中文在前，English below.
这个面板没有登录体系，并且能修改防火墙、操作 Docker 容器。它的设计前提是 只在可信内网或 VPN 中访问。
如果你把它直接暴露到公网，那不是漏洞，是配置错误——就像把没有密码的 Redis 开在 0.0.0.0 上一样。请先读 README 的安全须知。
| 机制 | 作用 |
|---|---|
| 写操作默认拒绝 | 未配置 write_token 时，所有写接口返回 403 |
| 受保护网段 | 内网、回环、Tailscale CGNAT 段不可封禁，防止自锁 |
| 只读挂载 | 除 ./data 外全部只读，面板无法修改宿主机文件 |
| 无 privileged | 只用 SYS_ADMIN（btrfs ioctl）和 SYS_RAWIO（SMART） |
| 快照不真删 | 只生成命令，由你在宿主机上执行 |
| 操作审计 | 所有写操作记录来源 IP、路径、结果、耗时 |
请不要开公开 issue——那等于把利用方法公之于众，而使用者还没来得及升级。
请走 GitHub 的私密报告通道：仓库页面 → Security → Report a vulnerability。 这条通道只有维护者可见，修复前不会公开。
请包含：
- 漏洞类型与影响范围
- 复现步骤
- 你认为的严重程度，以及理由
- 如果有，修复建议
我会在 72 小时内确认收到，并在修复后于 release notes 中致谢（除非你 希望匿名）。
算
- 绕过
write_token执行写操作 - 通过面板读取到不该暴露的宿主机文件
- 命令注入、路径穿越（尤其是容器操作与快照命令生成那两处）
- 受保护网段的封禁保护被绕过
- 审计日志可被伪造或绕过
不算
- 「面板没有登录所以任何人都能看」—— 这是已知设计，见上文
- 「暴露到公网后被攻击」—— 配置错误，不是漏洞
- 需要宿主机 root 权限才能利用的问题 —— 有 root 就已经赢了
- 依赖库的漏洞（请直接报给上游，但欢迎提 PR 升级版本）
后端依赖见 requirements.txt，前端零依赖——没有 npm 包，没有 CDN 引用，
不存在供应链风险。这是刻意的设计约束。
This dashboard has no authentication and can modify your firewall and control Docker containers. It is designed to be reachable only from a trusted LAN or VPN.
Exposing it directly to the internet is not a vulnerability, it's a misconfiguration — comparable to running Redis on 0.0.0.0 with no password. Please read Security notes first.
| Mechanism | Effect |
|---|---|
| Writes refused by default | Without write_token, every write endpoint returns 403 |
| Protected networks | Private, loopback and Tailscale ranges can't be banned — no self-lockout |
| Read-only mounts | Everything except ./data is read-only; the panel can't modify host files |
| No privileged | Only SYS_ADMIN (btrfs ioctl) and SYS_RAWIO (SMART) |
| Snapshots not really deleted | A command is generated for you to run on the host |
| Operation audit | Every write records source IP, path, result and duration |
Please do not open a public issue — that publishes the exploit before anyone has had a chance to upgrade.
Use GitHub's private reporting: repository page → Security → Report a vulnerability. Only maintainers can see it, and it stays private until fixed.
Please include:
- Vulnerability class and impact
- Reproduction steps
- Your severity assessment and reasoning
- A suggested fix, if you have one
I'll acknowledge within 72 hours and credit you in the release notes once fixed, unless you prefer to stay anonymous.
In scope
- Bypassing
write_tokento perform write operations - Reading host files that shouldn't be exposed through the panel
- Command injection or path traversal (particularly container operations and snapshot command generation)
- Bypassing the protected-network ban guard
- Forging or evading the audit log
Out of scope
- "There's no login so anyone can view it" — known design, see above
- "I exposed it to the internet and got attacked" — misconfiguration
- Anything requiring host root to exploit — root already wins
- Dependency CVEs (report upstream; PRs bumping versions are welcome)
Backend dependencies are in requirements.txt. The frontend has zero
dependencies — no npm packages, no CDN references, no supply-chain surface.
That's a deliberate constraint.