Traditional CAPTCHAs prove you're human. But what about the opposite?
As AI agents become first-class web citizens — browsing, booking, purchasing, automating — some systems need to gate access to agent-facing endpoints without forcing every caller to enroll a key. Think agent-only APIs, AI-only platforms, or multi-agent authentication.
imrobot flips the CAPTCHA model: it generates deterministic challenge pipelines that are trivial for any LLM or programmatic agent to solve (< 1 second), but impractical for humans to work through manually.
- ✅ Proves the caller can execute a deterministic compute pipeline (string transforms, bytewise ops, hashing) end-to-end without human interaction.
- ✅ Proves the verification request was issued by a server holding the same HMAC secret (no cross-site replay).
- ✅ Issues a standards-compliant JWT (RFC 7519, HS256) that downstream services can verify with any JWT library.
⚠️ Does not cryptographically identify a specific bot — anyone who can run JS in a browser console can callsolveChallenge()and pass.⚠️ Does not replace cryptographic agent identity. For verified-bot identity, layer this with Cloudflare's Web Bot Auth (HTTP Message Signatures, RFC 9421), mTLS, or per-agent OAuth credentials.⚠️ Thesha256_hashoperation is misnamed for historical reasons — it cascades FNV-1a 8 times into 64 hex characters; it is not RFC 6234 SHA-256. Usefnv1a_cascadein new code (same wire output).
The library's positioning is "zero-enrollment behavioural gate that survives serialization" — not "cryptographic proof of bot identity." Use the right tool for the job.
The version field on the discovery document (/.well-known/imrobot.json) is the protocol version, not the package version. The current protocol version is 1.0. Backwards-incompatible wire-format changes will bump the major.
imrobot generates a pipeline of deterministic operations (string transforms, byte operations, hashing, and more) applied to a random seed. AI agents parse the structured challenge data, execute the pipeline, and submit the result. Humans would need to manually compute multi-step transformations — practically impossible without tools.
seed: "a7f3b2c1d4e5f609"
1. reverse()
2. caesar(7)
3. xor_encode(42)
4. fnv1a_hash()
5. to_upper()
The challenge data is embedded in the DOM via data-imrobot-challenge attribute as structured JSON, making it trivially parseable by any agent.
npm install imrobotimport { ImRobot } from 'imrobot/react'
function App() {
return (
<ImRobot
difficulty="medium"
theme="light"
onVerified={(token) => {
console.log('Robot verified!', token)
}}
/>
)
}<script setup>
import { ImRobot } from 'imrobot/vue'
function handleVerified(token) {
console.log('Robot verified!', token)
}
</script>
<template>
<ImRobot difficulty="medium" theme="light" @verified="handleVerified" />
</template><script>
import ImRobot from 'imrobot/svelte'
</script>
<ImRobot
difficulty="medium"
theme="light"
onVerified={(token) => console.log('Robot verified!', token)}
/><script type="module">
import { register } from 'imrobot/web-component'
register() // registers <imrobot-widget>
</script>
<imrobot-widget difficulty="medium" theme="light"></imrobot-widget>
<script>
document.querySelector('imrobot-widget').addEventListener('imrobot-verified', (e) => {
console.log('Robot verified!', e.detail)
})
</script>import { generateChallenge, solveChallenge, verifyAnswer } from 'imrobot/core'
const challenge = generateChallenge({ difficulty: 'medium' })
const answer = solveChallenge(challenge)
const isValid = verifyAnswer(challenge, answer) // trueFor production use, the server SDK provides tamper-proof, stateless challenge verification using HMAC-SHA256. No database required — the cryptographic signature ensures integrity.
import { createVerifier } from 'imrobot/server'
const verifier = createVerifier({
secret: process.env.IMROBOT_SECRET!, // min 16 chars
difficulty: 'medium',
})
// API route: generate a signed challenge
app.get('/api/challenge', async (req, res) => {
const challenge = await verifier.generate()
res.json(challenge) // includes HMAC signature
})
// API route: verify agent's answer (stateless)
app.post('/api/verify', async (req, res) => {
const { challenge, answer } = req.body
const result = await verifier.verify(challenge, answer)
// result: { valid: true, elapsed: 42, suspicious: false }
// or: { valid: false, reason: 'wrong_answer' | 'expired' | 'invalid_hmac' | 'tampered' | 'replay' }
res.json(result)
})The server verifier checks in order: HMAC signature validity (challenge and pipeline not tampered), expiration (challenge not expired), answer correctness (pipeline re-executed), and replay detection (duplicate challenge IDs are rejected when a replay guard is configured). A different secret on a different server will reject the challenge — preventing cross-site replay attacks.
Protect your API endpoints with framework-agnostic middleware. Verified agents receive a standards-compliant JWT (RFC 7519, alg: HS256) that they pass via X-Agent-Proof header on subsequent requests. The token decodes cleanly with any JWT library (jose, jsonwebtoken, jwt-decode, ...).
Token shape:
// Header
{ "alg": "HS256", "typ": "JWT", "kid": "k-2026-04" }
// Payload (claims in seconds-since-epoch per RFC 7519 §4.1.4)
{
"iss": "imrobot",
"sub": "agent_123",
"iat": 1711540860,
"nbf": 1711540860,
"exp": 1711544460,
"jti": "imr_abcd1234",
"imr": {
"challenge_id": "ch_abc",
"difficulty": "hard",
"solve_time_ms": 42,
"suspicious": false,
"version": 2,
"turnstile_verified": true
}
}import { requireAgent, createAgentRouter } from 'imrobot/server'
// Mount challenge/verify endpoints with rate limiting
const router = createAgentRouter({
secret: process.env.IMROBOT_SECRET!,
rateLimit: { windowMs: 60_000, maxRequests: 30 },
})
app.get('/imrobot/challenge', router.challenge)
app.post('/imrobot/verify', router.verify)
// Protect routes — only verified agents can access
const agentOnly = requireAgent({
secret: process.env.IMROBOT_SECRET!,
rateLimit: { windowMs: 60_000, maxRequests: 30 },
})
app.get('/api/data', agentOnly, (req, res) => {
res.json({ agent: req.agentProof })
})Both requireAgent and createAgentRouter accept a trustProxy option that controls how client IPs are resolved for rate limiting. When running behind a reverse proxy (nginx, Cloudflare, etc.), set trustProxy: true to read the real client IP from X-Forwarded-For / X-Real-IP headers instead of req.ip.
import { requireAgent, createAgentRouter } from 'imrobot/server'
// Behind a trusted reverse proxy
const agentOnly = requireAgent({
secret: process.env.IMROBOT_SECRET!,
trustProxy: true, // reads X-Forwarded-For for accurate IP-based rate limiting
rateLimit: { windowMs: 60_000, maxRequests: 30 },
})
const router = createAgentRouter({
secret: process.env.IMROBOT_SECRET!,
trustProxy: true,
})Warning: Only enable
trustProxywhen your server is behind a trusted proxy. Enabling it on a public-facing server allows clients to spoof their IP and bypass rate limiting.
Alternatively, use the combined .handler property to route both GET and POST requests to a single path:
import { createAgentRouter } from 'imrobot/server'
const router = createAgentRouter({ secret: process.env.IMROBOT_SECRET! })
// Routes GET → /challenge and POST → /verify under one path
app.use('/imrobot', router.handler)The handler automatically routes based on HTTP method:
- GET → challenge endpoint (returns a signed challenge)
- POST → verify endpoint (verifies answer, returns proof token)
- Other methods → 405 Method Not Allowed
Both createAgentRouter and requireAgent support built-in sliding-window rate limiting to protect against brute-force attacks and request flooding. The rate limiter is in-memory, zero-dependency, and avoids the 2× boundary burst that fixed-window counters allow.
import { createAgentRouter } from 'imrobot/server'
const router = createAgentRouter({
secret: process.env.IMROBOT_SECRET!,
rateLimit: {
windowMs: 60_000, // 1-minute sliding window
maxRequests: 30, // max 30 requests per window per IP
onLimitReached: (key) => console.warn(`Rate limited: ${key}`),
},
})When a client exceeds the limit, they receive a 429 Too Many Requests response with standard headers. X-RateLimit-Reset is in seconds since epoch (matching the GitHub / IETF convention), and Retry-After is in seconds (RFC 6585):
HTTP/1.1 429 Too Many Requests
X-RateLimit-Limit: 30
X-RateLimit-Remaining: 0
X-RateLimit-Reset: 1711540860
Retry-After: 45
The RateLimiter class can also be used standalone:
import { RateLimiter } from 'imrobot/server'
const limiter = new RateLimiter({ windowMs: 60_000, maxRequests: 10 })
if (!limiter.isAllowed(clientIp)) {
// Handle rate limit exceeded
}
const status = limiter.getStatus(clientIp)
// { remaining: 7, resetAt: 1711540860000 }| Option | Type | Default | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
windowMs |
number |
60000 |
Sliding window duration in ms |
maxRequests |
number |
30 |
Max requests per window per key |
onLimitReached |
(key) => void |
— | Callback when a client exceeds the limit |
Expired entries are automatically cleaned up to prevent memory leaks in long-running servers.
createAgentRouter optionally integrates with Cloudflare Turnstile — a privacy-preserving CAPTCHA alternative — as an extra human-verification layer alongside the imrobot proof-of-work challenge.
When configured, the /verify endpoint reads the cf-turnstile-response header, validates the token against Cloudflare's siteverify API, and stamps the result (turnstile_verified: true/false) into the issued proof token. Zero external dependencies — uses Node 18+ native fetch.
import { createAgentRouter } from 'imrobot/server'
const router = createAgentRouter({
secret: process.env.IMROBOT_SECRET!,
turnstile: {
// Load from env — never hardcode. Must be ≥16 non-whitespace characters.
secretKey: process.env.TURNSTILE_SECRET_KEY!,
tokenHeader: 'cf-turnstile-response', // default, matches Cloudflare widget output
required: false, // default — non-breaking, won't block existing clients
timeoutMs: 5000, // siteverify timeout (default 5s; 0 disables)
},
})The siteverify call uses an AbortController with a configurable timeoutMs so a slow Cloudflare response can never hang your verify endpoint. On timeout the result is { success: false, errorCodes: ['timeout'] } and the request is treated like any other Turnstile failure (per your required setting).
On the client side, include the Turnstile widget and pass its token as a request header:
<script src="https://challenges.cloudflare.com/turnstile/v0/api.js" async defer></script>
<div class="cf-turnstile" data-sitekey="YOUR_SITE_KEY" data-callback="onTurnstileSuccess"></div>
<script>
function onTurnstileSuccess(token) {
// Pass token when submitting the imrobot verify request
fetch('/imrobot/verify', {
method: 'POST',
headers: {
'Content-Type': 'application/json',
'cf-turnstile-response': token,
},
body: JSON.stringify({ challenge, answer }),
})
}
</script>The standalone TurnstileVerifier class and verifyTurnstileToken function are also exported for use outside of createAgentRouter:
import { TurnstileVerifier, verifyTurnstileToken } from 'imrobot/server'
// Class-based
const verifier = new TurnstileVerifier({
secretKey: process.env.TURNSTILE_SECRET_KEY!,
})
const result = await verifier.verify(cfToken, clientIp)
// { success: true, hostname: 'example.com', challenge_ts: '...', errorCodes: [] }
// Standalone function
const result = await verifyTurnstileToken(secretKey, cfToken, clientIp)Behaviour by required flag:
required |
Token absent | Token invalid | Token valid |
|---|---|---|---|
false (default) |
token issued, no turnstile_verified flag |
token issued, turnstile_verified: false |
token issued, turnstile_verified: true |
true |
400 TURNSTILE_TOKEN_REQUIRED |
400 TURNSTILE_VERIFICATION_FAILED |
token issued, turnstile_verified: true |
Set required: false initially for a non-breaking rollout — you can enforce it once all clients send the header.
Security note: The secret key must always be loaded from
process.env.TURNSTILE_SECRET_KEY. Never hardcode it.
Both requireAgent and createAgentRouter accept a keyId (embedded as kid in the JWT header) and a previousSecrets array so you can rotate signing secrets without invalidating outstanding tokens:
const router = createAgentRouter({
secret: process.env.IMROBOT_SECRET!, // active key
keyId: 'k-2026-04', // identifies the active key
previousSecrets: [
{ keyId: 'k-2026-01', secret: process.env.IMROBOT_SECRET_PREV! },
],
clockSkewSec: 5, // tolerate ±5s drift on iat/nbf/exp (default 5, max 300)
})- New tokens are signed with
secretand stamped withkid: keyId. - Verification looks up the secret by the token's
kid. Ifkidis unknown the request is rejected with403. - Tokens issued before you started setting
keyId(nokidheader) verify against the activesecret.
Roll a key by deploying with the new secret/keyId while moving the previous one into previousSecrets. Once your max token TTL has elapsed, you can drop the old entry.
For agents that need to verify themselves programmatically without any UI:
import { invisibleVerify } from 'imrobot/core'
const result = await invisibleVerify({
challengeUrl: 'https://api.example.com/imrobot/challenge',
verifyUrl: 'https://api.example.com/imrobot/verify',
agentId: 'my-bot-v1',
maxRetries: 3,
})
if (result.success) {
// Use result.proofToken in X-Agent-Proof header
fetch('/api/protected', {
headers: { 'X-Agent-Proof': result.proofToken! },
})
}Built-in CLI for testing, benchmarking, and inspecting challenges:
npx imrobot challenge --difficulty hard
npx imrobot solve --difficulty medium
npx imrobot benchmark --count 1000
npx imrobot infoInspired by the A2A Agent Card pattern, imrobot supports a discovery endpoint that lets AI agents automatically find and interact with your imrobot-protected service.
import { createDiscoveryHandler, createAgentRouter, requireAgent } from 'imrobot/server'
// Mount the discovery endpoint
const discovery = createDiscoveryHandler({
challengePath: '/imrobot',
name: 'My Agent API',
description: 'Agent-verified data service',
})
app.get('/.well-known/imrobot.json', discovery)
// Mount challenge/verify as usual
const router = createAgentRouter({ secret: process.env.IMROBOT_SECRET! })
app.get('/imrobot/challenge', router.challenge)
app.post('/imrobot/verify', router.verify)Agents fetch /.well-known/imrobot.json and receive a structured document describing the protocol, endpoint paths, supported difficulty levels, and step-by-step instructions for completing verification:
{
"protocol": "imrobot",
"version": "1.0",
"endpoints": {
"challenge": "/imrobot/challenge",
"verify": "/imrobot/verify",
"proofHeader": "X-Agent-Proof"
},
"difficulties": ["easy", "medium", "hard"],
"instructions": "1. GET the challenge endpoint..."
}For framework-agnostic usage (Hono, Koa, Fastify, etc.), use buildDiscoveryDocument() directly:
import { buildDiscoveryDocument } from 'imrobot/server'
const doc = buildDiscoveryDocument({ challengePath: '/imrobot' })
// Serve `doc` as JSON at /.well-known/imrobot.jsoncreateDiscoveryHandler sets sensible defaults so third-party agents can fetch the document from any origin and cache it:
Content-Type: application/json; charset=utf-8
Cache-Control: public, max-age=3600
Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *
Vary: Origin
Override either with cacheControl / corsOrigin. Pass null to omit:
createDiscoveryHandler({
cacheControl: 'no-store', // disable caching
corsOrigin: 'https://agents.example.com', // restrict CORS
})The challenge text is blurred by default and only revealed when the user hovers over it. This defeats screenshot-based attacks (screen capture tools, CDP screenshots, PrintScreen) since the captured image shows only blurred content.
An additional JavaScript shield detects screenshot shortcuts (PrintScreen, Cmd+Shift+3/4/5, Ctrl+Shift+S) and window blur/visibility changes, applying an extra blur layer that overrides even the hover state.
Combined with the hidden nonce (not displayed visually) and TTL expiry, this makes screenshot+OCR workflows ineffective — even if the blur were bypassed, the nonce is missing from the visual output.
Note: AI agents are unaffected — they read challenge data from the DOM, not from the screen.
The screenshot shield is exported for use outside the bundled components:
import { setupScreenshotShield } from 'imrobot'
const cleanup = setupScreenshotShield((shielded) => {
// shielded: true when a screenshot attempt is detected
// automatically resets to false after 1.2s
})
// Call cleanup() to remove event listenersAI agents read the challenge data directly from the DOM via the data-imrobot-challenge attribute — they never need to "see" the visual text, so blur has no effect on them.
- Read the challenge from
data-imrobot-challengeattribute (JSON) - Execute the pipeline — each operation is a deterministic transform
- Submit the answer via the input field or programmatically
// Agent reads challenge from DOM (unaffected by blur)
const el = document.querySelector('[data-imrobot-challenge]')
const challenge = JSON.parse(el.dataset.imrobotChallenge)
// Agent solves it (or implement the pipeline yourself)
import { solveChallenge } from 'imrobot/core'
const answer = solveChallenge(challenge)
// Agent fills in the answer and clicks verify
const input = el.querySelector('input')
input.value = answer
input.dispatchEvent(new Event('input', { bubbles: true }))
el.querySelector('button').click()By default, challenges display operations in programmatic syntax (reverse(), caesar(7)). For deployments where you want to make regex-based scraping of the display text harder, use the natural-language formatting functions:
import { formatOperationNL, formatPipelineNL } from 'imrobot/core'
const challenge = generateChallenge({ difficulty: 'hard' })
// Each call produces randomised phrasing:
console.log(formatPipelineNL(challenge.visibleSeed, challenge.pipeline))
// "Begin with the text: "a7f3..."
// Step 1: Flip the string backwards
// Then 2: Shift every letter 7 positions in the alphabet
// Next 3: Bitwise-XOR every character with the value 42
// ..."Every operation has 3–4 distinct phrasings that are randomly selected on each call, so the display text varies unpredictably. Agents must parse the JSON pipeline (unaffected), while regex scraping of the visual text becomes unreliable.
Tip: The original programmatic functions
formatOperation/formatPipelineremain unchanged — use them when you need a stable, deterministic format.
| Operation | Description | Example |
|---|---|---|
reverse() |
Reverse the string | "abc" → "cba" |
to_upper() |
Convert to uppercase | "abc" → "ABC" |
to_lower() |
Convert to lowercase | "ABC" → "abc" |
base64_encode() |
Base64 encode | "hello" → "aGVsbG8=" |
rot13() |
ROT13 cipher | "hello" → "uryyb" |
hex_encode() |
Hex encode each char | "AB" → "4142" |
sort_chars() |
Sort characters | "dcba" → "abcd" |
char_code_sum() |
Sum of char codes | "AB" → "131" |
substring(s, e) |
Extract substring | "abcdef" → "cde" |
repeat(n) |
Repeat string n times | "ab" → "ababab" |
replace(s, r) |
Replace all occurrences | "aab" → "xxb" |
pad_start(len, ch) |
Pad start to length | "abc" → "000abc" |
vowel_count() |
Count vowels | "hello" → "2" |
consonant_extract() |
Extract consonants only | "hello" → "hll" |
run_length_encode() |
Run-length encode | "aaabb" → "3a2b" |
atbash() |
Atbash cipher (a↔z) | "abc" → "zyx" |
| Operation | Description | Example |
|---|---|---|
caesar(shift) |
Caesar cipher with configurable shift | "abc" + shift 1 → "bcd" |
xor_encode(key) |
XOR each byte with key | "AB" + key 1 → "@C" |
count_chars(char) |
Count occurrences of a char | "aababc" + char "a" → "3" |
slice_alternate() |
Keep every other character | "abcdef" → "ace" |
fnv1a_hash() |
FNV-1a hash of the string | "test" → "bc2c0be9" |
length() |
String length as string | "hello" → "5" |
fnv1a_cascade() |
Cascaded FNV-1a, 8 rounds → 64 hex chars | deterministic hex output |
sha256_hash() |
Misnomer — alias of fnv1a_cascade(). Kept for wire-format compatibility. NOT real SHA-256. |
identical output to fnv1a_cascade |
byte_xor(key[]) |
XOR each byte with key array (cycling) | byte-level encryption |
hash_chain(rounds) |
Iterated FNV-1a hash | cascaded hashing |
nibble_swap() |
Swap high/low nibbles per byte | 0xAB → 0xBA |
bit_rotate(bits) |
Rotate bits left within byte | bitwise rotation |
About
sha256_hash: The op name is preserved for wire-format compatibility with already-issued challenges, but the implementation has always been FNV-1a cascaded 8 times — not RFC 6234 SHA-256. Usefnv1a_cascadein new code; both names produce identical output.
| Prop | Type | Default | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
difficulty |
'easy' | 'medium' | 'hard' |
'medium' |
Number and complexity of operations |
theme |
'light' | 'dark' |
'light' |
Color theme |
size |
'compact' | 'standard' |
'standard' |
Widget size — compact for smaller footprint (320px). Supported by all four adapters (React, Vue, Svelte, Web Component). |
ttl |
number |
per-difficulty | Challenge time-to-live in ms (easy: 30s, medium: 20s, hard: 15s) |
onVerified |
(token) => void |
— | Callback on successful verification |
onError |
(error) => void |
— | Callback on failed verification |
- easy: 2-3 simple operations (reverse, case, sort, length, slice_alternate, vowel_count, atbash)
- medium: 3-5 operations including encoding, extraction, caesar, char counting, consonant_extract, run_length_encode
- hard: 5-7 operations including XOR encoding, hashing, replacement, padding, SHA-256, byte XOR, hash chains, nibble swap, and bit rotate
For production deployments, use the server SDK (imrobot/server) instead of client-side-only verification. The server SDK uses HMAC-SHA256 to sign challenges, providing tamper-proof, stateless, replay-resistant verification with zero database overhead.
import { createVerifier } from 'imrobot/server'
const verifier = createVerifier({
secret: process.env.IMROBOT_SECRET!, // HMAC secret (min 16 chars)
difficulty: 'hard',
ttl: 10_000, // optional: override default TTL
})
// Generate → send to client → client solves → verify answer
const challenge = await verifier.generate()
const result = await verifier.verify(challenge, agentAnswer)To prevent the same challenge from being verified more than once, pass a ChallengeReplayGuard instance to createVerifier():
import { createVerifier, ChallengeReplayGuard } from 'imrobot/server'
const replayGuard = new ChallengeReplayGuard({
maxAge: 5 * 60 * 1000, // track IDs for 5 minutes
cleanupInterval: 60_000, // purge expired entries every minute
})
const verifier = createVerifier({
secret: process.env.IMROBOT_SECRET!,
difficulty: 'medium',
replayGuard, // enables replay detection
})
// First verify() succeeds; second verify() with the same challenge
// returns { valid: false, reason: 'replay' }The replay guard is in-memory with automatic expiry cleanup and unref()'d timers, so it won't keep the process alive. Call replayGuard.destroy() on shutdown to clear the cleanup interval.
ChallengeAnalytics (exported from imrobot/server) is a lightweight, in-memory metrics tracker for monitoring challenge activity — generation rates, verification rates, solve-time percentiles, and failure-reason distributions. Zero external dependencies, memory-bounded (sliding window of configurable size).
import { ChallengeAnalytics } from 'imrobot/server'
const analytics = new ChallengeAnalytics({
maxSamples: 1000, // solve-time samples kept per difficulty (default: 1000)
trackFailureReasons: true, // track per-reason failure counts (default: true)
})
// Record events as they happen
analytics.recordGenerated('medium')
analytics.recordVerified('medium', 142, false) // 142ms, not suspicious
analytics.recordFailed('hard', 'wrong_answer')
// Get a full snapshot
const stats = analytics.getStats()
console.log(stats.summary.verificationRate) // 0.5 (50%)
console.log(stats.byDifficulty.medium.avgSolveTimeMs) // 142
console.log(stats.byDifficulty.hard.failureReasons) // { wrong_answer: 1 }
// Export for dashboards / structured logging
console.log(JSON.stringify(analytics.toJSON(), null, 2))
// Periodic rotation — reset all counters
analytics.reset()getStats() returns an AnalyticsSnapshot with:
summary— aggregate totals:totalGenerated,totalVerified,totalFailed,totalExpired,totalSuspicious,verificationRate,avgSolveTimeMs,uptimeMsbyDifficulty— per-difficultyDifficultyStatswith min/max/p95 solve times and per-reason failure countscollectedAt— Unix timestamp of the snapshot
The verify() method returns a VerifyResult:
interface VerifyResult {
valid: boolean
reason?: 'expired' | 'invalid_hmac' | 'wrong_answer' | 'tampered' | 'replay'
elapsed?: number // ms since challenge was created
suspicious?: boolean // true if response was unusually slow
}On successful verification, onVerified receives an ImRobotToken:
interface ImRobotToken {
challengeId: string // Unique challenge identifier
answer: string // The correct answer
timestamp: number // Verification timestamp
elapsed: number // Time taken to solve (ms)
suspicious: boolean // true if elapsed > 5s (possible human relay)
signature: string // Verification signature
}The adaptive difficulty engine auto-adjusts challenge difficulty per agent based on behavioral patterns — inspired by Arkose Labs (FunCaptcha) progressive difficulty and reCAPTCHA v3 risk scoring.
import { AdaptiveDifficulty } from 'imrobot/core'
const adaptive = new AdaptiveDifficulty({
initialDifficulty: 'medium',
escalateAfterFailures: 2, // escalate after 2 consecutive failures
relaxAfterSuccesses: 5, // relax after 5 consecutive successes
})
// Record outcomes as agents solve challenges
adaptive.recordAttempt('agent_123', { success: true, solveTimeMs: 42 })
// Get recommended difficulty for next challenge
const diff = adaptive.getDifficulty('agent_123') // 'medium' | 'easy' | 'hard'
// Get risk assessment (0-1 score with breakdown)
const risk = adaptive.getRiskAssessment('agent_123')
// { score: 0.15, level: 'low', factors: { failureRate, abnormalTiming, rapidAttempts, inconsistentTiming } }
// Get just the numeric score (shorthand)
const score = adaptive.getRiskScore('agent_123') // 0.15The risk score weighs four factors: failure rate (35%), abnormal timing (25%), rapid-fire attempts (25%), and inconsistent solve times (15%). Risk levels: low | medium | high | critical.
Foundation for AI-generated image verification challenges. Pre-generate pools of images with known ground truth, then serve them as additional challenge layers.
import { ImageChallengePool } from 'imrobot/core'
// Option 1: Static provider (pre-generated images, no API needed)
const pool = new ImageChallengePool({
provider: {
type: 'static',
images: [
{ imageUrl: '/img/kitchen-3-apples.png', type: 'object_count', question: 'How many red apples?', answer: '3' },
{ imageUrl: '/img/park-bench.png', type: 'spatial_reasoning', question: 'What is to the left of the bench?', answer: 'tree' },
],
},
})
// Option 2: Custom provider (bring your own AI image generator)
const pool2 = new ImageChallengePool({
provider: {
type: 'custom',
generate: async (prompt) => {
const result = await myImageGenerator(prompt)
return { imageUrl: result.url }
},
},
poolSize: 100,
challengeTypes: ['object_count', 'spatial_reasoning', 'color_identification'],
rotationIntervalMs: 3_600_000, // rotate pool every hour
})
await pool.initialize()
const challenge = pool.getChallenge()
const isCorrect = pool.verifyAnswer(challenge.id, userAnswer)Six challenge types are supported: object_count, spatial_reasoning, color_identification, scene_description, text_recognition, and odd_one_out. Each type includes built-in prompt templates that generate prompts with known ground truth.
Note: Direct OpenAI/Stability AI API integration is planned. For now, use the
customorstaticprovider.
Contributions are welcome! Feel free to open issues for bug reports or feature requests, or submit pull requests.
git clone https://github.com/leopechnicki/im_robot.git
cd im_robot
npm install
npm testMIT