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Decide: signature replay boundary — position binding or defer #32
Signatures bind identity to a snapshot id, not a branch position, so a legitimately signed snapshot can be replayed elsewhere in history; merge/rebase/amend results start unsigned by design (P22 threat model; audit known-boundary finding). Does position/ancestry binding (or another mitigation) get specified now, or is this boundary re-affirmed and deferred with recorded rationale?
Re-affirmed and deferred. No position-binding mechanism is specced in this map; P22's threat model stands, restated more sharply than the audit's phrasing.
Sharpened boundary (recorded): a Snapshot's parents are part of the content its id hashes, so a P22 signature over the snapshot id already binds identity to the snapshot and its entire ancestry — a signed snapshot cannot be grafted under different parents without voiding the signature. The genuine residue is ref binding only: nothing stops a hostile remote from pointing a branch name at an older or side-branch legitimately-signed snapshot (rollback / ref-swap) — the same gap git addresses with signed pushes / gittuf-class ref metadata. "Replayed elsewhere in history" overstates the surface; "replayable to a ref tip within its own history" is the accurate claim, and docs/THREAT-MODEL.md should say it that way (folded into the assembly ticket's doc sweep).
Defer rationale: the attack requires a hostile shared or multi-writer server; no such deployment exists (pre-1.0; P29's serve auth targets single-operator use). The correct fix — gittuf / push-certificate-shaped signed ref attestations with freshness/monotonicity semantics, verified at fetch/clone — is a trust-model and protocol design that deserves its own charted effort when server deployments are real, not a corner of this map.
Revisit triggers: the first real multi-writer or hosted sc serve deployment, or hosting sc repos on untrusted infrastructure.
Also kept as-is: P22's re-sign-after stance for merge/rebase/amend results (a new snapshot id is a new claim); threading --sign through history-op completions stays an un-promoted ROADMAP follow-on — it shrinks an ergonomic window, not this replay surface.
Activity
tonibergholm commentedon Jul 10, 2026
Resolution
Re-affirmed and deferred. No position-binding mechanism is specced in this map; P22's threat model stands, restated more sharply than the audit's phrasing.
Sharpened boundary (recorded): a
Snapshot's parents are part of the content its id hashes, so a P22 signature over the snapshot id already binds identity to the snapshot and its entire ancestry — a signed snapshot cannot be grafted under different parents without voiding the signature. The genuine residue is ref binding only: nothing stops a hostile remote from pointing a branch name at an older or side-branch legitimately-signed snapshot (rollback / ref-swap) — the same gap git addresses with signed pushes / gittuf-class ref metadata. "Replayed elsewhere in history" overstates the surface; "replayable to a ref tip within its own history" is the accurate claim, anddocs/THREAT-MODEL.mdshould say it that way (folded into the assembly ticket's doc sweep).Defer rationale: the attack requires a hostile shared or multi-writer server; no such deployment exists (pre-1.0; P29's serve auth targets single-operator use). The correct fix — gittuf / push-certificate-shaped signed ref attestations with freshness/monotonicity semantics, verified at fetch/clone — is a trust-model and protocol design that deserves its own charted effort when server deployments are real, not a corner of this map.
Revisit triggers: the first real multi-writer or hosted
sc servedeployment, or hosting sc repos on untrusted infrastructure.Also kept as-is: P22's re-sign-after stance for merge/rebase/amend results (a new snapshot id is a new claim); threading
--signthrough history-op completions stays an un-promoted ROADMAP follow-on — it shrinks an ergonomic window, not this replay surface.