Fix shell injection in GitHub Actions workflows#2
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persimmon16 merged 1 commit intofeat/apple-containerfrom Apr 1, 2026
Merged
Fix shell injection in GitHub Actions workflows#2persimmon16 merged 1 commit intofeat/apple-containerfrom
persimmon16 merged 1 commit intofeat/apple-containerfrom
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Summary
${{ }}expressions fromrun:blocks toenv:blocks across all CI workflows to prevent shell metacharacter injection via crafted PR titles, branch names, or workflow inputsAffected workflows:
docker-build.yml,e2e-test.yml,release-canary.ymlTest plan
${{ }}expressions remain inrun:blocks (exceptsteps.*.outputs.*which are safe)