feat(auth): admit an admission bearer and substitute the stored main credential - #1853
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…credential Groundwork for #1686. Two facts were collapsed into one: WHICH credential matched, and HOW it was presented. `DataPlaneAdmission` named only the first, so "a proxy secret arriving as a bearer on the Responses transport" was not expressible -- the transport simply rejected every bearer, and a Codex client configured with `env_key` could not reach Direct at all. `DataPlaneAdmission` now carries `source: loopback | dedicated | bearer | x-api-key`. The Responses transport accepts a bearer that is one of OUR admission secrets, with the dedicated header still winning when both are present. A bearer that is NOT our secret stays unadmitted, so Codex Direct passthrough is untouched and the two bearer domains still never mix. `materializeCodexUpstreamAuth` is the single place the two credential domains meet: - pool / main-pool always overwrite with the stored account credential (unchanged behavior, now stated in one function). - main WITH an admission bearer substitutes the stored main credential, and throws `CodexMainSubstitutionUnavailableError` before any upstream I/O when none is usable. Falling through there would forward the admission secret -- exactly the leak `validateForwardAdmissionCredential` exists to prevent. - main WITH a dedicated header keeps today's intentional passthrough, because that bearer is the user's own ChatGPT credential. `headersForCodexAuthContext` stays as a thin deprecated wrapper so existing call sites are unchanged until they can pass admission context. Regressions: substitution replaces the secret and never forwards it; missing main fails closed (driven red by returning the caller headers instead); dedicated-header passthrough is preserved; bearer admission is accepted on both paths and records its source; a foreign bearer stays unadmitted. Refs #1686.
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Included review availability: Your plan includes up to 10 reviews per rolling hour; 0 remain after this review. 📝 WalkthroughWalkthroughThe change adds credential-source metadata to data-plane admissions and expands API credential resolution. It also adds optional live stored-main-credential substitution for admission bearers during Codex upstream authentication materialization. ChangesAuthentication flow
Estimated code review effort: 3 (Moderate) | ~25 minutes Merge Risk: 🟠 High · up to This change admits certain bearer credentials on the Responses path while end-to-end replacement with the stored main credential is still deferred; an admitted credential could otherwise reach an upstream path unchanged, exposing an admission secret. Merge should be blocked until substitution is wired through the affected handlers or admission is kept disabled there. Sequence Diagram(s)sequenceDiagram
participant Client
participant resolveResponsesApiAuth
participant resolveDataPlaneAdmissionSecret
participant materializeCodexUpstreamAuth
participant isMainAccountTokenLive
Client->>resolveResponsesApiAuth: submit dedicated or bearer credential
resolveResponsesApiAuth->>resolveDataPlaneAdmissionSecret: resolve token and source
resolveDataPlaneAdmissionSecret-->>resolveResponsesApiAuth: source-attributed admission
resolveResponsesApiAuth->>materializeCodexUpstreamAuth: pass admission bearer context
materializeCodexUpstreamAuth->>isMainAccountTokenLive: check stored main credential
isMainAccountTokenLive-->>materializeCodexUpstreamAuth: live status
materializeCodexUpstreamAuth-->>Client: materialized upstream auth or substitution error
Possibly related PRs
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The matrix is asserted against a real running server, so it is the declaration of record rather than prose. Bearer admission on the Responses and Chat transports is now accepted; x-api-key stays rejected there.
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Inline comments:
In `@src/server/auth-cors.ts`:
- Around line 462-468: Ensure bearer admissions are substituted before upstream
forwarding: in the Responses request flow, pass whether admission.source is
"bearer" as substituteMainCredential to materializeCodexUpstreamAuth, and
convert CodexMainSubstitutionUnavailableError into a pre-I/O request failure.
Update the integration test to exercise the routed request path, not just the
helper functions.
In `@tests/codex-auth-context.test.ts`:
- Around line 632-644: Update the test around materializeCodexUpstreamAuth to
generate the live JWT once, store it in a local variable, and reuse that
variable both when writing auth.json and when asserting the authorization
header.
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src/codex/auth-context.tssrc/server/auth-cors.tstests/codex-auth-context.test.tstests/data-plane-admission-identity.test.ts
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| const admissionSecret = "ocx_data_localsecret"; | ||
| writeFileSync(join(testDir, "auth.json"), JSON.stringify({ | ||
| tokens: { access_token: liveJwt(), account_id: "stored_main_acc" }, | ||
| })); | ||
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| const headers = materializeCodexUpstreamAuth( | ||
| new Headers({ authorization: `Bearer ${admissionSecret}`, "openai-beta": "responses=experimental" }), | ||
| { kind: "main", accountId: null }, | ||
| { substituteMainCredential: true }, | ||
| ); | ||
|
|
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| expect(headers.get("authorization")).not.toContain(admissionSecret); | ||
| expect(headers.get("authorization")).toBe(`Bearer ${liveJwt()}`); |
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🎯 Functional Correctness | 🟡 Minor | ⚡ Quick win
Store the generated JWT before asserting it.
Line 634 writes one liveJwt() value. Line 644 creates a second value for the expected header. If execution crosses a one-second boundary, the exp claim differs and this test fails.
Generate the token once and use it in both places.
Proposed fix
const admissionSecret = "ocx_data_localsecret";
+ const storedAccessToken = liveJwt();
writeFileSync(join(testDir, "auth.json"), JSON.stringify({
- tokens: { access_token: liveJwt(), account_id: "stored_main_acc" },
+ tokens: { access_token: storedAccessToken, account_id: "stored_main_acc" },
}));
@@
- expect(headers.get("authorization")).toBe(`Bearer ${liveJwt()}`);
+ expect(headers.get("authorization")).toBe(`Bearer ${storedAccessToken}`);📝 Committable suggestion
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| const admissionSecret = "ocx_data_localsecret"; | |
| writeFileSync(join(testDir, "auth.json"), JSON.stringify({ | |
| tokens: { access_token: liveJwt(), account_id: "stored_main_acc" }, | |
| })); | |
| const headers = materializeCodexUpstreamAuth( | |
| new Headers({ authorization: `Bearer ${admissionSecret}`, "openai-beta": "responses=experimental" }), | |
| { kind: "main", accountId: null }, | |
| { substituteMainCredential: true }, | |
| ); | |
| expect(headers.get("authorization")).not.toContain(admissionSecret); | |
| expect(headers.get("authorization")).toBe(`Bearer ${liveJwt()}`); | |
| const admissionSecret = "ocx_data_localsecret"; | |
| const storedAccessToken = liveJwt(); | |
| writeFileSync(join(testDir, "auth.json"), JSON.stringify({ | |
| tokens: { access_token: storedAccessToken, account_id: "stored_main_acc" }, | |
| })); | |
| const headers = materializeCodexUpstreamAuth( | |
| new Headers({ authorization: `Bearer ${admissionSecret}`, "openai-beta": "responses=experimental" }), | |
| { kind: "main", accountId: null }, | |
| { substituteMainCredential: true }, | |
| ); | |
| expect(headers.get("authorization")).not.toContain(admissionSecret); | |
| expect(headers.get("authorization")).toBe(`Bearer ${storedAccessToken}`); |
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In `@tests/codex-auth-context.test.ts` around lines 632 - 644, Update the test
around materializeCodexUpstreamAuth to generate the live JWT once, store it in a
local variable, and reuse that variable both when writing auth.json and when
asserting the authorization header.
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| const bearer = req.headers.get("authorization")?.replace(/^Bearer\s+/i, "").trim(); | ||
| if (bearer) return resolveDataPlaneAdmissionSecret(bearer, config, "bearer"); |
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When a request selects a custom-named openai-responses provider targeting the canonical ChatGPT URL with authMode: "forward" but no codexAccountMode, this branch admits the proxy bearer, while resolveResponsesCodexAuth only invokes validateForwardAdmissionCredential for codexAccountMode === "direct"; headersForCodexAuthContext therefore retains the bearer and the canonical-forward adapter copies it to ChatGPT. Carry the admission source into every handler and substitute or reject bearer admissions before enabling this branch, including routes without an account mode.
AGENTS.md reference: AGENTS.md:L266-L272
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| export type DataPlaneAdmission = | ||
| | { kind: "configured"; keyId: string } | ||
| | { kind: "environment" } | ||
| | { kind: "loopback" }; | ||
| | { kind: "configured"; keyId: string; source: DataPlaneAdmissionSource } | ||
| | { kind: "environment"; source: DataPlaneAdmissionSource } | ||
| | { kind: "loopback"; source: "loopback" }; |
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When the full Bun suite runs, tests/loopback-listener-admission.test.ts still compares these results exactly against { kind: "loopback" } and { kind: "configured", keyId: "k1" }, so both assertions fail now that every result includes source. Update those existing expectations (and include this test in focused validation) so the required full server suite remains green.
AGENTS.md reference: AGENTS.md:L276-L278
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Summary
Groundwork for #1686. This touches the authentication boundary and needs explicit security review per
MAINTAINERS.md.Two facts were collapsed into one: which credential matched, and how it was presented.
DataPlaneAdmissionnamed only the first, so "a proxy secret arriving as a bearer on the Responses transport" was not expressible — the transport rejected every bearer, and a Codex client configured withenv_keycould not reach Direct at all.DataPlaneAdmissionnow carriessource: loopback | dedicated | bearer | x-api-key. The Responses transport accepts a bearer that is one of our admission secrets, with the dedicated header still winning when both are present. A bearer that is not our secret stays unadmitted, so Codex Direct passthrough is untouched and the two bearer domains still never mix.materializeCodexUpstreamAuthbecomes the single place the two credential domains meet:CodexMainSubstitutionUnavailableErrorbefore any upstream I/O when none is usable. Falling through there would forward the admission secret upstream, which is precisely the leakvalidateForwardAdmissionCredentialexists to prevent.headersForCodexAuthContextremains as a thin deprecated wrapper, so no existing call site changes behavior in this PR.Security review notes
The reviewable question is narrow: can an OpenCodex admission secret now reach an upstream?
materializeCodexUpstreamAuthreplaces it, and the no-credential case throws rather than proceeding.Scope
This lands the admission-source plumbing and the substitution primitive with its own tests. Wiring the admission through the HTTP/compact/WebSocket handlers so Direct actually performs substitution end to end, plus the
env_keyinjection change, is the remaining half of #1686 and is documented indevlog/_plan/260816_wave34_closeout/100_1686_admission.md. Keeping them separate means the boundary change can be reviewed on its own.Refs #1686.
Verification
bun test tests/codex-auth-context.test.ts tests/data-plane-admission-identity.test.ts tests/forward-admission-separation.test.ts tests/server-auth.test.ts— 149 pass / 0 fail.bun run privacy:scan— passed.bun x tsc --noEmit— clean.Checklist
devSummary by CodeRabbit
New Features
Bug Fixes