Please report vulnerabilities privately via GitHub's private vulnerability reporting on the public repository: Security → Report a vulnerability (https://github.com/dfinity/public-multidex/security/advisories/new).

If that is unavailable to you for any reason, email multidex@dfinity.org instead. Either channel is private; use whichever you can reach.

This link previously pointed at dfinity/multidex, which is a private repository — so it 404'd for every external reporter, and there was no working private channel at all. Two independent review teams hit that wall in August 2026 and published in the open rather than sit on their findings; one withheld a user-targeting exploit for want of somewhere to send it. If a link here ever 404s for you, that is a bug in this file — mail the address above and say so.

Please do not open public issues or pull requests for security problems, and do not test against deployments you do not operate beyond what is needed to demonstrate the issue.

A useful report includes: the affected surface (canister method, page, script), steps to reproduce, the impact you believe it has (funds, privacy, availability), and — for exchange-logic issues — the market/pool state needed to trigger it.

MULTI/DEX is a research prototype under active development. It has not been audited. Public deployments run in #play posture: every balance is play-money by construction (capped simulated deposits; no real-asset custody), so vulnerabilities there are treated as correctness/robustness reports rather than incidents. There is currently no bug bounty; reports are handled on a best-effort basis.

Findings we especially care about:

• Solvency and conservation — anything that mints, loses, or double-counts value across the ledger, order books, AMM vault, margin pools, insurance fund or treasury.
• Authorization and scoping — reading or acting on another principal's balances, orders, positions, or history (including through the OQL query surface and its per-caller row scoping).
• Ledger integrity — breaking the hash chain, the certified head, or the archive's append-only guarantees without detection.
• Matching fairness — bypassing the sealed staging/release pass, priority rules, or self-trade prevention.
• Availability — cheap ways to exhaust cycles, memory, or the staged-order queue past its shed defenses.

Out of scope: issues requiring a malicious controller (controllers are trusted by definition until the NNS-controlled production posture), dev-only surfaces (#dev test hooks, xrc-mock, fuel-mock), and volumetric denial of service against public IC boundary infrastructure.

Only the main branch (and the deployments built from its tip) is supported.

The production gate lives in docs/pre-mainnet-checklist.md, and the deployment-posture kill-matrix in docs/deployment-modes.md. Do not deploy the dev mock canisters to value-bearing targets, and rotate any API keys that ever appeared in git history before going public with a deployment.