
ssh -F "$INSTANCE_DIR/ssh/config" rootcell-firewall -- \
"ss -tln '( sport = :8080 or sport = :8081 )' && ss -uln '( sport = :53 )'"Test an HTTPS allowlist entry from inside the VM:
./rootcell -- curl -v https://example.comInspect the live allowlists inside the firewall VM:
ssh -F "$INSTANCE_DIR/ssh/config" rootcell-firewall -- \
"cat /etc/agent-vm/allowed-https.txt && cat /etc/agent-vm/dnsmasq-allowlist.conf"Copyright (C) 2026 Jim Pudar.
rootcell is licensed under the GNU Affero General Public License v3.0 only
(AGPL-3.0-only). See LICENSE.
