fix(capability): detect native and escaped Windows private paths in public-safe-outbound

loopx/capabilities/public_safe_outbound/scanner.py

@@ -27,8 +27,17 @@
     {"id": "aklt_access_key", "label": "AK/SK access key", "pattern": r"\b" + "AKLT" + r"[A-Za-z0-9]{10,}\b"},
     {"id": "private_key_block", "label": "private key block", "pattern": r"-----BEGIN (RSA |EC |OPENSSH )?PRIVATE KEY-----"},
     {"id": "api_key_assignment", "label": "api key assignment", "pattern": r"(?i)\b(api[_-]?key|access[_-]?key|secret)\b\s*[=:]\s*['\"][^'\"]{8,}['\"]"},
-    # private absolute paths
-    {"id": "private_abs_path", "label": "private absolute path", "pattern": r"/(Users|home|data00|root)/([A-Za-z0-9_.-]+)/"},
+    # Private absolute paths: the private roots under whatever separator the
+    # host or a serialized string chose. A separator run at every junction
+    # covers the POSIX spelling (/Users/alice/), the native Windows spellings
+    # (\Users\alice\ and C:\Users\alice\) and the mixed or escaped spellings of
+    # serialized text (\\Users\\alice\\), matching the boundary scan's
+    # separator-run class (#6161).
+    {
+        "id": "private_abs_path",
+        "label": "private absolute path",
+        "pattern": r"[\\/]+(?:Users|home|data00|root)[\\/]+[A-Za-z0-9_.-]+[\\/]+",
+    },
 )
 
 

loopx/capabilities/public_safe_outbound/tests/test_scanner.py

@@ -34,6 +34,55 @@ def test_detects_private_path() -> None:
     assert any(h.rule_id == "private_abs_path" for h in res.hits)
 
 
+def test_detects_native_windows_private_path() -> None:
+    # The same private path in the spellings a Windows host produces: a drive
+    # letter and an UNC share. Assembled at runtime so the source stays clean of
+    # the literal pattern.
+    separator = "\\"
+    drive = separator.join(["C:", "Users", "example-user", "code-reading", "some_workspace"])
+    unc = (
+        separator
+        + separator.join(["", "fileserver", "Users", "example-user", "code-reading", "some_workspace"])
+    )
+    for label, private in (("drive", drive), ("unc", unc)):
+        res = scan_texts({label: "run from " + private})
+        assert res.ok is False, label
+        assert any(h.rule_id == "private_abs_path" for h in res.hits), label
+
+
+def test_detects_escaped_and_mixed_windows_private_path() -> None:
+    # Serialized text doubles each backslash, and a Windows host mixes
+    # separators when a POSIX-style segment meets a native one; both are the
+    # same private path and must be a hit, like the boundary scan sibling
+    # (#6161). Assembled at runtime so the source stays clean of the literal
+    # pattern.
+    slash = "/"
+    sep = "\\"
+    doubled = sep + sep
+    parts = ["Users", "example-user", "code-reading", "some_workspace"]
+    cases = {
+        "escaped-drive": "C:" + doubled + doubled.join(parts),
+        "escaped-unc": doubled + doubled + "fileserver" + doubled + "Users" + doubled + "example-user" + doubled,
+        "mixed-drive": "C:" + sep + slash.join(parts),
+        "mixed-unc": slash + slash + "fileserver" + sep + "Users" + sep + "example-user" + sep,
+        "rooted-native": sep + "Users" + sep + "example-user" + sep,
+    }
+    for label, private in cases.items():
+        res = scan_texts({label: '{"cwd": "' + private + '"}'})
+        assert res.ok is False, label
+        assert any(h.rule_id == "private_abs_path" for h in res.hits), label
+
+
+def test_native_windows_path_outside_the_private_roots_stays_clean() -> None:
+    # The rule keeps the same root keywords as the POSIX spelling carried, so
+    # an ordinary drive path that is not under a private root must stay clean
+    # and cannot block a submission on its own.
+    separator = "\\"
+    public_path = separator.join(["C:", "Projects", "public-demo", "build"])
+    res = scan_texts({"d": "build output lives under " + public_path})
+    assert res.ok is True
+
+
 def test_clean_text_passes(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
     (tmp_path / "ok.md").write_text(
         "Public-safe note: compare baseline vs treatment on the same model/task/verifier.",