feat(qwp): stop resending the full symbol dictionary on every message - #66
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Previously every QWP ingress message re-sent the entire symbol
dictionary, so a connection with many distinct symbols paid to
retransmit the whole dictionary on every message. The client now
sends each symbol id to the server only once per connection.
Memory mode:
- The producer keeps a monotonic "sent" watermark and each frame
carries only the ids above it (a delta section), instead of the
full dictionary from id 0.
- On reconnect or failover the fresh server has an empty dictionary,
so the I/O thread replays the whole dictionary as a catch-up frame
before any post-reconnect traffic, keeping the producer's monotonic
baseline valid across the wire boundary.
Store-and-forward (file mode):
- Each slot persists its dictionary to a dot-prefixed side-file
(PersistedSymbolDict) using write-ahead ordering: new symbols are
appended before the referencing frame is published, so a recovered
or orphan-drained slot on a fresh process can always rebuild the
dictionary that a delta frame references.
- The persistence does not fsync, matching the rest of
store-and-forward, which is process-crash durable (the page cache
survives) but not host-crash durable. A host crash that tears the
dictionary is caught at replay by a guard that fails the send
cleanly ("resend required") instead of transmitting a gapped frame
that would corrupt the table.
Catch-up split:
- The reconnect/recovery catch-up splits across as many frames as the
server's advertised batch cap requires, so a dictionary larger than
the cap is re-registered without any single frame exceeding it. The
frames carry contiguous id ranges and reassemble on the server
exactly as the original per-frame deltas would.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Update the java-questdb-client submodule to de86197, which makes the QWP client register each symbol id with the server only once per connection (delta symbol dictionary) instead of re-sending the whole dictionary on every ingress message. The OSS server already parses delta symbol-dictionary frames, so this is the OSS half of a tandem pair with the client PR questdb/java-questdb-client#66 and needs no server change. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Tandem OSS PR (submodule bump): questdb/questdb#7374 — merge together. |
The symbol-dictionary catch-up called fail() on a send error, but the catch-up runs inside connectLoop (via swapClient) and, on the initial connect, on the caller thread (via start() -> positionCursorForStart). Calling fail() there re-entered connectLoop. On a reconnect this corrupted the wire mapping: the outer setWireBaselineWithCatchUp overwrote fsnAtZero while nextWireSeq kept the nested attempt's value, so a later ACK translated through engine.acknowledge(fsnAtZero + wireSeq) and trimmed un-acked frames from the store-and-forward log -- silent data loss. A flapping connection recursed connectLoop until the stack overflowed into a terminal, turning a transient outage into a hard failure (breaking Invariant B). On the initial connect the same fail() ran connectLoop on the caller thread and blocked Sender construction forever. sendDictCatchUp and sendCatchUpChunk now throw CatchUpSendException instead of calling fail(). connectLoop's own retry catch handles the swapClient path (one non-re-entrant reconnect with backoff); trySendOne's orphan-retire re-anchor turns it into a fresh fail() from the I/O loop body; start() drops the dead client so the I/O thread reconnects and re-sends the catch-up off the caller thread. A single dictionary entry too large for the server batch cap is non-retriable, so it latches a terminal (recordFatal) rather than looping -- also removing the oversized-entry reconnect livelock. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
persistNewSymbolsBeforePublish keyed the append range off sentMaxSymbolId+1. That watermark only advances after the whole frame is published, whereas PersistedSymbolDict.size() advances per persisted entry. If a mid-batch appendSymbol threw (a short write on a full disk), the symbols before the failing one were already durable but the frame was not published, so sentMaxSymbolId stayed put. A retry then re-keyed from sentMaxSymbolId+1 and re-appended that already-persisted prefix, duplicating entries and breaking the dense id->symbol mapping recovery relies on (entry i must be symbol id i) -- a torn dictionary that re-registers the wrong symbols on the fresh server, or diverges the producer's watermark from the I/O thread's mirror. Resume from pd.size() instead: it is exactly the count already durable, so the retry continues past the persisted prefix (the next append overwrites any torn trailing bytes) without duplicating. In the happy path pd.size() equals sentMaxSymbolId+1, so behaviour is unchanged. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Add a regression test: a dictionary entry larger than the reconnect
server's per-chunk catch-up budget must latch a clean terminal, not
reconnect-loop. Connection 1 advertises no cap so a ~200-byte symbol
registers into the sent-dictionary mirror; the handler then shrinks the
advertised cap and drops the socket, so the reconnect's catch-up cannot
re-ship the entry. The test asserts the surfaced terminal names the
catch-up path ("... during catch-up").
Reverting the fix (entry-too-large calling fail() again) fails this test
with a StackOverflowError on the I/O thread -- the catch-up re-entering
connectLoop -- confirming the guard bites both ways.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
persistNewSymbolsBeforePublish appended each new symbol with its own PersistedSymbolDict.appendSymbol call, and each appendSymbol issues one positioned write. A high-cardinality batch -- one new symbol per row, which is exactly the store-and-forward workload delta encoding targets -- therefore stalled the producer thread with up to one pwrite syscall per row per flush. Add PersistedSymbolDict.appendSymbols(dict, from, to): it encodes the whole [from..to] entry region into scratch once and issues a single positioned write, so a flush that introduces N symbols costs one syscall instead of N. It keeps appendSymbol's durability and idempotency contract -- no fsync, and a short write throws without advancing size, so a retry keyed off size() re-encodes and overwrites at the same offset. PersistedSymbolDictTest.testAppendSymbolsBatchWritesDenseRange checks the batched write produces the same dense, id-ordered file (including an empty symbol mid-range), that an empty range is a no-op, and that a follow-on batch keyed off the recovered size continues without a gap or duplicate. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
On recovery / orphan-drain the CursorWebSocketSendLoop constructor seeds a native mirror (sentDictBytesAddr) from the slot's persisted dictionary so the first connection can re-register it. That mirror is freed only on ioLoop's exit path, so a loop that is constructed but never runs -- start() never called, or Thread.start() failing before the loop runs, or a close() racing an unstarted loop -- leaked it. close() already safety-nets the client for that same "loop never started" case; the mirror was missed. close() now frees the mirror when the loop never ran (ioThread was null on entry). It does NOT free it when the loop ran: ioLoop's exit owns the free there, and on the failed-stop path the thread may still be mid-send, so touching the mirror would race; a duplicate close observes a zero address and skips. CursorWebSocketSendLoopMirrorLeakTest populates a recoverable slot, then leak-checks constructing an engine + loop over it and closing WITHOUT start(). Reverting the free fails it with a 4096-byte NATIVE_DEFAULT leak. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
testRecoveredSlotReplaysDeltaFramesAgainstFreshServer never acked in phase 1, so recovery replayed from the very first frame -- whose delta already starts at id 0. The replayed frames were thus self-sufficient from 0, and the reconstructed-dictionary assertions passed whether or not the seeded catch-up carried the right symbols (or any at all). Only the sawCatchUpFrame existence check was load-bearing. Stamp the ack watermark at FSN DISTINCT_SYMBOLS-1 between the phases so recovery replays from the first frame past the symbol-introducing cycle: a frame with deltaStart=DISTINCT_SYMBOLS carrying no new symbols. The early ids it references now exist only in the persisted dictionary, so the reconstructed dictionary is complete solely because the catch-up re-registered them. Verified both ways: with a catch-up that sends a table-less frame but no symbols, the pre-change test still passes (the head frames carry the dictionary) while the stamped test fails at "dictionary id 0 expected sym-0 but was null". Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
When a disk-mode slot's .symbol-dict cannot be opened, the engine reports delta encoding as unavailable and the sender must fall back to self-sufficient frames -- every batch re-ships the whole dictionary from id 0 -- because a recovered slot would have no dictionary to rebuild non-self-sufficient deltas from. Nothing exercised that path. Add a test that plants a directory where the dictionary file belongs, so openRW / openCleanRW fail and open() returns null. It then asserts both batches ship deltaStart=0 and that batch 2 re-ships the whole dictionary (deltaCount=2), rather than the monotonic delta (deltaStart=1, deltaCount=1) the enabled path emits. Verified it bites: forcing isDeltaDictEnabled() to stay true regresses batch 2 to deltaStart=1 and the test fails. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
openExisting parsed complete entries and set appendOffset past the last one, but left the file at its full length. A crash mid-append leaves a torn trailing record; if the next append after recovery is SHORTER than that torn tail, it overwrites only the tail's prefix and leaves residue beyond its own end. A later recovery can then mis-parse that residue as a ghost symbol, shifting every subsequent dense id -- so the "self-healing tail" guarantee was not actually airtight. open() now truncates the file to the end of the last complete entry (ftruncate) so nothing survives past appendOffset. Best-effort: a failed truncate falls back to the prior overwrite-from-appendOffset behaviour. testTornTrailingEntrySelfHeals now asserts the file returns to its clean length after the reopen; reverting the truncate fails it (19 vs 16 bytes). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The I/O thread's lifetime-monotonic symbol-dictionary mirror is sized with int math: accumulateSentDict passed sentDictBytesLen + regionBytes (an int sum) to ensureSentDictCapacity, and the grow step doubled capacity*2, also int. On a pathological, very-high-cardinality connection the sum overflows negative -- so the capacity check passes and copyMemory scribbles past the buffer (silent heap corruption) -- and capacity*2 overflows negative near 1 GB, degrading the doubling to exact-fit reallocs. Reaching this needs ~200M+ distinct symbols on one connection, far past any real workload, but the failure mode is silent corruption. ensureSentDictCapacity now takes a long, the caller passes a long sum, and the method throws a LineSenderException above an int-addressable ceiling (Integer.MAX_VALUE - 8) instead of overflowing, growing in long math clamped to that ceiling. Defensive only -- not reachable at realistic symbol cardinality, so there is no scale test. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Review of PR #66 — feat(qwp): stop resending the full symbol dictionary on every message
Reviewing at level 3 (full mission-critical pass: all steps, all reviewer dimensions, per-finding source verification). Note: the subagent tool is unavailable in this environment, so the parallel-reviewer passes and per-finding verification were run inline by the parent session using read/bash against the source and a local build+test run — not delegated. Every finding below was verified against the cited source lines; false positives are listed in Downgraded.
Build/test evidence: mvn -pl core compile clean on JDK 25; DeltaDictCatchUpTest, DeltaDictRecoveryTest, PersistedSymbolDictTest, SelfSufficientFramesTest, ReconnectTest → 15 tests, 0 failures.
Committed-binary gate: PASS — git diff --numstat shows no binary files; all 10 changed files are .java with numeric line counts.
Critical
C1 — Persisted .symbol-dict accumulates duplicate entries when appendBlocking fails and a later flush succeeds → silent symbol corruption on recovery (file mode, delta enabled). [in-diff]
File: core/src/main/java/io/questdb/client/cutlass/qwp/client/QwpWebSocketSender.java:3660-3676 (persistNewSymbolsBeforePublish), triggered via flushPendingRows (3491/3498) and flushPendingRowsSplit (3574/3582).
Code-path trace (verified):
flushPendingRows runs, in order:
persistNewSymbolsBeforePublish(); // 3491 — appends [sentMaxSymbolId+1 .. currentBatchMaxSymbolId] to .symbol-dict (Files.write, no fsync)
activeBuffer.write(...); // 3494
sealAndSwapBuffer(); // 3495 — calls cursorEngine.appendBlocking(); CAN THROW
advanceSentMaxSymbolId(); // 3498 — SKIPPED on throw
...
resetTableBuffersAfterFlush(keys); // SKIPPED on throw → rows + currentBatchMaxSymbolId preservedsealAndSwapBuffer → appendBlocking throws LineSenderException("cursor SF append failed", …) on the two documented conditions (QwpWebSocketSender.java:3768,3783-3785): backpressure deadline (the SF ring hit sf_max_total_bytes and did not drain — i.e. exactly the store-and-forward stress scenario, server slow/down) and PAYLOAD_TOO_LARGE. The I/O loop is not failed, so cursorSendLoop.checkError() passes and the sender stays open and usable.
On the throw: the frame's new symbols are already durably on disk (persist ran before sealAndSwapBuffer), but sentMaxSymbolId was not advanced (advanceSentMaxSymbolId at 3498 skipped) and the table buffers/currentBatchMaxSymbolId are not reset (resetTableBuffersAfterFlush skipped — verified: currentBatchMaxSymbolId is reset only at 3607, 3686, and inside resetTableBuffersAfterFlush, none of which run on this path).
The next successful flush() (a transient backpressure clears the moment the server catches up) re-enters persistNewSymbolsBeforePublish with the same from = sentMaxSymbolId + 1 (3668) and to = currentBatchMaxSymbolId (3669) — because pd.appendSymbol has no dedup (PersistedSymbolDict.java:appendSymbol) and nothing rolled back the earlier append, the failed frame's symbols are written to the file a second time. The file's positional invariant ("symbol id i is the i-th entry", PersistedSymbolDict.java class doc) is now broken.
Impact on recovery/orphan-drain (a fresh process reads the file):
seedGlobalDictionaryFromPersisted(2243/3695) callsgetOrAddSymbol, which de-dupes → producerglobalSymbolDictionary.size()andsentMaxSymbolIdare below the file's entry count.- The send loop's constructor seeds the mirror directly from the raw file bytes with
sentDictCount = pd.size()(CursorWebSocketSendLoop.java:515-522), i.e. including the duplicate. sendDictCatchUpre-registers the duplicated mirror on the fresh server, so every global id above the duplicate is shifted by +1.- Symbol column cells are encoded as absolute global ids (
QwpColumnWriter.writeSymbolColumnWithGlobalIds, line 277buffer.putVarint(globalId)). The replayed frames carry the original ids, which now resolve against the shifted server dictionary → rows get the wrong symbol values, silently. The torn-dictionary guard does not catch this (deltaStartnever exceeds the now-largersentDictCount, sotrySendOneat 2223-2238 passes).
This is a store-and-forward data-integrity violation triggered by an ordinary transient outage — the exact failure class SF exists to survive.
Suggested fix: base the append range on the true persist watermark, not the wire baseline. pd.size() already tracks how many symbols are durably persisted at contiguous ids 0..size-1:
int from = pd.size(); // instead of sentMaxSymbolId + 1
int to = currentBatchMaxSymbolId;
if (to < from) return;
for (int id = from; id <= to; id++) pd.appendSymbol(globalSymbolDictionary.getSymbol(id));In the happy path pd.size() == sentMaxSymbolId + 1, so behavior is identical; after a failed append it skips the already-persisted ids, making the operation idempotent across retries. Add a regression test: file mode + delta, force an appendBlocking failure (small sf_max_bytes + silent server), then a successful flush, then assert .symbol-dict has no duplicate and a fresh-process recovery reconstructs the dictionary gap-free.
C2 — Required Enterprise failover tandem is missing/unlinked; the HA path this feature targets is UNTESTED in CI (Step 2.7 gate). [tandem]
Verification (commands recorded):
- OSS tandem:
gh pr list --repo questdb/questdb --head qwp-delta-symbol-dict→ #7374 present, matching branch, bidirectionally linked (body: "Tandem OSS half of #66"; a PR comment links back). It is a submodule bump only — "The OSS server already parses delta symbol-dictionary frames, so no server change is required." Its CI covers single-node QWP e2e. - Enterprise tandem:
gh pr list --repo questdb/questdb-enterprise --head qwp-delta-symbol-dict→ empty.ghcan reach the private enterprise repo (confirmed), and a scan of the 60 most-recent enterprise PRs shows no client-bump/qwp-symbol-dict PR.SqlFailoverQwpClientLosslessTestexists in enterprise (questdb-ent/src/test/java/com/questdb/lifecycle/), and the PR body claims it "passes end-to-end against a real server" — but with no enterprise PR bumping the client submodule, that test runs against the old client in enterprise CI, not this change.
Why this trips the gate: the change is squarely HA-facing — it rewrites the SF drainer's on-the-wire framing, adds reconnect/failover dictionary catch-up (swapClient → setWireBaselineWithCatchUp → sendDictCatchUp), and adds recovery/orphan-drain dictionary rebuild. The headline benefit (dictionary survives a reconnect/failover) is only proven end-to-end by the enterprise failover suite the PR itself names. Per Step 2.7, a required-but-missing tandem is Critical and every behavior it would cover is treated as UNTESTED. The client-local loopback tests (C-tier coverage below) are strong, but they cannot prove (a) a real server accepts and correctly registers a 0-table catch-up frame mid-stream, or (b) primary→replica failover preserves the dictionary.
Required action: open (or link) the enterprise tandem that bumps the client submodule to this SHA and runs SqlFailoverQwpClientLosslessTest (and, ideally, a kill-9 recovery variant in the enterprise e2e-python suite for the file-mode host-crash/torn-dict path, which the unit test only simulates by truncating the file). Also confirm OSS #7374's e2e actually drives a reconnect (so the catch-up frame is exercised against a real server), not just a single connected ingest.
Moderate
M1 — One Files.write syscall per new symbol on the producer thread. [in-diff]
persistNewSymbolsBeforePublish (3660-3676) loops pd.appendSymbol(...), and each appendSymbol (PersistedSymbolDict.java) issues its own Files.write(fd, …) (one pwrite). A frame that introduces K new symbols does K syscalls on the user/producer thread. This is per-new-symbol (not per-row), so it's bounded by dictionary growth, but a high-cardinality first batch will burst syscalls synchronously in the flush path. Batch the frame's whole new-symbol range into a single scratch buffer and one Files.write. Not zero-GC-blocking (no allocation), but avoidable syscall amplification on the ingestion path.
M2 — accumulateSentDict silently drops symbols on a partial-overlap delta. [in-diff]
CursorWebSocketSendLoop.java:1946-1960: the guard is if (deltaCount <= 0 || deltaStart != sentDictCount) return;. A delta with deltaStart < sentDictCount and deltaStart + deltaCount > sentDictCount (overlaps the tip and extends past it) is dropped entirely — the new tail symbols never enter the mirror, so a later catch-up would be incomplete (→ the same shifted-id corruption as C1). I verified this is currently unreachable: the producer emits strictly contiguous, non-overlapping deltas (beginMessage computes deltaStart = confirmedMaxId+1; advanceSentMaxSymbolId moves the baseline to exactly currentBatchMaxSymbolId), and recovery seeds sentDictCount from a superset, so deltaStart < sentDictCount ⇒ deltaStart+deltaCount ≤ sentDictCount. But it is load-bearing correctness resting on an invariant enforced elsewhere. Harden it: handle the partial overlap (accumulate only the [sentDictCount .. deltaStart+deltaCount) tail) or assert deltaStart + deltaCount <= sentDictCount so a future producer change fails loudly instead of silently corrupting the mirror.
Minor
m1 — Stale "self-sufficient / delta from id 0" comments now contradict delta mode.
QwpWebSocketSender.java:3392, 3398-3399, and 3777 still say cursor frames are "self-sufficient (every frame carries … a symbol-dict delta from id 0)". In delta mode frames are explicitly not self-sufficient (the whole point of the PR), and the 3777 comment ("next batch re-emits … symbol-dict delta from id 0") describes behavior that no longer happens. Update to match the new baseline semantics to avoid misleading a future reader on the recovery/retry path (which is exactly where C1 lives).
m2 — Memory-mode mirror double-stores the dictionary.
The I/O-thread mirror (sentDictBytes*) holds every symbol's UTF-8 bytes while globalSymbolDictionary already holds them as Java Strings. Bounded by distinct-symbol count (not per-row), so acceptable, but worth a comment that memory-mode steady-state native footprint is ~2× the dictionary size for the reconnect-catch-up capability.
Downgraded (false positives — verified against source)
- Negative
fsnAtZeroon fresh recovery (replayStart=0⇒fsnAtZero = -catchUpFrames) corrupts ack accounting — dismissed.SegmentRing.acknowledgeclamps topublishedFsnand no-ops whenseq ≤ ackedFsn(339-349); the catch-up frame maps to an already-acked/nonexistent low FSN and its ack is a harmless no-op.DeltaDictRecoveryTestexercises exactly this (silent server, nothing acked) and passes. pd.size()read race in the send-loop constructor vs producerappendSymbol— dismissed. The loop is constructed during sender build/startCursorSendLoop(or on the drainer thread with no producer at all), which happens-before the first user send; no concurrent append occurs, sosentDictCount == loadedEntriescount.- Catch-up frame double-advances the durable-ack watermark — dismissed. The catch-up frame's OK enqueues a
tableCount=0(trivially durable) pending entry mapping to an ≤ackedFsnFSN;drainPendingDurableacks a no-op. Cumulative ack semantics make a missing catch-up OK harmless too. - Catch-up (non-
DEFER_COMMIT) frame prematurely commits deferred WAL on reconnect — dismissed. It is the first frame on a fresh server connection, which holds no pending WAL state; committing nothing is a no-op before the deferred replay frames arrive. positionCursorForStartre-sends a catch-up when retiring an orphan tail — dismissed. That branch is guarded bynextWireSeq == 0(trySendOne2166-2175), which cannot hold aftersendDictCatchUpincrementednextWireSeq; whensentDictCount==0there is nothing to re-send.- A symbol larger than the batch cap breaks catch-up — dismissed. The original data frame carrying that symbol (plus row data) would already exceed the cap and fail; the catch-up (symbol only, less overhead) is strictly smaller, so
sendDictCatchUp'sentryBytes > budgetterminal is consistent, not a new failure. - Java 8 floor violations in new code — dismissed. No
var, text blocks,instanceofpatterns,List.of, etc. in the changed main files; the one->is a pre-existing lambda. Compiles clean on JDK 25. PersistedSymbolDictuses slf4j instead of QuestDBLog— dismissed. Its sibling SF-cursor classes (AckWatermark,SegmentRing,CursorSendEngine, the send loop) all use slf4j; this is consistent.
Coverage map
| # | Behavioral change | Test (local unless noted) | Failure link | Dimensions | Verdict |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Memory-mode monotonic delta (symbolDeltaBaseline in beginMessage) |
SelfSufficientFramesTest.testMemoryModeShipsMonotonicDelta |
asserts batch-2 deltaStart=1,deltaCount=1 — fails if baseline reverts to -1 |
happy ✓; NULL N-A; boundary (2 symbols) ✓; concurrency N-A | TESTED |
| 2 | File-mode delta + write-ahead persist | SelfSufficientFramesTest.testFileModeShipsMonotonicDeltaAndPersistsDict |
asserts monotonic delta + .symbol-dict retains both symbols |
happy ✓; resource (dict file) ✓ | TESTED |
| 3 | Reconnect catch-up (memory) | DeltaDictCatchUpTest.testReconnectCatchUpRebuildsDictionary |
reconstructs conn-2 dict from wire; fails on null gap | happy ✓; reconnect ✓ (loopback) | TESTED |
| 4 | Split catch-up under batch cap | DeltaDictCatchUpTest.testReconnectCatchUpSplitsLargeDictionaryAcrossFrames |
asserts ≥2 zero-table frames + gap-free reassembly | boundary (cap) ✓ | TESTED |
| 5 | File-mode recovery replay to fresh server | DeltaDictRecoveryTest.testRecoveredSlotReplaysDeltaFramesAgainstFreshServer |
asserts catch-up frame seen + gap-free dict | recovery ✓ (loopback); memory-leak N-A | TESTED |
| 6 | Torn-dictionary guard (simulated host crash) | DeltaDictRecoveryTest.testTornDictionaryFailsCleanlyInsteadOfCorrupting |
asserts 0 frames replayed + terminal "incomplete" error | error path ✓ | TESTED |
| 7 | PersistedSymbolDict open/append/reopen/torn-tail/bad-magic/removeOrphan |
PersistedSymbolDictTest (5 tests, assertMemoryLeak) |
round-trip + self-heal asserts | happy/boundary/empty-symbol/resource ✓ | TESTED |
| 8 | appendBlocking failure → persist-then-retry dict duplication (file mode) |
none (recorded search: no test references appendBlocking/backpressure/dup + persisted dict) |
— | error+retry ✗; recovery-after-retry ✗ | UNTESTED → Critical (C1) |
| 9 | Real-server 0-table catch-up acceptance + primary→replica failover | OSS tandem #7374 (single-node only); Enterprise tandem missing | — | real-server/failover ✗ | UNTESTED → Critical (C2) |
| 10 | seedGlobalDictionaryFromPersisted id/baseline resume on recovery |
indirect via DeltaDictRecoveryTest #5 |
dict reconstructed gap-free implies correct seed | happy ✓; retry-dup interaction ✗ (see C1) | TESTED (partial) |
Summary
Verdict: REQUEST CHANGES.
The design is careful and the write-ahead/torn-dictionary reasoning is largely sound, but two blocking issues stand:
- C1 (data integrity): a transient
appendBlockingbackpressure failure followed by any successful flush duplicates the failed frame's symbols in the persisted.symbol-dict; a later recovery/orphan-drain then silently misattributes symbol values via shifted global ids. This is a store-and-forward correctness violation on the very outage class SF exists to survive, it has no regression test, and the fix is small (base the persist range onpd.size()). - C2 (test gate): the HA failover behavior the feature targets has no linked, CI-running enterprise tandem; the OSS tandem #7374 covers single-node only.
Test & tandem gate: FAILS — one UNTESTED-Critical bug-fix-worthy path (C1, no regression test) and a required-but-missing Enterprise tandem (C2). Cannot approve.
Zero-GC gate: PASSES — no steady-state per-row/per-producer-call allocation on the ingestion path; producer-side additions (symbolDeltaBaseline, advanceSentMaxSymbolId, persistNewSymbolsBeforePublish) allocate nothing (M1 is syscall amplification, not GC). Catch-up/mirror allocations are I/O-thread, reconnect-only.
Coverage map: 10 behavioral-change groups — 8 tested locally (loopback), 2 UNTESTED (dict-dup-on-retry; HA-failover tandem).
Tandem status: OSS e2e tandem linked (#7374, single-node); Enterprise failover tandem required and missing; enterprise e2e-python kill-recovery coverage for the host-crash/torn-dict path recommended.
Findings: 6 verified (2 Critical, 2 Moderate, 2 Minor); 8 draft findings dropped as false positives after source verification.
In-diff vs out-of-diff: 4 in-diff (C1, M1, M2, m1), 1 tandem/process (C2), 1 cross-cutting (m2). The C1 mechanism spans the new persistNewSymbolsBeforePublish (in-diff) and the pre-existing sealAndSwapBuffer/appendBlocking failure path (out-of-diff) it now interacts with — the classic "diff quietly changed a contract at an unchanged callsite" case.
trySendOne decoded a frame's delta header twice: the pre-send torn-dictionary guard called frameDeltaStart (magic/flags check + start-id varint), then post-send accumulateSentDict re-ran isDeltaFrame and re-read the start id before reading deltaCount. Both run on every delta frame on the I/O send path. Decode the start id once in the guard, hoist the frame address into a local, and pass the start id into accumulateSentDict, which now locates deltaCount just past the canonical start-id encoding (via NativeBufferWriter.varintSize) instead of re-parsing the header. The non-delta-frame case is carried by the same start id (-1), so the post- send mirror update runs exactly when it did before. Also move the accumulateSentDict javadoc onto accumulateSentDict: it had drifted above frameDeltaStart (which kept its own doc), leaving accumulateSentDict undocumented. The per-entry region walk (to size the mirror copy) remains; eliminating it needs a wire-level deltaBytes field, a server-side change out of scope for this client fix. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Several comments predated file-mode delta encoding and claimed every
cursor frame is self-sufficient with a "symbol-dict delta from id 0". That
is now only the fallback: in delta mode (memory mode, and file mode when
the persisted dictionary opened) frames carry monotonic deltas that are
NOT self-sufficient, and the fresh server's dictionary is re-established by
an I/O-thread catch-up frame before replay.
The worst offender was the deltaDictEnabled field doc ("Enabled only in
memory-mode ... File-mode keeps full self-sufficient frames"), which
directly contradicted the feature. Corrected it plus the two ensureConnected
call-site comments, the append-failed-path comment, and the
wasRecoveredFromDisk field doc (schema stays self-sufficient per frame; the
dictionary does not). No behavior change.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Two robustness fixes to the delta symbol-dictionary tests. Deterministic synchronization (replaces fixed sleeps): - DeltaDictCatchUpTest waited a fixed 200 ms for the server to close connection 1 before sending batch 2. On a loaded machine that could under-wait and let batch 2 race into connection 1's pre-close window, changing which connection the catch-up lands on. The handler now sets a conn1Closed flag after it closes the socket, and the test waits on that. - DeltaDictRecoveryTest's torn-dictionary test slept a fixed 1 s to let the replay guard fire before close(). It now polls flush() for the latched terminal (close() remains the fallback), so it captures the terminal as soon as it fires -- the run dropped from ~1 s to ~0.3 s. Leak checks: the Sender-based tests allocate native memory (the send-loop mirror, persisted-dict buffers, segment mmaps) but were not wrapped in assertMemoryLeak, unlike the rest of the suite. Wrap all eight methods across the three classes; every one is balanced (they already cleaned up via try-with-resources -- the wrapper now guards against future leaks). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
flushPendingRowsSplit fires when one flush's encoded size exceeds the server's batch cap: it emits one frame per table. The first frame must carry the whole batch's symbol-dict delta and advance the baseline, and the remaining frames must carry an empty delta that only references ids the first frame already registered -- otherwise a fresh server would see dangling symbol ids. No test drove that producer-side split. Add a test that buffers two padded tables into one flush under a small advertised cap, so the batch splits, and asserts the first frame ships deltaStart=0/deltaCount=2 while the second ships deltaStart=2/deltaCount=0. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
accumulateSentDict dropped a frame entirely whenever deltaStart != sentDictCount. A delta that overlaps the mirror tip and extends past it (deltaStart < sentDictCount < deltaStart+deltaCount) was therefore discarded whole -- the new tail symbols never entered the mirror, which would leave a later reconnect catch-up incomplete and shift server-side ids. The producer only ever emits strictly contiguous, non-overlapping deltas, so this is currently unreachable, but it is load-bearing correctness resting on an invariant enforced elsewhere. Handle the overlap: skip the already-held prefix [deltaStart, sentDictCount) and copy only the new tail [sentDictCount, deltaStart+deltaCount). The steady-state case (deltaStart == sentDictCount) has skip == 0, so it is unchanged and free. A gap (deltaStart > sentDictCount, which the torn-dictionary guard rejects before send) now bails explicitly rather than implicitly. Also document that the I/O-thread mirror is a second, native copy of the dictionary (the producer's GlobalSymbolDictionary already holds the same symbols as Java Strings) -- so a memory-mode connection's steady-state dictionary footprint is ~2x the symbol set, an intentional cost of the reconnect-catch-up capability. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Regression test for the write-ahead persist path: persistNewSymbolsBefore- Publish runs before the frame is published (sealAndSwapBuffer -> appendBlocking). If publish fails after the persist -- here PAYLOAD_TOO_LARGE (a frame bigger than the SF segment), a backpressure deadline in production -- the symbols are already on disk but sentMaxSymbolId is not advanced and the rows stay buffered, so a retry re-runs the persist. The fix keys the persist range off pd.size() (idempotent); this pins it. The test drives one new-symbol row whose padded frame exceeds a 1 KB segment, flushes it twice (both fail to publish), then asserts the persisted .symbol-dict holds the symbol exactly once. Reverting the fix to sentMaxSymbolId+1 fails it with size 2 -- the duplicate that shifts every later global id and silently misattributes symbol values on recovery. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
…va-questdb-client into qwp-delta-symbol-dict
setWireBaselineWithCatchUp anchors fsnAtZero = replayStart - catchUpFrames so every catch-up frame maps to an already-acked FSN. Dropping the - catchUpFrames term is silent data loss: a server ACK for a catch-up frame then translates to an FSN at or above replayStart and trims a not-yet-delivered data frame from the store-and-forward log. The existing catch-up tests reconstruct the dictionary from wire bytes and never assert ACK/trim accounting, so they were blind to this line; the enterprise SqlFailoverQwpClientLosslessTest ingests no symbols and never enters the catch-up path at all. CursorWebSocketSendLoopCatchUpAlignmentTest drives the catch-up against a stub client and asserts the catch-up frame's OK leaves the real engine's ackedFsn untouched, for both a single catch-up frame and a split (multi-frame) catch-up. Reverting the - catchUpFrames term fails both. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
sendCatchUpChunk throws CatchUpSendException on a transient wire failure instead of calling fail(). From inside the catch-up fail() re-enters connectLoop -- desyncing the fsnAtZero/nextWireSeq wire mapping (a later ACK then trims un-acked store-and-forward frames), or overflowing the stack on a flapping connection -- turning a transient outage into a hard failure. Only the oversized-entry (non-retriable) terminal was covered; the retriable path had no test. testTransientCatchUpSendFailureIsRetriableNotTerminal drives the catch-up against a stub whose sendBinary throws, and asserts the failure surfaces as a retriable CatchUpSendException and leaves the producer-facing error latch clear. Reverting the throw to fail() fails it. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Four minor cleanups on the delta symbol-dictionary catch-up, all behaviour-preserving on every reachable path: - The sentDict* field comment said the catch-up mirror is memory-mode only; it is also seeded and used in disk mode on a recovered / orphan-drained slot. Corrected. - positionCursorAt's javadoc said it runs after nextWireSeq was reset to 0, but the catch-up path leaves nextWireSeq past the frames it emitted. Corrected to describe setWireBaselineWithCatchUp anchoring the wire baseline; the method only moves the byte cursor. - The recovery-seed constructor set sentDictCount = pd.size() outside the loadedEntriesLen > 0 block. A recovered slot always has entries when size > 0, so the result is unchanged, but coupling the count to the mirror bytes stops sentDictCount ever claiming symbols the mirror does not hold. - sendDictCatchUp used Integer.MAX_VALUE as the no-cap per-frame budget, so sendCatchUpChunk's int frameLen could overflow on a multi-GB dictionary. Bound it by MAX_SENT_DICT_BYTES, the same ceiling ensureSentDictCapacity enforces. Unreachable at real cardinality (~200M+ symbols); defensive. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Close three ways the delta symbol-dictionary feature could lose or corrupt data on the reconnect and store-and-forward recovery paths. Run the torn-dictionary guard unconditionally. trySendOne gated the guard on deltaDictEnabled, which CursorSendEngine reports false when a recovered disk slot cannot open its persisted dictionary (fd exhaustion, a read-only remount, ENOSPC). The recorded frames are still delta frames, so replaying them against a fresh empty-dictionary server null-padded the missing ids and silently corrupted the table. The guard now decodes the delta start for every frame and fails terminally on a gap regardless of the flag; only the sent-dictionary mirror stays gated. Stop treating a catch-up frame as the head data frame. sendCatchUpChunk advances nextWireSeq, but onClose's poison-strike gate and handleServerRejection's pre-send gate read nextWireSeq > 0 as "a data frame was sent". A transient non-orderly close or NACK after the catch-up but before the first replay frame then charged a poison strike on a frame that never left, and after a few flaps escalated a transient outage to a PROTOCOL_VIOLATION terminal that quarantines an orphan drainer. A new dataFrameSentThisConnection flag, set only after a real ring frame sends, now gates both decisions, so the drainer keeps retrying as Invariant B requires. Bound the commit message's dictionary delta to the sent watermark. sendCommitMessage skips the write-ahead persist yet encoded a delta up to currentBatchMaxSymbolId, so a symbol left in the batch by a cancelled row (cancelRow rolls back neither currentBatchMaxSymbolId nor the global registration) rode out on the commit frame without being persisted. A recovered slot then under-seeded the producer against the surviving frame and misattributed the reused id. The commit now caps the delta at sentMaxSymbolId in delta mode, giving an empty delta. Each fix carries a regression test proven to fail when the fix is reverted: a directory-shadowed .symbol-dict (guard), a close after only the catch-up (poison gate), and a cancelled-row symbol on a transactional commit (delta bound). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
On recovery the send loop copied the persisted dictionary's loaded-entries buffer into a fresh mirror allocation and left PersistedSymbolDict holding a second copy for the engine's lifetime -- roughly twice the dictionary size in native memory on a high-cardinality recovered slot, retained long after the one-time seed. The loop now adopts that buffer as its mirror backing via takeLoadedEntries(), which transfers ownership so the dictionary no longer retains or frees it. The producer's readLoadedSymbols() is the only other consumer and runs first (setCursorEngine seeds the producer before the loop is built; the drainer has no producer consumer), guarded by an assert. Add a recover-then-continue-ingest test. A file-mode sender writes symbols and crashes; a fresh sender recovers the slot and ingests a NEW symbol. It asserts the producer continues the dictionary from the recovered size instead of colliding at id 0, exercising seedGlobalDictionaryFromPersisted, which no prior test drove past recovery. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
sendRow() walked every column twice per row whenever the server advertises a batch cap (the ordinary case): once in the cap guard's getBufferedBytes() and again in nextRow()'s null-padding walk, which already sums the same per-column byte counts. QwpTableBuffer.nextRow(snapshotBytes, maxRowBytes) now performs the budget check inside that single walk and throws before the commit motion (rowCount/committedColumnCount untouched), so the at()/atNow() error path's cancelCurrentRow() undoes the row's value writes and the padding nulls alike. sendRow() passes the once-read volatile cap, or Long.MAX_VALUE when the server advertises none; the no-arg nextRow() delegates with an unlimited budget, keeping the UDP sender unchanged. Semantic delta: the guard now counts padding-null bytes. They go into the wire frame, so the old value-only measure could pass a row that still produced an oversize WS frame the server closes with 1009. Review finding C5 (1122_r4o.md). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PFV4mYtzZqxr8gD9xSuJSu
The nextRow(snapshotBytes, maxRowBytes) overload reset columnAccessCursor and inProgressColumnCount before the budget check, so a rejected row briefly read as "no row in progress" between the throw and the caller's rollback. Move the resets after the check: the throw path now leaves both fields exactly as the pre-fold guard did. Also pin the guard's snapshot wiring with a cumulative-rows test: three rows that each fit the cap but whose running total exceeds it must all commit. A regression to nextRow(0, cap) fails this test; previously only an OSS-side E2E test could catch it. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PFV4mYtzZqxr8gD9xSuJSu
A full-dictionary frame carries the whole symbol dictionary from id 0, so its fixed overhead grows with lifetime symbol cardinality. Once that overhead alone reached the server's batch cap, every frame was oversized however the batch was split: flushPendingRowsSplit's pre-flight rejected it, reset() could not help because it discards rows rather than the dictionary, and the sender could never flush again. Only close-and- rebuild recovered. Two routes reached it -- a mid-life disableDeltaDict on a large delta-mode dictionary, and, with no fault at all, ordinary growth on a slot whose .symbol-dict never opened. preRegisterDictionaryChunks now registers the dictionary up front as deferred, dictionary-only frames, each carrying a contiguous id range sized under the cap, exactly as CursorWebSocketSendLoop.sendDictCatchUp chunks the reconnect catch-up. The data frames that follow encode against the resulting baseline and carry an empty delta. Making those data frames non-self-sufficient is safe because the server never acks a deferred frame individually: QwpIngressUpgradeProcessor marks uncommitted deferred rows so the cumulative-ack watermark cannot move past them, and QwpIngressProcessorState clamps and logs critical if it ever tries. A deferred group is therefore atomic against the client's trim watermark, so the GROUP is self-sufficient even though its frames are not: the chunks cannot be trimmed ahead of the frames that depend on them, and recovery replays the group whole with RecoveredFrameAnalysis folding the chunk deltas first. The chunker runs in full-dictionary mode only. In delta mode it would publish frames before persistNewSymbolsBeforePublish runs, leaving frames that reference ids the .symbol-dict cannot describe if the process crashed in between -- a write-ahead violation that would quarantine the slot on recovery. Delta mode also needs no such help: its section covers only the batch's new symbols. Every entry is validated against the cap before any chunk is published, so a symbol too large to ship at all throws with nothing on the ring. The baseline is threaded through flushPendingRowsSplit rather than re-read, so the frame the publish loop assembles stays byte-identical to the one the pre-flight sized. Behaviour below the threshold is unchanged: the pre-registration is a no-op unless the dictionary section would leave no room for a table body. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Mutation testing showed three guards on this branch survive the whole suite when reverted. Each protects a failure mode the branch introduced or fixed, and each was attributed in the PR body to a test that does not cover it. The OK-path ACK lower clamp. fsnAtZero is negative whenever a reconnect's dictionary catch-up spans more frames than the replay start -- a shape this feature introduced -- so a corrupt or hostile negative wire sequence makes "fsnAtZero + capped" wrap POSITIVE and acknowledge() trims every published frame the server never received. The new test drives Long.MIN_VALUE into the response handler against a negative baseline and asserts the ack watermark does not move. connectLoop's entry guard, in both directions. It decides whether a RE-ENTRY keeps or restarts the orphan drainer's cap-gap settle budget -- the budget that stops a transient from quarantining a drainable slot. Accrual inside a single connectLoop invocation is guarded separately, so deleting this line and making it unconditional both left the suite green. The tests observe inside the reconnect factory: the first point after the entry guard runs and before the loop body's own reset would mask the difference. Raising a real cap gap through setWireBaselineWithCatchUp is the only way a test can obtain a cap-gap throwable, since CatchUpSendException is private to the loop. The PR body credited testTransportWindowResetsCapabilityGapWallClock, which exercises BackgroundDrainer's method-local counters -- a different mechanism that happens to share the name. close()'s catch of BatchTooLargeForCapException. Letting that throw escape skips sendCommitMessage, sealAndSwapBuffer and drainOnClose, abandoning every row an earlier successful flush already published. Every existing close() site wraps the call in catch (LineSenderException), and the new type extends it, so caught-inside and escaping are indistinguishable to them. The new test observes drainOnClose instead: against a server that never acks and a short close budget, reaching that step produces a drain timeout, and removing the catch makes it vanish. All three fail on the reverted production line and pass on it. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Two unrelated integrity items in the recovery paths. errno across free(). PersistedSymbolDict.open and openFresh route the refuse-vs-degrade decision on the errno of a failed stat, but read it through Files.length(String), which frees its native path pointer in a finally -- so on POSIX a libc free() lands between the failing stat and the Os.errno() JNI call. POSIX does not require free() to preserve errno; glibc only began saving and restoring it in 2.33, and this client's runtime floor is older. A clobber inverts the disposition: a genuinely absent file reads as a hard error and aborts build(), or a real EIO reads as ENOENT and degrades the session next to a possibly-populated side-file -- the cross-generation misattribution entry point the errno routing exists to close. A new statLength() helper stats through the pathPtr overload so the two calls stay adjacent, which is what every other errno read in this client already does: they all follow either a socket call or the fd-based length(int) overload. Windows was never affected -- its length0 saves the error into a TLS slot on every failing arm. The six test facades that injected stat faults through length(String) gained length(long) twins, so the injection still reaches production. One of them faults only the dictionary path and now tracks the pointer through allocNativePath rather than matching on the path string. Four comments that described the opposite of the code. SegmentManager and CursorSendEngine claimed the side-file gauge takes its dictionary's monitor, making "lock -> dict monitor" a documented nesting; appendedBytes() is a plain volatile read and must stay one, because it runs under the manager lock on the worker that drives provisioning for every ring while a producer can hold that monitor across mmap I/O. Sender attributed the segment-skip verdict to UnreplayableSlotException, which SegmentRing never constructs -- it throws SfRecoveryException, and with no manifest it quarantines and returns an empty recovery rather than refusing at all; narrowing that catch on the strength of the old comment would have restored the permanent build() brick. PersistedSymbolDict cited MmapSegment.scanFrames as precedent for updateUnsafe over a mapping; no such method exists and MmapSegment uses the native CRC. QwpWebSocketSender promised reclaimLogicalSlotLockOnClose is reset to true once connect() hands ownership back; nothing resets it. Also reattaches endpointPolicyFailureIsTerminal's javadoc, which sat stranded above a different method and so documented nothing, and drops the review-artifact references (C5, "the review found", "this PR") that stop resolving once this squashes. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
…va-questdb-client into qwp-delta-symbol-dict
preRegisterDictionaryChunks declines to chunk whenever the dict-only frame fits the cap -- but a data frame is dictionary section PLUS table body. When a full-dict sender's section landed within one table body of the cap, the combined frame overflowed, the split pre-flight sized every frame WITH the section (the baseline never advances in full-dict mode) and rejected a batch that was shippable. reset() could not recover -- the next batch re-references the same symbols -- and the error text's 'produce smaller batches' advice could not help, because full-dict mode re-sends the section on every frame. The producer was wedged until a larger-cap node appeared. flushPendingRows now falls back: when the combined frame is over cap in full-dict mode, the dictionary was not already chunked, the split would reject, and every table body fits with an empty delta, it publishes the dictionary through the extracted publishDictionaryChunks and re-encodes the batch against the resulting empty delta. The re-encode (rather than switching baselines inside the split) is forced by the encoder: beginMessage resets the buffer the split's staged body slices live in. The bodies-fit guard runs before any chunk publishes, so a genuinely oversized table still throws with nothing stranded on the ring -- pinned by testFullDictNearCapOversizedBodyStrandsNoChunks. Ordinary full-dict splits, delta mode, and the section-alone-over-cap chunker path are unchanged. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PFV4mYtzZqxr8gD9xSuJSu
PrReviewRedTests carried three tests behind a name and a javadoc that
framed the whole class as PR-17 scaffolding ("intentionally written to
FAIL on current vi_sf HEAD"). Two of them guard real invariants, so the
framing invited a future cleanup sweep to delete genuine coverage.
testC2 was the only test anywhere that fed SegmentRing.acknowledge a
seq above publishedFsn. testAcknowledgeIsMonotonic states the clamp in
prose but acks only 100/50/200 against publishedFsn=200, so it pins the
regression rule and never the clamp. It moves across as
testAcknowledgeClampsAtPublishedFsn, which asserts the exact clamp
(ackedFsn == publishedFsn) rather than the original's <= disjunction.
testC1 overlapped the existing torn-oldest-segment test, which already
uses the identical frame[0] CRC clobber. The residual case is the
single-segment slot: no valid sibling, so recovery reports the slot
empty and returns rather than refusing. It moves across as
testOpenExistingPreservesSoleSegmentWithTornFirstFrame and reuses the
existing corruptFrameZeroCrc helper instead of repeating the clobber.
The relocated javadoc drops testC1's claim that openExisting refuses
the slot with a typed UnreplayableSlotException. The original called
openExisting with no try/catch and passed, so it returns normally for
the single-segment case; the javadoc now describes what the test pins.
That stale claim is also why the UnreplayableSlotException import
looked load-bearing when it was only ever cited from a {@code} block.
testC7 asserted a stray QWP_CLIENT_REVIEW.md was absent. The file is
already gone, so it guarded a completed chore, and it could only fail
spuriously -- or, since it resolves the repo root from the surefire
working directory, silently check the wrong root and pass. Dropped
along with two imports the class never referenced.
SegmentRingTest and SegmentSkipQuarantineTest cited the deleted class
from their helper javadoc; both now point at the surviving tests.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The M1 fallback in flushPendingRows guards dictionary chunking with `!deltaDictEnabled`, but nothing pinned that conjunct: the fallback's other three conditions (messageSize > cap, a pessimistic splitFramesFit(cap, deltaBaseline) false, splitFramesFit(cap, currentBatchMaxSymbolId) true) are all reachable in plain delta mode too, and the existing delta-split test (testSplitPreflightAdvancesBaselineSoLaterFramesArentSizedWithTheDelta) passes under a gate-drop mutation by coincidence -- its sizing happens to leave the mutated frame count and varints matching what the test already asserts, so it does not distinguish the two code paths. A dropped gate would chunk the dictionary in delta mode, putting a frame on the ring before persistNewSymbolsBeforePublish's write-ahead persist runs -- an inversion that is safe only in full-dict mode, where there is no side-file and no such ordering invariant. testFullDictFallbackGateStaysOffInDeltaMode reuses the wave's near-cap sizing discipline in delta mode: 8 new 48-char symbols (392-byte delta section) referenced by a tiny-bodied t1, re-referenced by a ~200-byte-bodied t2. The combined frame exceeds the cap and splitFramesFit(cap, deltaBaseline) is pessimistically false, which would (gate dropped) chunk the dictionary and re-encode a single combined frame that then fits -- one dictionary-only frame ahead of one data frame. With the gate intact the ordinary split ships two DATA frames instead. The distinguishing assertion is on tableCount, not frame count, since both paths produce 2 frames on this sizing. Verified by mutation: deleting the gate's `!deltaDictEnabled &&` conjunct fails the test on the tableCount assertion; restoring it passes. publishDictionaryChunks now also opens with `assert !deltaDictEnabled`, converting any future gate-drop into a loud -ea failure for every caller, present or future. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PFV4mYtzZqxr8gD9xSuJSu
close() must discard a pre-flight-rejected batch and keep going -- commit, seal and DRAIN what an earlier successful flush published -- before rethrowTerminal surfaces the retained batch's error. Letting the throw escape skips all three and abandons the earlier rows. The e2e sibling QwpSenderOversizeRowInBatchTest asserts a real server's row count, which covers the commit half: mutating the escape back in turns it red with "txn timed out [expectedTxn=1, writerTxn=0]". It cannot cover the drain half. Over localhost the earlier rows are normally acked before close() is entered, so drainOnClose returns at its "ackedFsn >= target" early-out; mutating away only drainOnClose leaves that test green, so a regression there ships unnoticed. Asserting the close-drain witness fired in that test would only invert the flake: the witness runs past the early-out, so it stays unfired whenever the acks happen to arrive first. This test withholds every server ack until the witness releases it. The earlier row is therefore provably unacknowledged when close() reaches the drain, the early-out cannot fire, and the witness both records that the drain had real work and releases the acks that let close() finish -- so the assertion cannot be satisfied without the drain rather than merely correlating with it. Under the same skip-drainOnClose mutation it fails on the witness assertion. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
…va-questdb-client into qwp-delta-symbol-dict
An over-cap batch rejection left the sender wedged on two paths. reset() dropped the buffered rows but kept currentBatchMaxSymbolId, and the delta section a later flush encodes spans [sentMaxSymbolId+1 .. currentBatchMaxSymbolId]. The watermark the discarded batch left behind therefore made even a single-row batch re-encode the whole abandoned range and hit the same cap rejection, so a delta-mode sender could never flush again -- including through the reset() its own error message prescribes. reset() now clears the watermark, matching what resetTableBuffersAfterFlush already leaves after a successful flush and what sendCommitMessage reads as an empty delta. That message also claimed an over-cap dictionary had been handled upstream. preRegisterDictionaryChunks returns early in delta mode to preserve the write-ahead persist ordering, so the section can be the half that does not fit -- and reset() cannot shrink it, because the next batch still starts its delta at the same id. The message now picks its remedy from which half exceeds the cap, and names close-and-rebuild, a larger server cap, or a varchar column when the dictionary is what does not fit. publishDictionaryChunk put its chunks on the ring carrying FLAG_DEFER_COMMIT but never recorded the debt. The server withholds the ack for every deferred frame and clamps the connection's cumulative-ack watermark until the group commits, so when the batch meant to close that group threw instead -- an oversized table body reaching the split pre-flight -- flushPendingRows never reached its own hasDeferredMessages assignment, close() skipped sendCommitMessage, and ackedFsn froze for the connection's whole life: trim stopped for every frame and the ring filled. The chunk publish now sets the flag itself. A later successful flush reassigns it from its own deferCommit, which stays correct because that data frame closes the group. Two regression tests pin the fixes, each verified by reverting the production line it guards: - testResetClearsTheBatchSymbolWatermarkSoDeltaModeCanFlushAgain reddens when reset() stops clearing the watermark. - testCloseCommitsDictionaryChunksStrandedByAnOversizedBody reddens when publishDictionaryChunk stops setting hasDeferredMessages. Neither fix closes the wider gap behind it. Delta mode still has no chunking escape when a batch's own new symbols outgrow the cap, and preRegisterDictionaryChunks still publishes before the split pre-flight can reject the batch, so a retried flush re-appends the dictionary to the ring. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Counting .symbol-dict bytes against sf_max_total_bytes gave the cap a component no trim can reclaim. totalBytes never falls below the active segment, and the dictionary is append-only and survives restarts, so once side-file bytes passed maxTotalBytes - 2 * segmentSizeBytes the manager could never provision a hot spare again: the ring stalled at one segment, appendBlocking timed out every 30s, and the disk-full warning blamed an ACK-driven trim that cannot free dictionary bytes at all. A 64 MiB cap over 4 MiB segments reaches that state at 56 MiB of dictionary -- roughly a million symbols, which is the workload delta encoding exists for. In a pool the gauge sums every registered slot, so one slot's dictionary starved every other slot's provisioning. SegmentManager now guarantees each ring its minimum working set. The provisioning gate keeps the cap check, but when the cap refuses AND the ring holds fewer than MIN_LIVE_SEGMENTS segments, the manager provisions anyway and warns separately, naming the remedy the operator actually has -- raise the cap, or reduce symbol cardinality -- instead of a trim. The ring then cycles between one and two segments as acks arrive and ingestion continues, overshooting the cap by what the dictionary needs rather than stopping the pipeline. Above the floor the cap governs unchanged, so segment bytes, which trim does reclaim, still produce ordinary backpressure. The gauge also under-reported what it measured. ensureAppendMap rounds the append window up to APPEND_MAP_CAPACITY and calls Files.allocate, which reserves real disk blocks, and close() returns that tail only at the end of the session -- so a live slot occupies up to 4 MiB more than appendedBytes() reports, throughout the run rather than only after a crash. PersistedSymbolDict now tracks the reservation and exposes occupiedDiskBytes(), and CursorSendEngine wires the manager gauge to that. appendedBytes() keeps its old meaning, which a reopen preserves and PersistedSymbolDictTest pins. Both fixes are mutation-verified. Reverting the floor reddens the new SegmentManagerSideFileCapTest case with the ring stuck at one segment, while the two pre-existing cap tests stay green; reverting the gauge reddens the CursorSendEngineTest assertion. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
flushPendingRows pre-registered the full dictionary before it had sized the table bodies, so a batch whose body exceeds the cap left deferred, table-less chunk frames on the ring with no data frame behind them. The server withholds the ack for every deferred frame until its group commits, so those chunks froze ackedFsn and trim stopped for the whole connection -- and because the split's throw RETAINS the batch by design and its message tells the caller to retry, every retry appended another whole dictionary to a ring that could no longer be trimmed, until sf_max_total_bytes filled and the producer hard-backpressured. flushPendingRows now encodes at the current baseline first and chunks only through the near-cap fallback, whose splitFramesFit guard already proves the bodies fit an empty delta. That covers both shapes the eager pass handled -- the section alone over the cap, and the section over it only beside a body -- so preRegisterDictionaryChunks goes away and publishDictionaryChunks inherits its per-entry validation. Nothing reaches the ring for a batch that then throws, on the first attempt or any retry. Moving that validation off the common path also drops a per-flush O(dictionary) UTF-8 walk that ran on every full-dict flush and discarded its answer. sendCommitMessage bounded its delta with currentBatchMaxSymbolId in full-dict mode, on the premise -- stated in its own comment -- that the prior flush had reset it to -1. flushPendingRows returns early WITHOUT resetting it when pendingRowCount is 0 or every table is empty, and cancelRow leaves behind the id of a symbol it registered, so a commit reached through that window re-shipped the entire dictionary from id 0 in the one frame no cap check and no chunker covers. Passing the baseline as both bounds makes the delta empty by construction in either mode, which is the only shape a row-less commit needs. Both fixes are mutation-verified. Restoring the old commit bound reddens the new full-dict commit test with "it re-shipped 2 -- the whole dictionary from id 0"; dropping the bodies-fit guard reddens the new retry test at attempt 0 with two frames already on the ring, and the pre-existing near-cap test with three. testCloseCommitsDictionaryChunksStrandedByAnOversizedBody asserted the stranding this change removes, so it is rewritten as testSectionOverCapWithAnOversizedBodyPublishesNothingOnEveryRetry, which keeps its scenario and pins the opposite, stronger property. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
reset() is the recovery the over-cap rejection documents, but in delta mode it only worked by luck. A section is anchored at sentMaxSymbolId+1 and that watermark advances only on a PUBLISH, so symbols an abandoned batch registered sit permanently between the watermark and the dictionary tip. Whether the sender recovered depended on what the caller's next row happened to reference: reuse an already-registered symbol and the section was tiny, but touch any NEW one and it landed above the abandoned range and dragged all of it back in -- throwing identically, on every later batch, forever. reset() now returns those ids to the unassigned space through the new GlobalSymbolDictionary.truncateTo. The floor is what makes reuse safe: an id may be reclaimed only while nothing has bound it to a string yet, so reclaiming stops at the higher of sentMaxSymbolId+1 (in a frame on the ring, and in the send loop's catch-up mirror) and the persisted dictionary's size (the write-ahead persist runs before the publish, so a persist that succeeded under a publish that failed leaves durable ids above the watermark). Handing either to a different string is the silent symbol misattribution the dense id space exists to prevent. Full-dict mode is excluded. Its sections always start at id 0, so there is no lifetime anchor to shrink and nothing to gain, while reclaiming would let a later frame define a different string at an id a frame already on the ring defines -- the same hazard the floor guards. truncateTo rebuilds the reverse index rather than removing from it: CharSequenceIntHashMap has no remove(), and the rebuild is O(survivors) on a path only reached when ids are genuinely being reclaimed. It also nulls the discarded slots, since ObjList.setPos moves the cursor without releasing what it drops. Mutation-verified in both halves. With the reclaim removed the new test fails on the reclaimed-size assertion; with that assertion also removed it still fails, on the post-reset flush throwing with dictionaryFrameBytes=2030 -- the whole abandoned 40-symbol section back in the frame, which is the wedge itself. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
PR #66 review (round 2) —
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testFailedPublishThenNewSymbolPersistsSuffixWithoutDuplicating
brackets each oversized flush in a try/catch and expects the
PAYLOAD_TOO_LARGE failure to surface from flush(). On a loaded CI
host it surfaced from atNow() instead, failing the test.
The WebSocket transport defaults auto_flush_interval to 100 ms, not
the 1000 ms HTTP default. A failed flush leaves its rows buffered
and also leaves firstPendingRowTimeNanos untouched, because
sealAndSwapBuffer throws before flushPendingRows reaches
resetTableBuffersAfterFlush -- the only place that restarts the
clock. The buffered row therefore keeps ageing, and once the next
row commit lands more than 100 ms later, sendRow calls
shouldAutoFlush, re-publishes inside atNow, and throws there.
The CI log shows the gap was ~105 ms: segment provisioning plus a
backpressure spin between the first flush and the second row
commit. A local run with a 150 ms sleep before the second atNow
reproduces the failure byte-for-byte, same stack and same lines.
Park the three auto-flush thresholds in the config so only the
test's explicit flush() calls publish, matching the idiom
SelfSufficientFramesTest already uses. auto_flush=off is not an
option: the builder rejects it for WebSocket. Coverage is
unchanged -- the batch is still {s0, s1} and the appendSymbols
re-encode branch still runs; only the throw site was
non-deterministic.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Four failure paths around the persisted .symbol-dict could take a running sender down, or silently corrupt it, when the side-file itself was unusable. CursorSendEngine's discard branch closed the recovered dictionary but left the file on disk. Full-dict mode never rewrites it (persistNewSymbolsBeforePublish returns early on !deltaDictEnabled), so the survivor was sticky: the next recovery re-read it, and once an intervening session ingested fewer distinct symbols than it holds, the discard's recoveredMaxSymbolId >= size() guard stopped firing. Delta mode came back on and seedGlobalDictionaryFromPersisted anchored the producer on the previous generation's strings. Nothing detected it -- foldDelta's `deltaEnd <= runningCoverage` fast path declares those frames covered and never compares a string -- so the catch-up registered the stale strings, the replayed frames redefined the same ids, and every later row landed under the wrong symbol with row counts intact. The branch now unlinks the survivor, which is safe precisely there because it has already established maxDeltaStart() == 0. openFresh inferred "cannot be truncated" from "openCleanRW failed", though the probe only establishes that the file exists. An unlink needs no descriptor, so it succeeds in exactly the fd-exhaustion transients that fail the truncate; openFresh now tries that first. Refusing instead quarantined a slot holding no recoverable frames at all -- openFresh runs only on the fresh path -- and paged the caller with a DATA_LOSS "the affected data must be resent" for data that never existed, burning one of the 64 quarantine indices each time, after which build() failed permanently. The unlink is gated on the path being a regular file: FilesFacade.remove is remove(3) on POSIX and an explicit RemoveDirectoryW on Windows, so a directory occupying the dictionary's name keeps the refusal it always had. PersistedSymbolDict.open throws SfOperationalException, which extends IllegalStateException and so is not in Sender.build()'s quarantine catch list -- it escaped build() entirely. With a stable senderId and a retained slot, a non-clearing operational error (a hard EIO on that one file, a read-only mount, an ownership change) re-threw on every restart, so the application could not construct a Sender and could not even buffer new rows. In a pool it is worse: allocateSlotIndex() hands out the lowest free index, so the same bad slot is re-selected and every borrow() fails rather than the pool losing one slot of capacity. The constructor now defers that verdict past the fold and rethrows only when maxDeltaStart() > 0, i.e. when a frame genuinely references ids that live only in the unreadable file. Otherwise it clears the file and recovers in full-dict mode. sendDictCatchUp had no diagnostic for an oversize entry under a server that advertises no batch cap. soloFrameLimit is then MAX_SENT_DICT_BYTES, so the cap-gap terminal cannot fire, and packing only splits between entries -- the frame goes out whole, is closed with 1009, and is retried byte-identically forever. That retry-forever is correct and stays, but the connect succeeds every cycle so nothing logged the cause; the stall read as a healthy reconnect loop until store-and-forward filled and surfaced as an unrelated out-of-space error. A throttled WARN now names the entry and its size. Each fix carries a regression test verified to fail without it. Two existing tests in PersistedSymbolDictTest pinned the old refuse-don't-delete mechanism rather than the invariant behind it; they now assert the stronger property, that openClean never returns with a prior generation's survivor still on disk. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
publishDictionaryChunks publishes each chunk as its own DEFERRED frame, so from the first successful publish the flush owns a commit debt that only its own data frame closes. splitFramesFit proves the batch is shippable once chunked, but it says nothing about whether the frames that follow will actually publish: sealAndSwapBuffer throws on a buffer-recycle timeout and on appendBlocking's backpressure deadline and PAYLOAD_TOO_LARGE paths, none of which a size check can see. Published frames cannot be rolled back, and the batch is retained on these paths by design, so the chunks stayed on the ring with their group open. The server withholds the ack for every deferred frame until its group commits, so ackedFsn froze for the connection's whole life: trim stopped for every frame, the ring filled, and each retry appended another full copy of the dictionary, because full-dict mode re-derives deltaBaseline == -1 and chunking restarts from id 0. Ingestion in that process was dead until a restart, though the on-disk state self-heals -- recovery retires a deferred-only tail as an aborted transaction. publishDictionaryChunks now closes the group when a chunk after the first throws, and flushPendingRows closes it when anything after the chunk publish throws. close() no longer skips that recovery either: its catch named only BatchTooLargeForCapException, so any other flush failure bypassed sendCommitMessage, sealAndSwapBuffer and drainOnClose -- abandoning every row an earlier successful flush had published, and leaving an orphaned group open for good. Two limits are deliberate. The commit publishes through the same seal path that just failed, so under backpressure it fails too; its failure is attached to the original as a suppressed cause rather than replacing it. And when the failure came from the split path the group may also hold some of the batch's table frames, so committing can apply a partial batch -- accepted because the retained batch's retry re-sends every table and dedup collapses the overlap, whereas leaving the group open kills ingestion outright. The regression test is the uncovered twin of testSectionOverCapWithAnOversizedBodyPublishesNothingOnEveryRetry, which pins only the route the pre-flight closes. It sizes sf_max_segment_bytes between the chunk frame and the data frame so the chunks publish and the data frame then fails deterministically, and asserts at the wire that the last frame clears FLAG_DEFER_COMMIT. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
[PR Coverage check]😍 pass : 1785 / 1943 (91.87%) file detail
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Code review —
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Follow-up: customer exposure of the Moderate findingsCompanion to the review above, which ranked the 11 Moderate findings by certainty of defect. Overlaying customer exposure produces an almost inverse ordering, which is worth having on the record before triage. No Moderate finding impacts a customer today. Every one is either test-only, or a coverage gap over production code that traced correct on inspection. So the useful question is not "impact today" but "what does a customer see if the behaviour this guards regresses, or if the latent trigger fires".
What this reorders
Prioritised by customer risk rather than defect certainty, the order becomes M12 -> M9 -> M2 -> M3 / M1 / M5 -> M6 -> M8 -> M7 / M10 / M11. M12 in particular is a one-line change (move Two caveats on reading this table
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Tandem
This change lands together with its counterparts (merge as a set):
java-questdb-clientsubmodule, and adds one server-side change: the ingress decoder now rejects a delta symbol dictionary whose start id runs past the connection dictionary, atomically and with a dedicated retriable error, instead of null-padding the hole. See "Server-side gap rejection" below.SqlFailoverQwpClientLosslessTest, file-mode failover) runs end-to-end against this change.Summary
Every QWP ingress message used to carry the entire symbol dictionary, so a connection that ingests many distinct symbols re-transmitted the whole dictionary on every message. This change makes the client register each symbol id with the server only once per connection and send only new ids (a delta) thereafter, re-registering the full dictionary when a connection is replaced.
The bandwidth saving grows with symbol cardinality and message count; for low-cardinality or short-lived connections it is negligible, and the change adds the costs described under Tradeoffs.
What changed
Memory mode
Store-and-forward (file mode)
PersistedSymbolDict) so a recovered or orphan-drained slot on a fresh process -- which has no in-memory dictionary -- can rebuild what its (non-self-sufficient) delta frames reference.Catch-up split
Full-dictionary mode: the dictionary chunks when it outgrows the batch cap
A full-dictionary frame carries the whole dictionary from id 0, so its fixed overhead grows with lifetime symbol cardinality. Against the OSS default
DEFAULT_MAX_BATCH_SIZE(16 MiB) that overhead reaches the cap at roughly 800k symbols of 20 bytes, ~165k of 100 bytes, or ~16k of 1 KB. Past that point every frame was oversized however the batch was split: the split pre-flight rejected it,reset()discards rows rather than the dictionary so the next batch failed identically, and the sender could not flush again until it was closed and rebuilt. Two paths reached it -- a mid-life degrade (disableDeltaDict) on a large delta-mode dictionary, and, with no fault at all, ordinary growth on a slot whose.symbol-dictnever opened.The producer now registers the dictionary up front as deferred, table-less frames, each carrying a contiguous id range sized under the cap -- the same chunking the reconnect catch-up already does -- and the batch's data frames follow with an empty delta.
That makes the data frames depend on the chunks, which full-dictionary mode otherwise avoids. The dependency is safe one level up: the server does not ack a deferred frame individually (
QwpIngressUpgradeProcessormarks uncommitted deferred rows so the cumulative-ack watermark cannot pass them, andQwpIngressProcessorStateclamps and logscriticalif it ever tries), so a deferred group cannot be trimmed part-way. The group is self-sufficient even though its frames are not, and recovery replays it whole with the chunk deltas folded before the data frames.Delta mode is deliberately excluded: there the section covers only the batch's new symbols, and publishing before
persistNewSymbolsBeforePublishwould break the write-ahead ordering -- a crash in between would leave frames referencing ids the.symbol-dictcannot describe. The pre-registration is also a no-op unless the dictionary section leaves no room for a table body, so behaviour below that threshold is unchanged.Server-side gap rejection (OSS half)
Delta framing makes a non-zero start id reachable on the wire for the first time, so the decoder's handling of one now matters.
QwpMessageCursor.parseDeltaSymbolDictgrew the connection dictionary with nulls up todeltaStartId + deltaCount, which inflatedsize()-- the very boundQwpSymbolColumnCursorchecks an incoming symbol index against. A row referencing a padded id therefore passed the bounds check, read back null, and landed a NULL symbol value with no error.The decoder now rejects
deltaStartId > size()with its own error code,DELTA_DICT_GAP, surfaced to the sender as a new wire status byte,STATUS_DICTIONARY_GAP(0x0D). The gap verdict depends on this connection's dictionary coverage -- server state, not the frame's bytes -- so unlike a parse error it is retriable: the server sends the NACK and keeps the connection open, and the sender recycles the wire and re-registers from an id the server actually holds. A contiguous append (deltaStartId == size()) and a lower start that re-registers or remaps existing ids both stay allowed. The parse is atomic on failure: a rejected delta restores every entry it overwrote and nulls the slots it grew into, so the connection dictionary is exactly what it was before the frame and can never hold a null.Wire-compat note: the server now rejects a frame shape it previously (wrongly) accepted, and 0x0D is a status byte no earlier server emitted, under an unchanged protocol version. QWP is experimental and unreleased, and the bundled client moves in lockstep with the server, which is what the
tandemlabels assert; this client maps an unknown status byte to a retriable category, so an older bundled client against a newer server degrades to retry rather than failing. This client cannot emit a gapped frame -- its send loop refuses to -- so the guard exists for a client bug, a torn store-and-forward dictionary, or a third-party implementation.Symbol dictionary capacity
The server caps a connection's symbol dictionary at 1,000,000 distinct values (
MAX_SYMBOL_DICTIONARY_SIZE, pre-existing). Before this change the practical ceiling was far lower: every message re-shipped the dictionary prefix from id 0, so per-message cost grew with lifetime cardinality and a large dictionary outgrew the frame budget long before the cap. Delta encoding removes that per-message cost, which makes the protocol cap the binding constraint for the first time — and because the producer's baseline is lifetime-monotonic, the reconnect catch-up would trip the server's rejection on every reconnect, including recovered slots and orphan drainers, stranding an already-buffered store-and-forward backlog with no error ever reaching the producer.The client therefore enforces the cap at registration: creating the 1,000,001st distinct symbol value throws a
LineSenderExceptionfromsymbol()naming the limit and the recovery, before the row is buffered. Rows using already-registered values are unaffected. Everything buffered stays deliverable — the server's check is>, so a dictionary of exactly the cap still catches up cleanly. To reset the id space, close the sender and build a new one: a fully drained close removes the slot's dictionary side-file, so the rebuilt sender starts fresh. Reaching a million distinct values in symbol columns usually means the data belongs invarchar.The server-side rejection itself keeps its parse-error (terminal) classification: with the registration guard, this client cannot reach it, the same unreachability argument the gap status relies on for old clients.
Recovery-time side-file disposition
PersistedSymbolDict.open()— the recovery entry point — now mirrors the Rust client'sopen_recovereddisposition matrix:SfOperationalExceptioninstead of silently degrading to full-dictionary frames.Sender.build()aborts without quarantining andBackgroundDrainerleaves the slot for a later scan, so a transient can no longer permanently quarantine an intact backlog, and a degraded session can no longer write frames next to a stale populated side-file that a later recovery would trust — the silent cross-generation symbol-misattribution chain loses its only organic entry point.openClean()(the fresh-slot truncate-or-refuse path) is unchanged.Coverage equivalent to the earlier generation-stamp test (
testRecoveryDiscardsADictionaryFromAnotherGeneration, removed with the stamp) is restored bytestTransientDictFaultOnRecoveredSlotFailsLoudAndRetryRecoversInFull, which drives the three-session chain end-to-end and proves it now breaks at session B with the slot byte-identical, nothing quarantined, and a full recovery on retry.Slot quarantine: deterministic recovery failures set the slot aside
A recovery failure that is deterministic -- a torn slot whose surviving frames cannot be replayed without corrupting data, an unreadable interior segment, a corrupt segment chain -- no longer aborts
Sender.build()forever or spins the orphan drainer.Sender.build()andBackgroundDrainercatch the typed exceptions (UnreplayableSlotException,SfRecoveryException,MmapSegmentCorruptionException), rename the whole slot directory aside for operator attention, dispatch a synchronousSenderError, and continue on a fresh slot. Renaming the whole directory guarantees the replacement starts empty and cannot fail the same way twice. Operational failures -- e.g. a drained-slot leftover whose unlink fails -- deliberately stay plain aborts that retry, rather than quarantining data that is still deliverable.Mmap faults on the dictionary path degrade instead of killing the sender
MmapSegment.isMmapAccessFaultrecognizes theInternalErrorHotSpot raises for an access to an unbacked page (delivered asynchronously before JDK 21, JDK-8283699). The dictionary-side consumers (persistNewSymbolsBeforePublish,healPersistedDictionary) treat a recognized fault as a persist failure and degrade the sender to full self-sufficient frames (disableDeltaDict) instead of propagating an untypedError; an unrecognizedInternalErrorstill propagates. Segment recovery itself validates every page through positioned reads before mapping, so the recovery scan cannot hit a late-delivered fault on pages it has not already read.Reconnect policy: post-connect endpoint rejections retry instead of killing the producer
Once a foreground sender has completed its first connection (including the dictionary catch-up), a later WebSocket upgrade rejection or durable-ack capability mismatch no longer latches a producer-fatal terminal: the send loop retries with backoff while store-and-forward keeps buffering, and the failure is reported through
SenderErrordispatch. At build/initialization time these failures still surface loudly. Auth failures on the orphan drainer, and initialization-time failures in all modes, keep their previous terminal behaviour.hasEverConnectedlatches only after the catch-up succeeds, so a first connection that fails inside the catch-up still counts as never-connected and keeps endpoint-policy failures terminal.P-C8:
.symbol-dictbytes count againstsf_max_total_bytesThe provisioning cap check compared
.sfasegment bytes only, while thesymbol dictionary's side-file grows monotonically over the sender's
lifetime -- so dictionaries could fill the SF filesystem while the cap
reported headroom.
SegmentManagernow reads a live per-slot gauge(
PersistedSymbolDict.occupiedDiskBytes(), wired at engineregistration) at every cap check, and the throttled disk-full warning
breaks the dictionary component out as
sideFileBytes=. Memory mode anddegraded full-dict sessions are unaffected (no side-file, no gauge).
The gauge reports the side-file's real footprint, not its logical one.
ensureAppendMaprounds the append window up toAPPEND_MAP_CAPACITYand calls
Files.allocate, which reserves real blocks, andclose()returns that tail only at the end of the session -- so a live slot
occupies up to 4 MiB more than its committed prefix throughout the run,
not just after a crash.
appendedBytes()keeps the logical meaning,which a reopen preserves;
occupiedDiskBytes()ismax(committed, reserved).Counting a component no trim can reclaim needs a liveness floor, or the
cap deadlocks instead of backpressuring.
totalBytesnever falls belowthe active segment and the dictionary never shrinks, so once side-file
bytes passed
maxTotalBytes - 2 * segmentSizeBytesthe manager couldnever provision a hot spare again: the ring stalled at one segment, the
producer saw a 30 s
appendBlockingtimeout, and the state survivedrestarts -- while the disk-full warning pointed at an ACK-driven trim
that cannot free dictionary bytes. The cap check now guarantees every
ring its minimum working set (the active segment plus one spare): when
the cap refuses and the ring is below that floor, the manager provisions
anyway and warns separately, naming the remedy the operator actually has
(raise
sf_max_total_bytes, or reduce symbol cardinality). The ringthen cycles between one and two segments as acks arrive and ingestion
continues, overshooting the cap by what the dictionary needs rather than
stopping. Above the floor the cap governs unchanged, so segment bytes --
which trim does reclaim -- still produce ordinary backpressure.
Durability
The persisted dictionary intentionally does not fsync, matching the rest of store-and-forward: it is process-crash durable (the OS page cache survives a JVM crash) but not host-crash durable. Rather than fsync only the dictionary -- which would not make the frame data itself host-crash durable -- a host crash that tears the dictionary is caught rather than silently trusted. Each side-file chunk carries a CRC-32C over its header and batched entry bytes (the same checksum the SF segment frames use), so recovery stops at the first torn or mismatched chunk and trusts only the intact prefix; the send loop then detects any surviving delta frame whose start id exceeds that prefix and fails cleanly with a "resend required" error instead of transmitting a gapped frame that would corrupt the table.
Tradeoffs
Each reconnect/failover now replays the full dictionary as a catch-up frame, so a reconnect on a very high-cardinality connection ships the whole dictionary once (previously every message did).
File mode writes a per-slot dictionary side-file (extra disk I/O and one small file per slot).
Without fsync, a host/power crash can still lose recently persisted symbols, and the affected data must be re-sent. Every detectable tear now fails clean rather than corrupting: the per-chunk CRC-32C catches an interior page lost out of order (or a stale chunk left by a failed best-effort truncate) that would otherwise shift the dense id->symbol mapping, so recovery trusts only the intact prefix and the send loop forces a "resend required" for the rest. A tail truncate that itself fails makes the file untrusted; recovery leaves it intact and falls back to full-dictionary frames rather than exposing stale bytes. The one residual is a tear that happens to leave a CRC-matching byte run -- a 1-in-2^32-per-chunk collision, no weaker than the SF frames' own checksum.
On failover to a node advertising a smaller batch cap, a symbol accepted under a larger or absent cap can exceed the new cap during the catch-up. A foreground sender retries that indefinitely and recovers on its own once a larger-cap node returns, so store-and-forward contains the window instead of surfacing it to the producer. Only an orphan drainer gives up, and only after both 16 consecutive cap gaps and a minimum wall-clock dwell (
catch_up_cap_gap_min_escalation_window_millis, 5 minutes by default); it then sets its slot aside for an operator and that slot's data must be re-sent. This cannot happen on a homogeneous cluster -- a symbol that fit inside a data frame under a given cap always fits the smaller catch-up frame under the same cap -- so it only affects heterogeneous/rolling-cap clusters or an operator lowering the cap below existing data.The server-side gap rejection turns a previously silent (and silently wrong) frame into a NACK. The rejection is retriable by design -- a gap is a statement about per-connection server state, and re-registering from a held id resolves it -- but a sender that persistently re-sends the same gapped frame escalates through the poison-frame detector to a terminal error rather than looping forever.
Quarantine trades availability of one slot's data for the rest of the pipeline: a slot set aside must be re-sent (or inspected and restored by an operator), and the sender continues on a fresh slot instead of blocking.
In full-dictionary mode a batch whose dictionary exceeds the cap now ships that dictionary as several extra frames per batch rather than failing. The bytes are what full-dictionary mode already paid -- the dictionary was always in every frame -- but they are spread over more frames, each carrying its own header and two varints. If a table body is still oversized after chunking, the split pre-flight throws with the dictionary chunks already published as deferred, row-less frames. They are harmless (a later commit over them is a no-op, and the next flush re-publishes) but they are a departure from the strict all-or-nothing the split otherwise gives.
A single symbol value larger than the cap cannot be split across frames. It is now refused before any chunk is published, with a dedicated error naming the symbol id, rather than surfacing as an unexplained oversized batch.
Follow-ups (known, deliberately not in this PR)
Sender.build()'s rollback closes the cursor engine without the failed-stop check the close-delegation protocol requires, andPersistedSymbolDictmakes the send loop's mirror a borrower of the engine's native memory — so a throw landing in the narrow window after the I/O thread starts, combined with a thread that outlives the 30 s stop (in practice an OOM), could free memory a live I/O thread still reads. The reachable window is effectively theoretical, and the fix (move the rollback close intoQwpWebSocketSender.connect's catch, which owns the engine and honours the protocol) touches teardown paths not worth destabilizing here. It must land together with narrowingensureConnected's blanket exception wrap, which currently masks the worse variant of the same defect: fixing either alone makes the other worse.accumulateSentDictstill runs per frame: it re-walks the already-held dictionary prefix varint-by-varint on the I/O thread and, when the loop was constructed with the delta dict already disabled, accumulates a native mirror nothing ever reads. Both are constant-factor costs on a mode that already re-sends the whole dictionary per frame, so the fix (carrying the encoder's entries-length as sideband on ring entries, plus offset arithmetic for the identical prefix) waits for profiling evidence rather than adding plumbing here.c-questdb-client) already enforces a producer-side dictionary cap (SymbolGlobalDict::internerrors at the cap), but its constantMAX_CONN_SYMBOL_DICT_SIZE = 8_388_608was taken from the egress/result-batch direction, not the ingress server's 1,000,000 — so its guard cannot fire before the server rejection. One-line constant fix (plus comment correction) needed in that repo.reset()as the non-destructive recovery, and (since the id reclaim above) that now holds for a delta-mode sender whatever the next batch references. The pre-flight is still whole-flush, though: one unsplittable table's batch blocks other tables' healthy batches behind the same exception until reset()/close(), andsendRow's per-row guard checks raw column bytes without the frame overhead (header, delta section, table name), so a batch can pass the row guard and still exceed the cap. Per-table pre-flight and an overhead-aware row guard are the follow-up.segmentSizeBytesinstead of the fixed 4 MiBAPPEND_MAP_CAPACITY.Until then
ensureAppendMappreallocates in 4 MiB steps, so a crashcan leave up to a 4 MiB allocated-but-unaccounted tail per slot; a
clean
close()truncates it back. Trigger for doing it: tighteningsmall-cap configurations (cap comparable to a few segments), where a
4 MiB tail is a material fraction of the budget.
bytes initially meant a configuration where
sideFileBytes + 2 * segmentSize > sf_max_total_bytescould never provision a hot spareagain, deadlocking ingestion across restarts. The cap check now
guarantees each ring its minimum working set, so that configuration
backpressures and recovers instead of stalling; see the P-C8 section.
What remains deliberately unimplemented is a cap-vs-dictionary
validation at construction -- the floor makes the condition survivable
and diagnosable, not impossible -- and an operator whose dictionary
outgrows the cap will see the throttled "provisioning past
sf_max_total_bytes" warning rather than a rejected config.
discards its recovered
.symbol-dictbut leaves the file on disk with anull gauge, so its bytes sit outside the cap for that session. The
residue is static (nothing appends to it) and is cleared by a fully
drained close or the next fresh session's truncate; unlinking at
discard time needs its own analysis before we do it.
Test plan
DeltaDictCatchUpTest-- reconnect catch-up rebuilds the dictionary (memory mode); a large dictionary splits across multiple catch-up frames under a small advertised batch cap and reassembles gap-free.DeltaDictRecoveryTest-- a recovered file-mode slot replays its delta frames against a fresh server; a torn (host-crash) dictionary is caught by the per-chunk CRC and only the intact prefix is trusted.PersistedSymbolDictTest-- side-file append/read/orphan-removal round trips, and a multi-byte UTF-8 round trip across reopen (every other symbol in these suites is ASCII, where a symbol's UTF-8 byte length and its char count agree, so a confusion between the two would otherwise go unnoticed).GlobalSymbolDictionaryTest,DeltaDictCeilingTest-- the 1,000,000-entry protocol cap: the boundary entry is accepted, the next is refused without mutation,cancelRow()recovers the row, the sender keeps working with registered values, and the refused symbol never reaches the wire.CursorWebSocketSendLoopCatchUpAlignmentTest-- the split catch-up's chunks must tile[0, n)exactly: the captured frames are reassembled through the same decoder the end-to-end tests use and compared per id, so an overlap, a gap or a shift all fail. Also covers a reconnect with an empty dictionary (no catch-up frame at all) and a split over entries of differing widths.SelfSufficientFramesTest,ReconnectTest-- full-dict fallback and reconnect replay still hold.MmapFaultDegradesTest-- a recognized mmap access fault on the dictionary persist path degrades the sender to full-dict frames; an unrecognizedInternalErrorstill propagates.MmapSegmentRecoveryFaultTest-- single-segment recovery fault shapes: read errors, short reads, size changes and unbacked pages fail closed before mapping or skip the unbacked tail.SegmentSkipQuarantineTest,SegmentRecoveryIntegrityTest,BackgroundDrainerUnreplayableSlotQuarantineTest-- deterministic recovery failures quarantine the whole slot and the replacement starts empty; a drained-slot leftover whose unlink fails aborts and retries instead of quarantining.CursorWebSocketSendLoopForegroundReconnectPolicyTest-- post-connect endpoint rejections retry on a foreground sender; initialization-time failures stay terminal; a first connect that fails inside the catch-up does not latchhasEverConnected.SlotLockTest-- lock lifecycle, including the pid-sidecar-before-lock unlink order on retirement.OSS
QwpSymbolDecoderTest-- a gapped delta is rejected withDELTA_DICT_GAP(routed to theDICTIONARY_GAPstatus), thedeltaStartId == size()boundary is still accepted, a rejected delta restores every overwritten entry and leaves no nulls -- including when the rejected frame was the connection's first.The enterprise
SqlFailoverQwpClientLosslessTest(file-mode failover) passes end-to-end against a real server, asserting per row that every surviving SYMBOL is the value its id implies.PersistedSymbolDictTest pins every disposition: each transient (stat, open, mmap, short read, truncate) throws SfOperationalException with the file byte-identical and a subsequent open recovering in full; absent/stub/bad-magic report null with nothing created or destroyed
DeltaDictRecoveryTest#testTransientDictFaultOnRecoveredSlotFailsLoudAndRetryRecoversInFull drives the three-session misattribution chain: session B fails loudly, the slot stays intact and unquarantined, and the retry replays the backlog with every wire-reconstructed id resolving to the original string
Both directions of the torn-dictionary defense are re-enabled: the fixtures now trim through the live
SegmentManager(prefix-ACK, manifest-correct head trim), soCursorWebSocketSendLoopTornDictGuardTestproves the pre-send guard refuses a gapped frame and ships nothing, andDeltaDictRecoveryTest#testFullyAckedTornSlotResumesInPlaceWithoutQuarantinelands exactly on theackedFsn == recoveredCommitBoundaryFsnboundary (a>=->>mutation reddens it) and resumes in place without quarantine.The fixture-driven quarantine tests pin the dictionary-gap verdict via the
.failedsentinel content, and a deliberate chain-boundary test keeps the missing-head-segment fail-closed path covered on purpose instead of by accident.DictionaryGapNackTest-- first end-to-end 0x0D: a realDICTIONARY_GAPNACK recycles the wire, replays from the ack watermark, materialises the server-side dictionary gap-free, and neither latches a terminal nor poison-escalates on a single gap.CloseDrainTestcovers both branches of close()'s drain-timeout outage naming: a 401-after-upgrade produces "the wire is not draining: WebSocket upgrade rejected with HTTP 401", and the never-dropped wire keeps the generic guidance tail. The test-onlywriteAckWatermarkhelper now writes the realAckWatermarkformat (its legacy 16-byte stamps were silently reset on open, i.e. no-ops).SenderErrorgains a first-class classification for permanent data loss:Category.DATA_LOSS+Policy.ABANDONED, constructible only through thedataLoss()factory, withgetQuarantinedPath()naming where the abandoned bytes remain. The previousPROTOCOL_VIOLATION/TERMINALclassification promised a throw that never comes after quarantine-and-continue; handlers can now discriminate data loss by category instead of message text (mirrors the Rust client'sStoreResendRequired).SenderPoolrecovery builds now deliver quarantine notifications to the user'serrorHandler: a provenance filter (DATA_LOSS, or a real server status byte) routed through a pool-ownedSenderErrorDispatcher, so an unreplayable slot found during pool recovery is no longer announced to nobody. Pinned bySenderPoolDataLossNotificationTest-- delivery, suppression of environmental noise (mutation-verified), NACK passthrough, and a blocking-handler close() bound.BackgroundDrainergains an error sink (pool-default, drainer-override) and all five.failed-sentinel abandonment sites dispatchSenderError.dataLoss, closing the paths where buffered data was abandoned with only an unbound slf4j logger as witness.The OK-ack path's wire sequence gains the lower clamp its NACK sibling already had, closing an overflow-wrap path (negative dict-catch-up baseline + corrupt/hostile negative sequence -> ack-and-trim of unsent frames); both paths now warn on any out-of-range sequence.
Perf (review C5):
sendRow()drops from two O(columns) walks per row to one — the batch-cap guard folds intoQwpTableBuffer.nextRow(snapshotBytes, maxRowBytes)'s existing padding walk and throws before the commit motion, so rollback semantics are unchanged. Behavioural note: the guard now measures the row including padding-null bytes (they go into the wire frame), so a row whose values fit the cap but whose padding pushes it over is now rejected up front instead of producing an oversize frame the server closes with 1009.Perf (review C4, server side, in the OSS PR):
QwpMessageCursorreleases the delta-dict rollback scratch by prefix instead ofObjList.clear()'s whole-backing-array fill, removing full-capacity fills on catch-up/replay/full-dict frames.SelfSufficientFramesTest#testDictionaryLargerThanTheCapShipsAsChunkedDictionaryFrames-- 40 symbols against a 512-byte cap: the flush succeeds, every frame respects the cap, and the chunks reassemble through the same decoder the delta suites use, gap-free and in id order.#testSingleSymbolLargerThanTheCapThrowsWithNothingPublished-- an unshippable symbol is refused with nothing on the ring.#testSectionOverCapWithAnOversizedBodyPublishesNothingOnEveryRetry-- an over-cap section beside an over-cap body publishes nothing, on the first flush and on every retry (this replaces#testCloseCommitsDictionaryChunksStrandedByAnOversizedBody, which asserted the stranding the change removes).#testFullDictCommitFrameCarriesNoDictionaryAfterACancelledRow-- the commit frame registers no symbols after a cancelled row leaked an id.SelfSufficientFramesTest#testCloseStillDrainsWhenTheRetainedBatchIsOverCap--close()discards an over-cap retained batch and still runs its commit, seal and drain steps, so rows an earlier successful flush published are not abandoned. Asserted throughdrainOnClose, because every close() site catches the parentLineSenderExceptionand cannot otherwise distinguish caught-inside from escaping.CursorWebSocketSendLoopCatchUpAlignmentTest#testHostileNegativeAckSequenceCannotTrimUnsentFrames-- the OK-path ACK lower clamp: against the negativefsnAtZeroa multi-frame catch-up produces, a corrupt or hostile negative wire sequence would wrap the sum positive and ack published-but-unsent frames.CursorWebSocketSendLoopCatchUpAlignmentTest#testConnectLoopEntryKeepsTheCapGapEpisodeForACapGapCauseand#testConnectLoopEntryRestartsTheCapGapEpisodeForAnUnrelatedCause-- the reconnect loop's entry guard, both directions. Accrual inside a singleconnectLoopinvocation is guarded separately, so neither direction was covered before.Each of the four is verified by reverting the production line it guards: the tests fail without it and pass with it.
reset()returns never-shipped symbol ids. Delta mode anchors every section atsentMaxSymbolId+1, and that watermark advances only on a publish, so symbols an abandoned batch registered sat permanently between the watermark and the dictionary tip. Whetherreset()-- the recovery the over-cap rejection documents -- actually worked therefore depended on what the caller's next row happened to reference: reusing an already-registered symbol gave a tiny section, while any NEW symbol landed above the abandoned range and dragged all of it back in, throwing identically on every later batch.reset()now reclaims those ids throughGlobalSymbolDictionary.truncateTo, stopping at the higher ofsentMaxSymbolId+1(in a frame on the ring and in the send loop's mirror) and the persisted dictionary's size (the write-ahead persist runs before the publish, so a persist that succeeded under a publish that failed leaves durable ids above the watermark) -- handing either to a different string is the silent misattribution the dense id space exists to prevent. Full-dict mode is excluded: its sections start at id 0, so there is nothing to shrink, and reclaiming would let a later frame redefine an id a frame on the ring already defines. Mutation-verified in both halves.reset()cannot shrink a dictionary.flushPendingRowsencodes at the current baseline, and when the split would reject a batch whose bodies DO fit an empty delta, it publishes the section as deferred, table-less chunk frames throughpublishDictionaryChunksand re-encodes against that empty delta (the re-encode is forced:beginMessageresets the buffer the split's staged body slices live in). Publishing happens only behind that bodies-fit proof, so nothing reaches the ring for a batch that then throws -- on the first attempt or any retry. An earlier revision pre-registered the dictionary before sizing the bodies; because the split's throw retains the batch by design and its message invites a retry, every retry appended another whole dictionary to a ring whose ack watermark was frozen (the server withholds the ack for a deferred frame until its group commits), untilsf_max_total_bytesfilled. Pinned by wire-shape tests with deterministic 504-vs-512 sizing, a retry test assertingpublishedFsnnever advances for an unshippable batch, and a delta-mode test proving the fallback stays off where the write-ahead persist ordering forbids it (mutation-verified in both directions).sendCommitMessagebounded its delta withcurrentBatchMaxSymbolIdin full-dict mode, on the premise -- stated in its own comment -- that the prior flush had reset it to -1.flushPendingRowsreturns early WITHOUT resetting it whenpendingRowCountis 0 or every table is empty, andcancelRowleaves behind the id of a symbol it registered, so a commit reached through that window re-shipped the entire dictionary from id 0 -- in the one frame no cap check and no chunker covers, which the chunking above otherwise exists to prevent. Passing the baseline as both bounds makes the delta empty by construction, which is the only shape a row-less commit needs. Mutation-verified against the cancelled-row path.hasReplayDictionaryDependencyis false for a live full-dict slot, so no reconnect catch-up is sent, while the group's data frames now carry an empty delta that depends on separately-published chunk frames. Reading the tandem server, that group IS atomic with respect to trim --markUncommittedDeferredRowsfires for every deferred frame including a row-less one, and no ack is emitted for a deferred frame at all -- so the disconnect window this bullet previously described ("between a dict-chunk frame's ack and its data frames' acks") does not actually exist against it; the earlier wording was wrong. Process-crash recovery is likewise covered, because the chunks' non-zero delta start turns the catch-up back on. What remains is that a client invariant now rests entirely on a server behaviour: against any deferred-ack hole (an older server mid-rolling-upgrade, an intermediary) the data frame meets an empty dictionary and the outcome is a loudSTATUS_DICTIONARY_GAP-> poison terminal and batch loss, never silent corruption. The cheap fix is to stop deriving the dependency from the engine mode:trySendOnealready decodes each frame's delta start, so latchingsawNonZeroDeltaStartthere and folding it into the catch-up gate makes the chunked case self-healing on every reconnect. Untested either way today.🤖 Generated with Claude Code