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feat: owner-only Windows DACL for the keygen identity and TLS serve key (#281) - #285
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…ntity and TLS serve key (#281) Move winacl from scl-repo to scl-core::owner_only (one implementation, the only Windows unsafe) and call it from local-key, sc keygen and, via an injected creator, scl-tlsio (a leaf crate that may not depend on scl-core).
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| `scl-core`; the key is also created with `create_new` on every platform, so a | ||
| race between two first starts fails the loser instead of overwriting), regenerating only when the material is missing, `not_after` set to |
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Make first-start TLS minting actually race-safe
When two processes mint the same empty serve-identity directory concurrently (for example, sc serve fingerprint racing the first sc serve --tls), both can pass the existence check, and one can overwrite cert.pem after the other has created key.pem before losing the key's create_new race. This leaves a certificate from one generated key paired with the other private key, so subsequent loads fail rather than merely failing the losing process as documented. Reserve the identity by creating the key before publishing the certificate, or otherwise serialize/atomically publish the pair.
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…pair mismatched halves (#281)
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Inline comments:
Review comments at @docs/THREAT-MODEL.md:
- Line 105: Update the threat-model explanation near
create_new_owner_only_or_warn to qualify the “small exposure” statement as
applying only to .sc/local-key, then add that identity files and TLS serve keys
may remain unencrypted under inherited permissions and be readable by other
local users.
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⛔ Files ignored due to path filters: 1
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📒 Files selected for processing: 23
.claude/skills/sc-cli-reference/SKILL.md.github/workflows/ci.ymlARCHITECTURE.mdCLAUDE.mdCONTRIBUTING.mdROADMAP.mdcrates/cli/src/main.rscrates/cli/tests/keygen_overwrite.rscrates/core/Cargo.tomlcrates/core/src/lib.rscrates/core/src/owner_only.rscrates/core/src/winacl.rscrates/repo/Cargo.tomlcrates/repo/src/cache.rscrates/repo/src/http_transport.rscrates/repo/src/lib.rscrates/repo/src/test_support.rscrates/tlsio/src/identity.rscrates/tlsio/src/stream.rsdocs/THREAT-MODEL.mddocs/adr/0042-in-binary-tls-sc-https.mddocs/adr/0043-randomized-protected-encryption.mddocs/security/third-party-inventory.md
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- crates/repo/Cargo.toml
- crates/repo/src/lib.rs
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tonibergholm
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Approved: independent review (no unsafe findings; red keygen CI step fixed), Windows job proves DACLs for keygen and TLS keys on a real runner, Codex clean, CI green.
Closes #281
What
On Windows the
sc keygen --outidentity file and the auto-minted TLS serve key (.sc/serve-tls/key.pem) are now created owner-only from the first byte, like.sc/local-key(#279): a protected single-ACE DACL for the current user, applied byCreateFileW.Design
winacl.rsmoved (git mv, not copied) fromscl-repotoscl-core, behind a newscl_core::owner_only:create_new_owner_only(path)(unixcreate_new+0600, Windows DACL, other targetsUnsupported) andcreate_new_owner_only_or_warn(path)(Windows/other: fall back to default permissions plus a one-time stderr warning naming the file, never fail; unix: identical to the strict call).windows-sysis now acfg(windows)dependency ofscl-coreonly, and the sole Windowsunsafestays incrates/core/src/winacl.rs..sc/local-keycalls the strict function and keeps its own fallback (it feedscan_restrict_permissions).sc keygencalls_or_warn.scl-tlsiostill depends on no workspace crate. Chosen:load_or_mint(dir, create_key: &dyn Fn(&Path) -> io::Result<File>), withscl-repo::http_transport::load_or_mint_serve_identityas the single place that injectsscl_core::owner_only::create_new_owner_only_or_warn. Rejected: copying ~170 lines of Win32unsafeinto tlsio (two implementations to audit and keep in sync). The signature change touches 2 production call sites and the tlsio tests; there is no default-permissions entry point left to misuse.sc.exeoverflowed the 1 MiB Windows main-thread stack before running any command (no earlier CI step ever executedscon Windows). On Windows,mainnow runs the real entry on a 32 MiB thread; other platforms are unchanged. Release-build behavior was not checked.create_newinstead of a truncating write, and the key is now created before the cert, so a race between two first starts fails the loser before it can write a mismatched cert (Codex review).What the advisory Windows job proves
cargo checkandclippy -D warningsfor the workspace, plus:scl-core owner_only::(ACL read back withicacls: exactly one explicit, non-inherited full-control ACE for the user; AlreadyExists on a second create; a path over 260 chars still gets the ACL),scl-repo cache::(local-key),scl-repo minted_serve_tls_key(serve key DACL),scl-tlsio identity::(key goes through the injected creator, a failing creator aborts the mint), andscl-cli --test keygen_overwrite(runssc keygen, no fallback warning, DACL read back, refuses to overwrite).Not covered
Identity files and serve keys created before this change keep inherited DACLs (documented). An operator-supplied
--tls-keyPEM is theirs to protect. A crash between writing the key and the cert leaves half an identity, whichload_or_mintalready reports instead of re-minting.Docs
THREAT-MODEL, ADR-0042/0043, CLAUDE.md gotcha, ROADMAP, CONTRIBUTING, ARCHITECTURE, sc-cli-reference skill, third-party inventory.
Summary by CodeRabbit
Security
Documentation