Vetty is a security sandbox tool that runs untrusted code inside Firecracker micro-VMs. Security is a core concern of this project.
The following are considered in scope for security reports:
- VM escape — Guest code breaking out of the Firecracker VM boundary
- Host compromise — Guest code gaining unauthorized access to the host system
- Daemon vulnerabilities — Issues in the REST API, WebSocket, or vsock listener that could be exploited
- Network isolation bypass — Guest traffic bypassing NAT rules or accessing unintended host services
- Privilege escalation — Any path from unprivileged guest code to elevated host privileges
Please do NOT report security vulnerabilities through public GitHub issues.
Instead, please email: security@vetty.dev
Include:
- Description of the vulnerability
- Steps to reproduce
- Potential impact assessment
- Any suggested fixes (optional)
- Acknowledgment: Within 48 hours
- Initial assessment: Within 1 week
- Fix or mitigation: Depends on severity, typically within 30 days
| Version | Supported |
|---|---|
| 0.1.x (current) | ✅ |
Vetty is under active development and has not been formally audited. Known limitations:
- The host network setup uses
iptablesrules managed viasudo— misconfiguration could weaken isolation - The mitmproxy HTTPS interception requires a CA certificate trusted by the guest, which is baked into the rootfs
- Serial console access gives interactive shell access to the guest VM
Do not rely on Vetty as a sole security boundary for adversarial workloads in production environments.
- Run Firecracker with the recommended production host setup
- Keep Firecracker updated to the latest stable release
- Use a dedicated user for running Vetty with minimal privileges
- Review iptables rules after Vetty exits to ensure cleanup