TEST: planted vulnerabilities (positive control, do not merge) - #2
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TEST: planted vulnerabilities (positive control, do not merge)#2markus-mohemian wants to merge 1 commit into
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markus-mohemian
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Against the real box (Qwen3.8-27B on a DGX Spark) the audit failed with "vLLM response message contained no content". The cause: vLLM generates a reasoning model's trace before any answer and charges it to max_tokens, so a 16384-token budget -- PROMPT_TOKEN_LIMIT, an Anthropic-era constant that was never an output budget -- was spent thinking about a 40k-token diff without ever reaching the JSON. - The budget is now its own constant, defaulting to 32768, overridable with VLLM_MAX_TOKENS. - VLLM_ENABLE_THINKING=false turns reasoning off via chat_template_kwargs. The same review then completes in under a minute instead of timing out. - finish_reason "length" is now an error that names the cause and both ways out, rather than the useless "contained no content". A truncated report is never parsed as findings. Verified end to end against the real model: PR #2 plants a SQL injection, a command injection and a path traversal, and all three are found and survive filtering.
markus-mohemian
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A subscription OAuth token authenticates the Claude Code CLI but is rejected by the Messages API with 401, so the two Anthropic call sites cannot share one credential. Verified against the real CLI with a bogus-token control to make sure a local login was not masking the result. - Either credential now satisfies validation. - With an OAuth token the audit runs and false-positive filtering falls back to the hard exclusion rules, with a warning. Degrading silently would make a noisier report look like a clean filter pass. - action.yml gains claude-code-oauth-token, with the usual env fallback. Verified end to end against PR #2: the anthropic provider finds all three planted vulnerabilities using only an OAuth token.
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Positive control for the security review. Contains SQL injection, command injection and path traversal. Do not merge.