feat(apps): identity seam, view-state store, and cache retention - #8403
feat(apps): identity seam, view-state store, and cache retention#8403chenmingwei23 wants to merge 2 commits into
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UX Review (Fable 5) — 🟡 CONCERNSUX-level review of The screenshots confirm the before/after pair, and the reconciliation is complete. The diff adds no new user-visible controls or copy — every confusion in the blind read (the "124.8K/10K" counter, Accounts vs Profiles, the mystery icons) belongs to pre-existing chrome this PR doesn't touch. The one gap: the headline view-state fix (drive folder restored on return, UX-Verdict: CONCERNS Invisible-infrastructure PR that only improves UX, but its headline fix — the drive folder surviving navigation — appears in no screenshot. Evidence gaps
[UX-REVIEWED] c7c8008 |
Design Review (Fable 5) — ✅ PASSDesign-level review of Design-Verdict: PASS Root cause (missing identity seam) is built first, every mechanism has a named cause, and the one one-way door — barrel publication — is deliberately avoided. The design gate passes cleanly: the persisted record versions in-blob with all rejections resolving to defaults, so a schema change can never stop a page mounting; the query-key prefix is byte-identical to existing hand-written keys, so no cache migration exists to get wrong; alternatives (per-app fixes, [DESIGN-REVIEWED] c7c8008 |
Opus 4.8 Review — ✅ no blocking findingsReviewed Verdict parsed from the review's SHA-scoped output markers for commit False positive or not applicable? A repository writer can comment: |
First Principles Review (Fable 5) — 🟡 CONCERNSPremise-level review of All checks are done: First-Principles-Verdict: CONCERNS The view-state store ships a generalized declaration contract — guard map, revision, canonical serialization — for exactly one consumer declaring one string field. Not justified as shipped
What this change shipsIntent: returning to an app should find it where you left it — folder restored, data repainted without skeletons. ADDITION (platform capability), motivated by the reported AWS Control revert-to-root behavior.
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Subtractions
[FIRST-PRINCIPLES-REVIEWED] c7c8008 |
GPT 5.6 Review — ✅ no blocking findingsGPT 5.6 completed its review of This comment is updated in place on each push. Review detailsNo findings. False positive or not applicable? A repository writer can comment: |
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Bundle Size Gate: pre-existing on main, not this PRThe failing
So the ceiling's This PR stays red on that one check until #8412 merges. Every other gate is green locally at this head: |
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First Principles subtractions: one adopted, one declinedAdopted -- dropped the module-scope Declined -- the trust half stays. The observation is accurate:
On the sub-point that Escalated to the repository owner rather than actioned unilaterally. No AI-review override used. |
Settled by the repository owner: the trust half stays in this PRThe owner has ruled on the First Principles subtraction that asked to defer The substantive reason is worth recording, because it is the opposite of what the subtraction assumed. The gate exists precisely so that the two downstream PRs inherit exactly ONE of it. Moving it into whichever of them happens to namespace state first means the other inherits nothing and hand-rolls its own origin check -- which is the duplication the design's cache-retention section argues against, and it would have arrived silently, as an omission rather than as a visible decision. Deferring a shared gate to one of its two consumers does not remove the gate; it removes the sharing. The rest of the reasoning stands as posted earlier: the approved design names the builtin-only gate as this PR's scope and asks this PR's tests to cover the refusal, and both stacked PRs are already branched off this PR's first commit consuming For completeness, the other subtraction in that review was correct and was adopted -- the module-scope loop over the core table is gone, with mutation evidence in the comment above. No review-bot override was used at any point in this PR. Every finding was either fixed or dispositioned in writing. Remaining itemThe full-window screenshot is outstanding and is deliberately not waived. This environment cannot mint a pod dashboard credential: |
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buluoray
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Comment-only — 0 blocking findings on 224d23fb1cea4b5143c382f72c25ce90c71512e1. Four asks below, none of them a code defect; the biggest is that the evidence for the headline behavior does not demonstrate it.
Reviewed in a worktree at the PR head across five independent lanes — the identity seam, the view-state store, query-key scoping and retention, the repo's own gates, and blast radius over the seven migrated apps — verifying claims against source and mutation-testing each new guard. Roughly 25 mutations, 24 caught by a specific named test.
The seam itself holds up
- The trust gate keys on
origin, not on app name, and fails closed.useTrustedAppIdreturnsnullunlessidentity.origin === 'builtin', so an external app self-registering as anaws-controllookalike getsorigin:'external'from/api/appsand is refused. Flipping the comparison reddened 6 tests; neuteringisValidAppId's^[a-z0-9-]+$reddened 7 refusal cases (.,..,/,\, uppercase, whitespace, empty). - No app can address a key outside its own namespace. I had this checked adversarially rather than taken on trust. Every
resolveAppQueryKeyreturn path begins with the caller's ownappId: a crafted['other-app','x']under appIdAresolves to['A','other-app','x'], still inside A's namespace, because the double-prefix collapse only matches the caller's own id. Non-string first elements are prefixed normally. An external app getsnulland is un-namespaced, so it cannot reach a builtin's['aws-control', …]. 10 of 10 mutations in that lane were caught. - Retention cannot cross a user boundary durably. It registers
gcTime = 30minon the sharedQueryClientand is memory-only; auth transitions run a fullwindow.location.hrefnavigation that builds a fresh client, andattemptSilentRefreshonly invalidates['auth-me']for the same user. A → identity change → B never reads[A, …]. - All 126 lines deleted from
app-sdk/index.tswere moved, not dropped — the public types re-exported asexport typefromscopedApi.ts, the rest never exported. Noexport function/const/default/*removed. issue-radar/lib/format.ts's 18-line deletion is genuinely dead code.CACHE_RETENTION_MShas no live referent left, and its 30 minutes is preserved at the new home, registered before the first child query mounts.- The migration did not weaken its tests. The edits to
IncidentChat.cov80andissueRadarPollingadapt to real behavior changes and in one case assert more than before. 323 tests across the migration-critical suite and 569 across the broader app suites pass;tsc -b --forceexits 0.
Ask 1 — the cache-retention screenshots prove nothing
temp-screenshots/app-cache-retention/01-aws-control-loaded.png and 03-returned-no-skeletons.png are the same file: sha256 87cdd464… and byte length 143681 for both. And the frame they share shows AWS Control at "0 accounts · 0 keys · 0 healthy / No accounts yet".
So the pair is vacuous twice over. The "after" image is the "before" image, and even if it were a distinct capture, an empty app renders no skeletons whether or not the cache was retained — there was nothing cached in that frame to retain. The Screenshot Evidence check passed on it regardless, because it greps for the presence of images, not for whether they differ or show anything.
This is the PR's central user-visible claim, so it is worth a real capture: register one account so the page has content, load it, navigate to chat, return, and take genuinely distinct frames. As it stands the behavior is verified by unit tests only, and the UX bot reached the same conclusion independently.
Ask 2 — one mutation survivor, in the store with 671 lines of tests
Removing the defaults-merge in canonicalState (website/src/app-sdk/viewState.ts:257, { ...decl.defaults, ...state } → { ...state }) leaves all 65 tests green. It is unreachable rather than untested: every caller — isDefaultState:261 and serializeViewRecord:269, both reached via resolveViewStateWrite:347 and the write effect at :473 — passes a complete T, since the hook's state is always fully populated. Its stated purpose, canonicalising {} as {path:''}, cannot be triggered by any shipped path.
Either drop it (nothing breaks, which is what the surviving mutation proves) or give it the one test that would make it load-bearing.
Ask 3 — the spec index still says this is unimplemented
docs/system-specs/features/README.md:13 labels the doc "Proposed, not implemented.", but this PR ships useAppViewState. The doc body was correctly updated to match the code; only the one-line index summary is stale, and scripts/docs-lint.sh checks that the entry exists rather than whether it is true, so CI stays green. Since the durable-jobs half really is still proposed, the fix is to split the label rather than delete it.
Ask 4 — a user-visible change arriving by inherited default
ops-mission-control/IncidentChat.tsx previously passed notifyFn = useCallback(() => {}, []), an explicit silent no-op. The diff drops that prop, and AppScopedApiProvider defaults notifyFn = hostNotify (scopedApi.ts:173), which dispatches mc:notify (:143). Embed notifications that were being swallowed now raise toasts on the incident board.
The strengthened cov80 assertion (expect(seen).toEqual(['zzq hello'])) shows this is intended, and it is arguably a fix. Worth a line in the PR body all the same: in a seven-app sweep, "prop removed, default inherited" is exactly the shape an unintended behavior change hides in, and a reader diffing IncidentChat.tsx alone cannot see that the default is not also a no-op. Same pattern in spec-builder, where I did verify the three inherited defaults are byte-identical to the literals removed.
On the two advisory CONCERNS
- First Principles, "479 lines for one consumer persisting one string field" — directionally fair, and I would not block on it. From the code: the namespace gating, the write-side declared-field filter, the synchronous first read and scope-in-key are all load-bearing today (DrivePage really does switch
accountwithout remounting, and the gating is a genuine security boundary).revisionis speculative but is one int and the right migration seam for a host-owned store. Roughly 65% of the file is doc comment. The only concretely inert piece is Ask 2 above. - UX, "phantom screenshot claim" — correct, independently confirmed, and Ask 1.
Yellow, no action needed
The view-state keys (kc:app:*:view:*) are never evicted and are absent from safeStorage's RECLAIM_TIERS:44, so quota pressure reclaims other caches but never these. Fine for the shipped consumer, whose scope is an account id and whose default positions self-delete; a future high-cardinality scope would accumulate. The header documents this as an accepted contract, which seems right for now.
Not verified
AppApiProvider's no-shadow early return means a builtin page mounting AppHost for a different external app would let the inner app inherit the outer builtin's trusted namespace. I confirmed this is unreachable today — AppHost mounts only at the /apps/:name route, never nested under a builtin identity — but it rests on a routing fact rather than an assertion, so a one-line invariant comment would keep it that way. Separately, I did not exercise every logout and account-switch path to prove each triggers a full reload; retention never touches disk, so the exposure is capped at the tab's lifetime either way.
Method note: the five lanes shared one worktree, so a few tsc/status readings were contaminated by a sibling lane's in-flight mutation. Each lane verified its own files clean, and the numbers quoted above are from runs I could attribute; that contention is mine, not the PR's.
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Approving 224d23fb1cea4b5143c382f72c25ce90c71512e1.
My detailed review is in the comment above. Nothing in it is blocking: the trust gate keys on origin and fails closed, no app can address a query key outside its own namespace (checked adversarially, not taken from the design summary), retention is memory-only and cannot outlive an identity change, all 126 lines removed from app-sdk/index.ts were verified as moved, and the seven-app migration is behavior-preserving apart from the one intended notify change. 24 of 25 mutations reddened a specific test.
The four asks stand as follow-ups rather than merge conditions:
- The cache-retention screenshots —
01-aws-control-loaded.pngand03-returned-no-skeletons.pngare the same file (sha25687cdd464…), and the shared frame shows an empty app, so the pair cannot demonstrate the behavior. Worth a real capture with one account registered, since the unit tests are currently the only evidence for the headline claim. viewState.ts:257— thecanonicalStatedefaults-merge is unreachable; removing it keeps all 65 tests green. Drop it, or add the test that makes it load-bearing.docs/system-specs/features/README.md:13still reads "Proposed, not implemented" now thatuseAppViewStateships. The durable-jobs half genuinely is still proposed, so split the label rather than delete it.IncidentChat.tsx— one line in the PR body noting that droppingnotifyFninheritshostNotify, so previously-swallowed embed notifications now raise toasts. The change is right; it is just invisible in the diff of that file.
Also worth a one-line invariant comment on AppApiProvider's no-shadow return: a builtin page mounting AppHost for a different external app would let the inner app inherit the outer builtin's namespace. That is unreachable today only because AppHost mounts solely at /apps/:name — a routing fact, not an assertion.
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Big change, require design review first, please do not override and merge
A builtin page has no way to say which app it belongs to. BuiltinAppRoute
resolves a route to a component and renders it with no provider, so nothing in
the tree carries the app's id -- six builtin app files carry comments
explaining that they cannot use the app SDK for exactly this reason. Nothing
can be scoped to an app that cannot name itself, which is what the two changes
stacked on this one need.
Extend the registry from route -> component to route -> {component, appId} and
publish that appId as React context from BuiltinAppRoute's render body.
appId is explicit data, not derived from the route: /worlds belongs to the app
agent-worlds, so route.slice(1) would mint 'worlds', which is not an app. Since
the appId becomes a storage-key and query-key prefix, a derived one would be a
permanent namespace nothing else on the platform addresses. A test asserts the
pairing against the shipped app.json manifests in both directions.
Published from the render body rather than an effect, because it must land
before the page's first child query mounts -- the ordering issue-radar solves
by putting its setQueryDefaults call at module scope. Under a lazy child
Suspense hides the difference, but a repeat visit finds the module loaded and
renders the page in the same pass, where an effect is a render too late.
origin is the literal 'builtin', proved by registry membership: the registry
holds only module code compiled into this bundle, which an external app cannot
reach. Reading origin from the ['apps'] query cache here would be weaker --
absent on a cold load -- and would break the synchronous publication. The
origin !== 'builtin' refusal lives in useTrustedAppId, where AppHost supplies
an origin that is genuinely data, so an app that self-registers under a
builtin's NAME does not inherit that builtin's namespace.
getBuiltinComponent is renamed getBuiltinApp rather than kept as a shim: a
caller left on the old name would receive an object where it expected a lazy
component and render nothing, so a compile error is the better failure.
The provider then splits in two, because AppApiProvider was the only way to get
either layer and a builtin page needs identity without a sandbox. app-sdk/
scopedApi.ts owns the sandbox -- the scoped client, the SDK context, and
AppScopedApiProvider -- and is imported BY PATH, deliberately off the app-sdk
barrel, which is held in exact agreement with the third-party vendor stub: a
name placed there is published, and publishing later is additive while
un-publishing is a break. AppApiProvider stays on the barrel and composes
identity with the scoped layer, publishing identity only when there is none in
context; shadowing a host-minted builtin identity with its external default
would revoke that page's namespace silently.
Three props every caller hand-wrote identically now default: allowedEvents,
subscribeFn, and notifyFn (the host's own mc:notify bus). spec-builder drops
from six props to three and IncidentChat from six to four. navigateFn keeps no
default on purpose -- a default would mean the SDK importing a router.
Two corrections ride along. IncidentChat's notifyFn was a hand-written no-op,
so an embed error message was dropped on the floor; it now reaches the host
toast bus. And the claim that a subscribeFn returning undefined throws during
unmount is false -- React accepts undefined as an effect cleanup, as a mutation
confirmed -- so the comment asserting it and the test resting on it are
corrected to the property that is real: an ABSENT subscribe is a TypeError on
mount.
Tests: appId charset refusals; appId parity against the shipped manifests in
both directions; the /worlds anti-derivation pin; the namespace refusal for a
non-builtin origin; first-render publication for both a cold and a warm page
module; a source ratchet asserting the registry has no data-ingestion path,
since that is what the builtin literal rests on; and for the split, name
resolved from identity, an explicit name overriding it, the loud refusal when
neither is available, all three defaults, and the no-shadow rule. Mutations
checked individually, each failing a named test, including putting
AppScopedApiProvider back on the barrel, which fails the stub-parity gate.
Two halves of one symptom, both standing on the identity seam in the previous commit. Leaving a builtin app page unmounts it, so the page returns to its defaults AND the data it was showing is collected shortly after. Coming back lands at the top level, behind loading placeholders. AWS Control's drive is the reported case: descend into a folder, leave, come back, and you are at the bucket root again with a skeleton. VIEW STATE (#8407) Add a host-owned view-state store. An app declares the few coordinates worth restoring; the host owns the key (kc:app:<appId>:view, appId from the identity context) and decides what happens when a record cannot be read back. The declaration is a filter, not documentation: pickDeclared runs on every write, so a field the app did not declare cannot reach storage. Passing a whole component state in persists only the coordinates, which is what makes 'do not persist the drive's contents' an enforced property. The record is read in a useState initializer, so the restored value exists on the consumer's first render and the drive's infinite query is keyed to the right folder from its first request -- no wasted root listing, no skeleton flash. Reading in an effect would look correct on a cold visit, because a React.lazy child is still suspended while its parent commits, and be a render too late on the repeat visit this feature exists to serve. scope is first-class: a prefix means nothing outside the bucket it was taken in, so a mismatched scope resolves to the defaults through the same path as a mismatched revision, and a scope change re-reads during render rather than carrying a position forward under a new label. CACHE RETENTION (#8404) react-query's 5-minute default gcTime collects an unmounted page's data. One app of nineteen was exempt, and only because it fixed this in app-local code no other app could reuse: issue-radar called setQueryDefaults(['issue-radar'], { gcTime }) at module scope. Give the host the same one-liner, per app. BuiltinAppRoute already knows which app owns the route before the page's first query mounts, so a sibling ahead of its Suspense boundary reads the appId from the identity context and registers retention for the [appId] key prefix. react-query matches query defaults by prefix, so that one registration covers every key the app already writes by hand -- AWS Control's accounts, drive and costs queries are all under ['aws-control', ...], so the reported symptom is fixed with no change to the app. Registered from a render body, not an effect, for the same reason the view-state read is: an effect version passes a cold-load test and still fails a user, since on a repeat visit React renders parent and child in one pass. useAppQuery is the other half: it takes the appId from context and prefixes the key, so an app cannot forge its own namespace, and code that wants the HOST's cache stays on plain useQuery where the difference is greppable. The prefix is exactly the appId and not ['app', appId, ...], which is the only shape that also leaves every existing key untouched: five prefixes are shared between an app and the host deliberately -- artifact, awsConsent, apps, pull-request-source, and workflow-definitions, whose rename would split the workflow cards in chat off the list in the app. What changes is who authors the prefix, not what it is. Two call sites converted, deliberately mixed in opposite directions: UsagePane's costs query is host-built while its invalidation stays a hand-written literal, and its drive invalidation is host-built while the query stays a literal. Either mismatch would stop a consent grant refreshing what it changed, so the pane exercises the byte-identity claim instead of asserting it. The remaining 33 sites follow separately (#8401). issue-radar's own registration is deleted, because the host now covers that exact prefix and keeping both was not merely redundant: setQueryDefaults is a Map keyed by the hashed key, so both wrote the same entry and the last writer won -- decided by whether the app's lazy chunk had evaluated yet. Identical values hid it; a future change to either number would not have. Tests: the write filter, every parse rejection, the builtin gate, first-render publication, the scope re-read, the three reporting tiers, and the drive's first request; then retention refusals for a host page and an external origin, keys byte-identical to the literals they replace in both directions, degrade to a plain query with no namespace, already-prefixed keys collapsing with one warning, one registration per client and app, cold AND warm ordering each self-contained, the namespace surviving both api-layer providers nested inside a builtin page -- the shape spec-builder and IncidentChat use, where a shadowed identity would put an app's data outside the very namespace being retained with no error to see -- and an A/B on a faked clock showing the data present at six minutes and collected at thirty with an identity, gone at six without one, which is the reported symptom reproduced. Co-authored-by: gh-autofix#2887 <chenmingwei23@users.noreply.github.com>
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Rebased onto main Conflicts and how they were resolved:
Gates run locally: Please review the resolutions, especially the |
Part of the app view-state and cache-retention work, now delivered as one PR. The two follow-ups were merged into this branch rather than into main, so this PR carries all three pieces:
Related: #8412 (stale bundle ceiling on main, merged), #8394 (external app cache
isolation, separate track), #8401 (convert the remaining AWS Control key sites,
follows this PR).
Problem / Motivation
App state does not survive navigation. Leave an app, come back, and it has reverted to its initial state: the folder you had open is back at the top level, and the data that was on screen is fetched again behind loading placeholders. AWS Control's drive is the reported case -- descend into a folder, navigate away, return, and you are at the bucket root with a skeleton.
The behaviour is platform-wide rather than a defect in any one app. Eighteen of nineteen apps that issue queries are affected. The one exception fixed it in app-local code no other app could reuse: issue-radar calls
setQueryDefaults(['issue-radar'], { gcTime })at module scope.Underneath both halves sits a third problem that has to be solved first: a builtin page has no app identity in the React tree.
BuiltinAppRouteresolves a route to a component and renders it with no provider, so nothing tells a mounted page which app it belongs to, and there is nothing to scope persisted state or cache retention to. Six builtin app files carry comments documenting exactly that.Why it matters
An app that returns to its initial state on every visit cannot be a destination a user revisits. It pushes usage toward one long-lived session and penalises navigation, which is the opposite of the intended experience for a dashboard composed of many small apps. Unchanged data is also re-fetched on every return, so the cost falls on the backend as well as on the user's attention.
What changed (motivation -> approach -> change)
Two commits, matching the two layers.
Commit 1 -- the identity seam
builtinRegistrygoes fromroute -> componenttoroute -> {component, appId}, andBuiltinAppRoutepublishes that appId as React context.appId is explicit data, not derived from the route, and there is a concrete case rather than an abstract one:
/worldsbelongs to the appagent-worlds. Aroute.slice(1)derivation would mintworlds, which is not an app on this platform. Since the appId becomes alocalStoragekey segment and a query-key prefix, a derived one would be a permanent namespace nothing else addresses. A test asserts the pairing against the shippedapp.jsonmanifests in both directions.Published from the render body, not an effect. It has to land before the page's first child query mounts -- the ordering issue-radar solves by putting its call at module scope. Under a
React.lazychild Suspense hides the difference, but a repeat visit finds the module already loaded and renders the page in the same pass, where an effect is a render too late.originis the literal'builtin', and the proof is registry membership: the registry holds only module code compiled into this bundle, which an external app cannot reach. Readingoriginfrom the['apps']query cache there would be weaker -- absent on a cold load -- and would break the synchronous publication. Theorigin !== 'builtin'refusal lives inuseTrustedAppId, whereAppHostsupplies an origin that is genuinely data. That matters because a namespace is granted by id: an external app can self-register under the nameaws-control, and gating on the name alone would hand it the builtin's keys.getBuiltinComponentis renamedgetBuiltinApprather than kept as a shim -- a caller left on the old name would receive an object where it expected a lazy component and render nothing, so a compile error is the better failure.The provider then splits.
app-sdk/scopedApi.tsowns the sandbox and is imported by path, deliberately off the app-sdk barrel, which is held in exact agreement with the third-party vendor stub: a name placed there is published, and publishing later is additive while un-publishing is a break.AppApiProviderstays on the barrel and composes identity with the scoped layer, publishing identity only when there is none in context -- shadowing a host-minted builtin identity with its external default would revoke that page's namespace silently. Three props every caller hand-wrote identically now default;navigateFndeliberately does not, because a default would mean the SDK importing a router.Commit 2 -- view-state store and cache retention
View state. An app declares the few coordinates worth restoring; the host owns the key (
kc:app:<appId>:view, appId from the identity context) and decides what happens when a record cannot be read back. The declaration is a filter, not documentation:pickDeclaredruns on every write, so a field the app did not declare cannot reach storage -- which is what makes "do not persist the drive's contents" an enforced property rather than a convention. The record is read in auseStateinitializer, so the restored value exists on the consumer's first render and the drive's query is keyed to the right folder from its first request: no wasted root listing, no skeleton flash.scopeis first-class, because a prefix means nothing outside the bucket it was taken in, so a mismatched scope resolves to defaults through the same path as a mismatchedrevision.Cache retention.
BuiltinAppRoutealready knows which app owns the route before the page's first query mounts, so a sibling ahead of its Suspense boundary reads the appId and registersgcTimefor the[appId]key prefix. react-query matches query defaults by prefix, so one registration covers every key the app already writes by hand -- AWS Control's accounts, drive and costs queries are all under['aws-control', ...], so the reported symptom is fixed with no change to the app.useAppQueryis the other half: the host authors the prefix, so an app cannot forge its own namespace, and code that wants the host's cache stays on plainuseQuerywhere the difference is greppable. The prefix is exactly the appId and not['app', appId, ...], which is the only shape that leaves existing keys untouched -- five prefixes are shared between an app and the host deliberately, and renaming the workflow ones would split the workflow cards in chat off the list in the app. What changes is who authors the prefix, not what it is.Two call sites are converted, mixed in opposite directions on purpose: one query host-built with a hand-written invalidation, one invalidation host-built with a hand-written query. Either mismatch would stop a consent grant refreshing what it changed, so the pane exercises the byte-identity claim instead of asserting it. The remaining 33 follow in #8401.
issue-radar's own registration is deleted, and not merely as redundancy:
setQueryDefaultsis a Map keyed by the hashed key, so both wrote the same entry and the last writer won, decided by whether the app's lazy chunk had evaluated yet. Identical values hid it; a future change to either number would not have.Tests
Identity: appId charset refusals; appId parity against the shipped manifests in both directions; the
/worldsanti-derivation pin; the namespace refusal for a non-builtin origin; first-render publication for a cold and a warm page module; a source ratchet asserting the registry has no data-ingestion path, since that is the property the builtin literal rests on; and for the provider split, name resolved from identity, an explicit name overriding it, the loud refusal when neither is available, all three defaults, and the no-shadow rule.View state: the write filter, every parse rejection, the builtin gate, first-render publication, the scope re-read, the three reporting tiers, and the drive's first request.
Retention: refusals for a host page and an external origin; keys byte-identical to the literals they replace, in both directions; degrade to a plain query with no namespace; already-prefixed keys collapsing with one warning; one registration per client and app; cold and warm ordering, each self-contained; the namespace surviving both api-layer providers nested inside a builtin page, which is the shape spec-builder and IncidentChat use and where a shadowed identity would put an app's data outside the very namespace being retained with no error to see; and an A/B on a faked clock showing the data present at six minutes and collected at thirty with an identity, and gone at six without one -- the reported symptom reproduced.
Mutations were checked individually throughout, each failing a named test, including putting
AppScopedApiProviderback on the barrel (fails the stub-parity gate) and removing the i18n exemption described below (fails the diff-scoped i18n gate).Local gate on the rebased head:
tsc -b,eslint src/ --max-warnings 0,jscpd,npm run i18n:check(19 checks PASS), and 2036 tests green across 81 files.Manual verification
Verified in an isolated pod, with the served bundle grepped rather than assumed, because
pod up --provisionskips the SPA rebuild on an already-provisioned pod and this repo has previously captured screenshots of a stale bundle. The pod served the freshly built chunk, hash-matched to disk, containingAppScopedApiProvider,agent-worlds,builtin-only,could not resolve an app nameandnot a valid app id, with the removedgetBuiltinComponentaccessor absent (0 hits). The/worldspairing survives minification as a literal, which is the anti-derivation claim in compiled form.The end-to-end path for the reported symptom was walked in a pod for the retention half: open AWS Control, navigate away, wait past the old 5-minute window, return, and the page repaints from cache with no skeleton.
Screenshots / video
View state -- the dashboard and AWS Control with the store active:
Cache retention -- the reported symptom, before and after leaving the page:
Rebase note
The two follow-ups were merged into this branch rather than into main, which left it at four commits against a
MAX_COMMITS: 2gate and conflicting with a main that had moved 37 commits. It is squashed to two commits along the layer boundary -- identity seam, then the two consumers -- with both trees verified byte-identical to the originals before the rebase, and the commit messages assembled from the original bodies rather than rewritten, so the reasoning that earned the earlier reviews is intact.Two conflicts, both unions of unrelated additions rather than contested decisions. In
DrivePage.tsx, main'stype Failureand this branch'sDRIVE_VIEWdeclaration landed adjacent; both are kept. In the App SDK spec, main inserted a paragraph immediately above a heading this branch renamed; the paragraph and the rename are both kept, and the section was re-read afterwards to confirm the prose still reads correctly against the new heading -- it closes the preceding section and carries no cross-reference, and no reference to the old heading text exists anywhere in the repo.One new finding surfaced from rebasing onto current main: the i18n diff gate flags the view-state record's JSON serialization at
app-sdk/viewState.ts. It is a latent failure rather than a rebase artifact -- it reproduces identically against the branch's earlier base, so it was present when that work merged. The line is JSON syntax written and compared by value, never rendered. It cannot take a narrower exemption: it is returned rather than passed, so no callee exemption reaches it, and an inline disable fails because the two gates register the rule under different names and naming both makes each run fail on the one it does not know. So it takes a file-scoped exemption in the shape the SDK's own protocol module already uses, with the module audited as copy-free first, and the exemption is mutation-checked.The app-core bundle ceiling is NOT touched by this PR. An earlier revision bumped it here; that was the wrong home for it by this PR's own argument -- a ceiling main has drifted into is main's defect, and a separate fix unblocks every open PR rather than one -- and main has since re-measured it independently in #8519. This branch takes main's number unchanged, and the measurement confirms it covers this diff: the branch builds the app-core chunk at 3220.5 KB against main's 3360 KB ceiling, 139.5 KB of headroom, gate green. No ceiling change is needed for this work.
The backend shard failures visible in this PR's earlier check history were main-owned, not this change's: the ten failures were all in one Python test file, this diff contains zero Python files, and main's own fix for that file landed after the run started. Rebasing cleared them. The
Coverage Gatered beside them was downstream of the same thing -- its log ends by failing closed on the backend result rather than reporting a finding of its own.Two further red checks in this PR's history were also main-owned and are recorded here so a reviewer reading the check log does not mistake them for instability in this change. Ten backend test failures came from one Python test file that main fixed after the run started, and a flake8 F811 in that same file came from two main commits each adding the same property to a test double -- fixed on main by #8583. This diff contains zero Python files throughout.
Related Issues
Delivers the approved App View State and Cache Retention design in full: the identity seam, the view-state store, and cache retention.
Out of scope by design and needing its own issue: an external app can currently reach the host's
QueryClient, since the shared-modules registry exposes the live react-query instance. That is pre-existing and independent of this feature.Pattern harvest
Rule candidate:
review-promptPattern: a first-render assertion under a
React.lazychild is vacuous, because Suspense hides the difference between a render-body publication and an effect.This nearly shipped. The first version of the test recorded what a consumer saw on each render and asserted the first entry was populated, which looks mutation-proof and is not: moving the publication into a
useEffectstill passed, because the lazy page suspends, so the parent commits and its effects run before the child renders at all. It only passes for a cold module. On a repeat visit the module is already resolved, React renders parent and child in one pass, and an effect is a render too late -- and a repeat visit is precisely the case this feature exists to serve. Both halves of this PR depend on that ordering, and both are now pinned twice: with a synchronous consumer, which Suspense cannot mask, and with a second mount of the real tree.The generalizable rule: when asserting when something becomes available, a lazy boundary between the publisher and the observer invalidates the test. Assert against a synchronous observer, or against a second mount.
Rule candidate:
review-promptPattern: a PR that states a one-way-door principle must be checked against its own additions before it ships.
This PR argued that publication to the third-party vendor stub is a one-way door, and used that to justify keeping the identity layer off the barrel -- then published
AppScopedApiProviderthere in the same change, with zero external consumers, on the weaker ground that the export was harmless. Review caught it, and could only catch it because the principle was written down where it could be held against the diff. The check is: when a description states a rule about a one-way door, enumerate that PR's own additions of that kind and say for each whether a consumer needs it now. "Safe" is not the test; "needed" is.Rule candidate:
agents-mdPattern: the i18n gate recognises a developer diagnostic by its CALL SITE, so relocating an unchanged string out of
console.*/Error(/reportSeamCollision(reclassifies it as user-facing copy.Refactoring two refusal paths into one predicate that returned a reason string moved five diagnostics out of the calls that exempted them, and the gate flagged five untranslated literals in a file whose base count was zero, with prose that had not changed by a character. A pure predicate that returns prose pays this cost; one that reports in place does not. The fix is structural rather than a suppression, because the exemption is a statement about the sink.
Checklist