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Rustls accepted TLS 1.3 handshake messages sent at the wrong encryption level
when they followed a key-changing message in the same record. For example,
a plaintext EncryptedExtensions message packed into the same record as the ServerHello was accepted.
RFC 8446 section 5.1 requires that handshake messages do not span key changes,
and that implementations terminate the connection with an "unexpected_message"
alert if they do.
The handshake transcript is still authenticated, so a network-position attacker
cannot use this to alter or complete a handshake; the practical effect is that
a peer could send handshake messages that should be encrypted in plaintext
without rustls rejecting the connection.
Triage: fixed by #152, which bumps rustls from 0.23.43 to 0.23.45 (the patched version). cargo audit is green on that PR, and the PR is only waiting on code-owner review. Close this once it merges.
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tonibergholm commentedon Sep 24, 2026
Triage: fixed by #152, which bumps
rustlsfrom 0.23.43 to 0.23.45 (the patched version).cargo auditis green on that PR, and the PR is only waiting on code-owner review. Close this once it merges.Generated by Claude Code
tonibergholm commentedon Sep 24, 2026
Fixed by #152 (merged), which bumps rustls to 0.23.45.
Generated by Claude Code