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31 changes: 24 additions & 7 deletions docs/audit/gap-analysis-source.md
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -689,13 +689,30 @@ rule now has `required_approving_review_count: 1`,
self-merge anymore; the two admin accounts review each other's PRs.

**Follow-up (same day): `.github/CODEOWNERS` added and code-owner review
required.** The one residual branch-protection sub-item — `codeowners review
is not required` — is now closed: `.github/CODEOWNERS` names both admin
accounts as owners of everything (with explicit callouts for
`crates/crypto`, `crates/tlsio`, `.github`, and the security docs), and the
ruleset's `require_code_owner_review` was set to `true` (verified live). The
`BranchProtectionID` check now has no residual warnings to raise. Only the
optional OpenSSF badge remains.
required.** `.github/CODEOWNERS` names both admin accounts as owners of
everything (with explicit callouts for `crates/crypto`, `crates/tlsio`,
`.github`, and the security docs), and the ruleset's
`require_code_owner_review` was set to `true` (verified live; PR #91).

**Actual post-remediation Scorecard scores (verified after the re-scan on the
#91 merge commit — corrects the earlier "will clear on next scan" projection):**

- `BranchProtectionID` (#4): **score 3 → 8.** All configurable protections are
on; the single remaining warning is "required approving review count is 1" —
Scorecard reserves the top score for **≥2** required reviewers, which for a
two-maintainer team would force every PR through both people. 8/10 is the
sensible ceiling here, not an unmet gap. The config is complete.
- `CodeReviewID` (#14): **score 0, "2/25 approved changesets."** This is a
*trailing* metric over the last 25 merged PRs, not a config switch: only the
PRs merged under the new required-approval rule carry approvals, so it climbs
on its own as reviewed PRs accumulate. Nothing left to configure.
- `CIIBestPracticesID` (#16): optional OpenSSF badge, "InProgress" — not a
guide-required gap.

Net: the branch-protection/code-review **configuration** is complete and
correct (G-032/T-16 closed); the three still-open alerts are a team-size
scoring artifact, a self-healing history metric, and an optional badge —
none require further change.

Every non-deferred gap in the 35-gap set is now resolved. Remaining: the
Deferred tier T-22…T-25 (gated on a first distribution channel) and the two
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14 changes: 8 additions & 6 deletions docs/audit/ostif-best-practices-audit.md
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ title: "Gap Analysis: src-control vs OSTIF Security Best Practices Guide"
comparison_direction: "src-control repository (current state) -> OSTIF/Least Authority Security Best Practices Guide (desired state)"
scope: "The whole repository (code, CI, docs, GitHub configuration via live API) compared against all six OSTIF practice areas; the guide's missing 08-what-next.md chapter and the external git-agentic.com website were excluded."
generated: "2026-07-18"
updated: "2026-07-18 — fifth round: second maintainer + required PR approvals enabled, closing G-032/T-16; code-scanning now 1 open alert (the optional OpenSSF badge). Every non-deferred gap is resolved."
updated: "2026-07-18 — sixth round: CODEOWNERS + code-owner review added (#91); every non-deferred gap resolved. 3 Scorecard alerts remain open, all non-gaps — branch-protection at 8/10 (capped by 2-reviewer scoring), a self-healing code-review history metric, and the optional OpenSSF badge."
generated_by: "han:gap-analysis"
sections_included:
- executive_summary
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ Every gap has a stable ID. Sections 3–5 reference those IDs. The full evidence

**Both actionable tiers of the work plan are done, and the one item that had been deferred for lack of a second reviewer is now also closed.** The Now tier (T-1…T-9, T-26) and the Soon tier (T-10…T-21) all shipped across pull requests #76–#87, plus repository-settings changes, an organization-wide two-factor-authentication requirement, and — as of later on 2026-07-18 — a second maintainer and required pull-request approvals (closing G-032/T-16). Only the **Deferred tier (T-22…T-25)** remains — OSS-Fuzz enrollment, reproducible builds, a release pipeline with supply-chain attestations, and a hardening guide for people who run the server component — and every one of those is deliberately parked behind a trigger that hasn't happened yet: the project still distributes nothing for a consumer to verify.

**The independent security scorecard tells the story in numbers: 17 open findings became 3, and after required reviews were enabled only 1 remains — the optional badge.**
**The independent security scorecard tells the story in numbers: 17 open findings became 3, and every one of those 3 is now a non-gap** — see the update at the end of this section for what each represents after required reviews and code-owner review were enabled.

| Scorecard finding (first run) | Now/Soon fix | Status |
|---|---|---|
Expand All @@ -55,13 +55,15 @@ Every gap has a stable ID. Sections 3–5 reference those IDs. The full evidence

The **automated code analysis is fully clean** — zero open findings — and now covers the desktop application's language as well as the core (T-3).

**Update (2026-07-18, later the same day): the two review-related findings are now resolved.** A second maintainer account was added, and the trunk protection was set to require **1 approval** from someone other than the last pusher, with stale approvals dismissed on push and last-push approval required. That closes gap G-032 / todo T-16 — it was the only remaining non-deferred gap — and the two Scorecard findings it drove (required review approvals, and branch-protection completeness) clear on the next weekly scan. Nobody self-merges now; the two admin accounts review each other's pull requests.
**Update (2026-07-18, later the same day): the review-related gap is fully closed and the protection is complete.** A second maintainer account was added, and the trunk protection was set to require **1 approval** from someone other than the last pusher, plus code-owner review (a `CODEOWNERS` file naming both accounts), with stale approvals dismissed on push and last-push approval required. That closes gap G-032 / todo T-16 — the only remaining non-deferred gap — and nobody self-merges now; the two admin accounts review each other's pull requests.

**That leaves one open code-scanning finding, and it is optional:**
**Three code-scanning findings remain open after the re-scan, and none is an unmet gap:**

- **An optional best-practices badge**, now showing "in progress." Completing it is nice-to-have, not a gap the guide requires.
- **Branch protection scored 3 → 8 of 10.** Every configurable protection is on; the top two points are reserved for *two or more* required reviewers, which for a two-person team would force every change through both people. 8/10 is the sensible ceiling, not a gap — the configuration is complete.
- **Code-review coverage is a trailing history metric**, counting approvals across the most recent merged changes. It climbs on its own as reviewed changes accumulate; only the ones merged under the new rule carry approvals yet. Nothing left to configure.
- **An optional best-practices badge**, showing "in progress." Nice-to-have, not required by the guide.

*(For the audit trail: these findings originally shared the root cause "review approvals set to zero," which was deliberately held because a lone maintainer cannot approve their own change under the platform's rules. Adding a second reviewer removed that blocker. The branch-protection finding had already improved once merge-gating on passing checks landed via T-9.)*
*(For the audit trail: the first two findings originally shared the root cause "review approvals set to zero," deliberately held because a lone maintainer cannot approve their own change under the platform's rules. Adding a second reviewer removed that blocker; the branch-protection finding had also improved earlier once merge-gating on passing checks landed via T-9. An earlier draft of this section projected both would "clear on the next scan" — the configuration did complete, but the two findings persist as a team-size scoring cap and a self-healing history metric respectively, which is why this note states the outcome precisely.)*

**Two closing items still need a human and cannot be done from the repository:** deploying the machine-readable security-contact file to the project website (`/.well-known/security.txt`), and the maintainer personally confirming the security-feed subscriptions the documentation now lists. Both are noted in Section 5.

Expand Down