fix(security): Fix 23 security issues in axios, tronweb, tar - #7
Open
aikido-autofix[bot] wants to merge 1 commit into
Open
fix(security): Fix 23 security issues in axios, tronweb, tar#7aikido-autofix[bot] wants to merge 1 commit into
aikido-autofix[bot] wants to merge 1 commit into
Conversation
This file contains hidden or bidirectional Unicode text that may be interpreted or compiled differently than what appears below. To review, open the file in an editor that reveals hidden Unicode characters.
Learn more about bidirectional Unicode characters
Sign up for free
to join this conversation on GitHub.
Already have an account?
Sign in to comment
Add this suggestion to a batch that can be applied as a single commit.This suggestion is invalid because no changes were made to the code.Suggestions cannot be applied while the pull request is closed.Suggestions cannot be applied while viewing a subset of changes.Only one suggestion per line can be applied in a batch.Add this suggestion to a batch that can be applied as a single commit.Applying suggestions on deleted lines is not supported.You must change the existing code in this line in order to create a valid suggestion.Outdated suggestions cannot be applied.This suggestion has been applied or marked resolved.Suggestions cannot be applied from pending reviews.Suggestions cannot be applied on multi-line comments.Suggestions cannot be applied while the pull request is queued to merge.Suggestion cannot be applied right now. Please check back later.
Upgrade axios, tronweb, and tar to fix critical SSRF/proxy bypass and prototype pollution vulnerabilities enabling MITM attacks, plus high-severity issues with proxy handling and header injection.
✅ 23 CVEs resolved by this upgrade, including 1 critical 🚨 CVE
This PR will resolve the following CVEs:
X-API-Keyand AWS tokens to unintended hosts, allowing attackers to steal sensitive authentication data. This information disclosure vulnerability affects shared environments where secret headers are set by default.formDataToJSONwhen processing deeply nested FormData field names causes stack overflow, resulting in denial of service for applications converting untrusted FormData to JSON.Object.prototypeproperties to inject maliciousAuthorizationheaders and manipulate query strings when applications pass placeholder objects likeauth: {}orparamsSerializer: {}. This enables credential exfiltration and request tampering when another component has already polluted the prototype chain.maxBodyLengthlimits on WHATWGReadableStreamrequest bodies with unknown sizes, allowing attackers to bypass upload size restrictions and cause unexpected network egress or resource exhaustion.formDataToJSONallows attackers to crash the process by submitting FormData with deeply nested bracket-delimited field names, causing stack exhaustion and denial of service.//(e.g.,https:internal.example) were silently normalized instead of rejected, allowing attackers to bypass URL allowlists or WAF checks and reach unintended hosts. The fix now throws an error for invalid scheme URLs before normalization.formDataToJSONhelper allows attackers to polluteObject.prototypethrough specially crafted multipart field names, potentially enabling remote code execution or other malicious actions.maxBodyLengthenforcement when sent over HTTP/2, allowing attackers to transmit arbitrarily large payloads and exhaust resources or bypass configured egress limits. This affects Node.js applications forwarding untrusted streams to HTTP/2 endpoints..split('/')on the numeric value, crashing the Node.js process during archive extraction.