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Server, Admin: Require confirmed access for security changes - #393
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- Add app.auth.reconfirmAccessAfter: logins and 'post confirm-access' confirm the access of the session for this long, default '10m' - Answer 403 with confirmationRequired to password and username changes, passkey registrations and removals, and turning TOTP on and off without it, which no longer takes a code - Confirm with the password and the code of users with TOTP, counting wrong codes, or with a passkey, keeping registration and authentication challenges apart - Reject passwords in the patch and put actions of UsersController, which only change through 'post password', and hashes in all of them - Ask to confirm the access in the admin when requests answer confirmationRequired and send them again, and always offer the Security dialog for the password
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A stolen session alone could add its own passkey, turn TOTP on or off, or change the password. Passkeys survive password changes, so a short takeover could become lasting access.
app.auth.reconfirmAccessAfter(default'10m'): logging in, or the new'post confirm-access', gives the session confirmed access for this long. It confirms with the password (plus the code for users with TOTP) or with a passkey.confirmationRequired:'post password', adding and removing passkeys, turning TOTP on and off ('delete totp'no longer takes a code), and username changes.patch/putrejectpassword, and every write rejectshash.hasConfirmedAccess(ctx)lets apps protect their own actions.Behaviour changes: admins no longer set other users' passwords via
patch/put; password fields move to the Security dialog.Reviews: three independent rounds. Their findings are fixed: the
hashbypass, account takeover through a username change, the TOTP lockout, therelategap, and the docs example fordelete.