State header-encryption splice resistance as a sender guarantee - #150
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Receivers accept already-opened frames, so the property follows from sealing every outbound frame, not from receive-side enforcement. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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The header-encryption chapter contradicted itself. The design-rationale and "does provide" sections claimed whole-frame splice resistance because the outer AEAD covers a frame as one unit. The receive rule, though, accepts an already-opened frame as a convenience and calls metadata hiding a sender guarantee.
This PR reconciles them in spec text, with no behavior change. Splice resistance against network adversaries holds because every outbound frame is sealed, so an adversary without the header keys never sees a frame's sections to recombine. It's a sender guarantee that receivers don't enforce, and it doesn't extend to anyone holding opened frames or the keys. Peer-level mix-and-match hardening (checking the AD on receive) remains separate.
Book-only, with an empty changeset.
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