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chore(deps): update dependency serialize-javascript to v7.1.2 [security] - #369
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This PR contains the following updates:
7.1.1→7.1.2Warning
Some dependencies could not be looked up. Check the Dependency Dashboard for more information.
Serialize JavaScript is Vulnerable to RCE via RegExp.flags and Date.prototype.toISOString()
GHSA-5c6j-r48x-rmvq
More information
Details
Impact
The serialize-javascript npm package (versions <= 7.0.2) contains a code injection vulnerability. It is an incomplete fix for CVE-2020-7660.
While
RegExp.sourceis sanitized,RegExp.flagsis interpolated directly into the generated output without escaping. A similar issue exists inDate.prototype.toISOString().If an attacker can control the input object passed to
serialize(), they can inject malicious JavaScript via the flags property of a RegExp object. When the serialized string is later evaluated (viaeval,new Function, or<script>tags), the injected code executes.Patches
The fix has been published in version 7.0.3. https://github.com/yahoo/serialize-javascript/releases/tag/v7.0.3
Severity
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:HReferences
This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).
Serialize JavaScript has CPU Exhaustion Denial of Service via crafted array-like objects
CVE-2026-34043 / GHSA-qj8w-gfj5-8c6v
More information
Details
Impact
What kind of vulnerability is it?
It is a Denial of Service (DoS) vulnerability caused by CPU exhaustion. When serializing a specially crafted "array-like" object (an object that inherits from
Array.prototypebut has a very largelengthproperty), the process enters an intensive loop that consumes 100% CPU and hangs indefinitely.Who is impacted?
Applications that use
serialize-javascriptto serialize untrusted or user-controlled objects are at risk. While direct exploitation is difficult, it becomes a high-priority threat if the application is also vulnerable to Prototype Pollution or handles untrusted data via YAML Deserialization, as these could be used to inject the malicious object.Patches
Has the problem been patched?
Yes, the issue has been patched by replacing
instanceof Arraychecks withArray.isArray()and usingObject.keys()for sparse array detection.What versions should users upgrade to?
Users should upgrade to
v7.0.5or later.Workarounds
Is there a way for users to fix or remediate the vulnerability without upgrading?
There is no direct code-level workaround within the library itself. However, users can mitigate the risk by:
serialize()function.v7.0.5as soon as possible.Acknowledgements
Serialize JavaScript thanks Tomer Aberbach (@TomerAberbach) for discovering and privately disclosing this issue.
Severity
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:HReferences
This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).
Serialize JavaScript: Cross-site scripting (XSS) via unescaped </script> in serialized function bodies
CVE-2026-97711 / GHSA-gfhx-hw2g-v5hg
More information
Details
Impact
serialize-javascriptescapes its output so it is safe to embed inside a<script>element. In 7.1.1 that guarantee does not hold for functionvalues: a crafted function body can carry a literal, unescaped
</script>into the output, terminating the script element early so the remainder is
parsed as HTML.
SCRIPT_CLOSE_REGEXPused<\/script[^>]*>as its first alternative. Thecharacter class excludes only
>, so a single match could run from one</scriptall the way to the next>anywhere in the source — swallowing asecond, complete
</script>along the way. Only one replacement is emittedper match, and the plain-code branch neutralizes just the leading
<(
'< ' + match.slice(1)), so the swallowed tag was re-emitted verbatim.Reaching that shape requires
</scriptin code position, which is legalJavaScript:
x</script=+/parses asx < /script=+/, a comparison against aregex literal.
Embedded as the README documents (
<script>window.S = <%= serialize(state) %></script>)and parsed by Chromium, the script element ends at the injected tag and the
<img>becomes a live DOM node with itsonerrorhandler executing in thepage origin.
Only the function path is affected. The same payload passed as data is
escaped correctly, and
options.isJSON/ non-function values are unaffected.Patches
Fixed in 7.1.2. The wildcard now excludes
<as well as>(
[^<>]*), so a match can never reach past a second<. Every</scriptin the source therefore either begins its own match or is followed by a
character the HTML tokenizer does not accept as ending a tag name — it ends
the tag name only on TAB, LF, FF, CR, SPACE,
/or>, and emits anythingelse as text.
Workarounds
Upgrade to 7.1.2. If you cannot upgrade, 7.1.0 and earlier are
unaffected, or avoid serializing functions whose source text is
attacker-influenced.
Regression note
This is a regression specific to 7.1.1, not a long-standing issue. 7.1.0 and
earlier applied the same wildcard but escaped the entire match, so no tag
survived. Downstream scanners defaulting to a
>= 7.1.0range would beoverly broad.
Severity
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:P/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:L/SI:L/SA:NReferences
This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).
Serialize JavaScript: Cross-site scripting (XSS) via unescaped </script> in serialized function bodies
CVE-2026-97711 / GHSA-gfhx-hw2g-v5hg
More information
Details
Impact
serialize-javascriptescapes its output so it is safe to embed inside a<script>element. In 7.1.1 that guarantee does not hold for functionvalues: a crafted function body can carry a literal, unescaped
</script>into the output, terminating the script element early so the remainder is
parsed as HTML.
SCRIPT_CLOSE_REGEXPused<\/script[^>]*>as its first alternative. Thecharacter class excludes only
>, so a single match could run from one</scriptall the way to the next>anywhere in the source — swallowing asecond, complete
</script>along the way. Only one replacement is emittedper match, and the plain-code branch neutralizes just the leading
<(
'< ' + match.slice(1)), so the swallowed tag was re-emitted verbatim.Reaching that shape requires
</scriptin code position, which is legalJavaScript:
x</script=+/parses asx < /script=+/, a comparison against aregex literal.
Embedded as the README documents (
<script>window.S = <%= serialize(state) %></script>)and parsed by Chromium, the script element ends at the injected tag and the
<img>becomes a live DOM node with itsonerrorhandler executing in thepage origin.
Only the function path is affected. The same payload passed as data is
escaped correctly, and
options.isJSON/ non-function values are unaffected.Patches
Fixed in 7.1.2. The wildcard now excludes
<as well as>(
[^<>]*), so a match can never reach past a second<. Every</scriptin the source therefore either begins its own match or is followed by a
character the HTML tokenizer does not accept as ending a tag name — it ends
the tag name only on TAB, LF, FF, CR, SPACE,
/or>, and emits anythingelse as text.
Workarounds
Upgrade to 7.1.2. If you cannot upgrade, 7.1.0 and earlier are
unaffected, or avoid serializing functions whose source text is
attacker-influenced.
Regression note
This is a regression specific to 7.1.1, not a long-standing issue. 7.1.0 and
earlier applied the same wildcard but escaped the entire match, so no tag
survived. Downstream scanners defaulting to a
>= 7.1.0range would beoverly broad.
Severity
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:P/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:L/SI:L/SA:NReferences
This data is provided by OSV and the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).
Release Notes
yahoo/serialize-javascript (serialize-javascript)
v7.1.2Compare Source
See: GHSA-gfhx-hw2g-v5hg
Configuration
📅 Schedule: (UTC)
🚦 Automerge: Enabled.
♻ Rebasing: Whenever PR is behind base branch, or you tick the rebase/retry checkbox.
🔕 Ignore: Close this PR and you won't be reminded about this update again.
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