If you discover a vulnerability in Foxglove, please report it privately rather than opening a public issue.

• Preferred: GitHub Security Advisories for this repository.
• Fallback: email the maintainer at the address listed on lopes.id.

Please include a description of the issue, steps to reproduce, and the version / commit you tested against. You'll receive an acknowledgement within 7 days.

Foxglove is a CLI tool. The components most likely to be in scope for security reports:

• The Thinkst Canary HTTP client (src/foxglove/thinkst/client.py) — auth handling, URL construction, response parsing.
• CLI argument validation (src/foxglove/cli.py, src/foxglove/thinkst/cli.py) — anything that lets an unsafe value through to the filesystem, the Anthropic SDK, or the Canary API.
• Writers (src/foxglove/writers/) — file-format generation that could produce malformed output, embed unsanitised input, or write outside the intended directory.
• Manifest read/write (src/foxglove/manifest.py) — anything that lets a tampered manifest cause unexpected behaviour.

Out of scope:

• The behavioural intent of the tool — Foxglove deliberately produces deceptive artifacts. That's the feature, not a bug.
• Issues that require an attacker to already control the operator's shell, env vars, or filesystem.
• Issues in upstream dependencies (anthropic, httpx, pydantic, python-docx, etc.) — please report those directly to the relevant project.

Foxglove is published for authorised defensive use: red-team engagements with explicit scope, blue-team detection exercises, MITRE Engage deployments on networks the operator owns or has written permission to deploy on. We will not provide guidance, fixes, or feature requests aimed at:

• Evading detection by EDR/SIEM in unauthorised contexts.
• Hardening the deceptive artifacts against forensic review by victims (i.e., obscuring the operator's identity from an investigation).
• Targeting individuals, infrastructure, or organisations without authorisation.

If your use case requires any of the above, this isn't the tool for you.

• Foxglove reads ANTHROPIC_API_KEY and (optionally) THINKST_API_KEY from the environment. They are never written to MANIFEST.json, never logged, and never echoed in error output.
• The THINKST_API_KEY is sent to the Canary console as the X-Canary-Auth-Token HTTP header over HTTPS (TLS 1.2+, validated against the OS certificate store via truststore).
• If you accidentally commit a key to version control, rotate it immediately. For Anthropic: revoke and reissue at console.anthropic.com. For Thinkst: revoke and reissue from your Canary console's Settings → API page (Thinkst keys cannot be modified after creation — only revoked + replaced).