weave ships from main. Fixes land there; there are no maintained release branches. Update with git pull.

Two properties of weave are by design, not vulnerabilities:

• No authentication and no per-user permissions. Anyone who can reach the port can read and write every workspace on that instance. The server binds 127.0.0.1; a self-hosted install is expected to sit behind a reverse proxy, SSO proxy, or private network that does the authenticating. See Self-hosting.
• Documents may contain raw HTML, and it renders same-origin. Write access to a shared workspace is equivalent to write access to a repo — grant it accordingly.

Reports that a directly-internet-exposed instance is unauthenticated, or that a user who can already write documents can inject HTML into their own workspace, will be closed as working-as-documented.

• Reading or writing data across a boundary weave claims to enforce — for example escaping a workspace via a crafted entity ref, path traversal in the document or file routes, or reaching outside the data directory.
• Remote code execution, including through the formula evaluator, CSV import, or document rendering.
• Anything that lets an unauthenticated request reach an instance bound to 127.0.0.1 (DNS rebinding, Host-header handling, CSRF against the REST API).
• Corruption or loss of a workspace file triggered by ordinary input.

Please do not open a public issue. Use GitHub's private reporting:

1. Go to https://github.com/grunion-ai/weave/security/advisories/new
2. Include the commit (git rev-parse --short HEAD), your Node version, reproduction steps, and the impact you believe it has.

You will get an acknowledgement within a week. This is a small project with no bug-bounty budget — what we can offer is a prompt fix and credit in the advisory and commit, unless you would rather stay anonymous.

Please give us a reasonable window to ship a fix before disclosing publicly.