Please do not open a public issue for security problems. Use GitHub's private vulnerability reporting on this repository (Security tab, "Report a vulnerability"). You should hear back within a week.

The threat model is summarised in the README under "Security in short" and detailed in docs/DEVELOPMENT.md under "Protocol". In short, everything a board does on the network is authenticated with a per-board key established by hcibridge claim, and firmware updates over the network are signed with the project's release key. Reports about bypassing either of those, or about the PC daemon feeding untrusted data into /dev/vhci, are very welcome.

Out of scope: physical access to the board (USB flashing is intentionally unrestricted), and confidentiality of Bluetooth traffic on the wired LAN (the link is authenticated but not encrypted, as documented).

Only the latest release receives fixes. Boards can be updated over the network with hcibridge update.