Safe to Send?

Paste an address and pick the chain you are about to send on. It tells you, from public RPCs only, whether funds sent to that address on that chain can be reached, before you send. The same answer tells you, after a mistake, whether funds already sent there can be recovered and by whom.

It never asks for keys, never connects a wallet and never signs anything.

Why

A 0x… address looks the same on every EVM chain, but it does not always mean the same thing:

• a key wallet address comes from a private key, and that key controls it on every EVM chain;
• a smart wallet (a Safe, an Abstract Global Wallet, an ERC-4337 account) is a contract. It exists only on the chains where it was created. On any other chain the same address has no code and no key behind it.

Send to a smart wallet on a chain where it does not exist and nobody may ever reach the funds. In October 2026 a user lost about $20,000 of USDC this way: they pasted their Abstract Global Wallet address while sending on BNB Chain. Wallets and exchanges accept the address because it is valid; on the chain it was sent on, it looks like an unused account. Abstract shuts down on 15 Dec 2026, so its users are moving funds now.

What existed on 26 Oct 2026 (notes in Cryppit's research repo): Rabby warns about contracts on other chains from its own private index; Abstract's Migration Hub blocks this inside its own bridge flow. MetaMask, Rainbow, Zerion, the exchanges' withdrawal screens and the address-screening APIs we checked do not catch it, and GoPlus marks an Abstract wallet as clean on BNB Chain. Chain-specific address standards (ERC-7930, ERC-7828) reached Review in April 2026 and no wallet ships them yet.

Use it

Node 22 or later, no dependencies.

node cli.js 0x<address> --chain bnbchain      # or a chain ID: --chain 56
node cli.js 0x<address> --chain 8453 --json   # every fact behind the answer
npm test                                      # replays recorded real addresses, no network

The page (index.html) does the same in the browser; ?address=0x…&chain=56 opens a check directly.

How it decides

For the address it reads, at the latest block of each of 20 chains: eth_getCode and eth_getTransactionCount. For a contract it also asks getThreshold() and getOwners() (a Safe), and on the chain you picked symbol() and decimals() (a token's own contract). It looks the address up in the archive of Abstract Global Wallets, and while Abstract runs it also asks Abstract's AGW registry (isAGW).

What it finds	Verdict	Who can reach funds already sent
An Abstract Global Wallet, and the chain is not Abstract or ZKsync Era	Stop: lost for good. Abstract runs EraVM, which derives contract addresses differently from EVM chains, so the wallet can never exist at this address there	nobody
An Abstract Global Wallet, and the chain is ZKsync Era	Caution: don't send. ZKsync Era also runs EraVM and has Abstract's wallet factory, wallet code, registry and signer validator at the same addresses (checked 26 Oct 2026), so the owner can most likely create the same wallet there	the owner, most likely
An Abstract Global Wallet, and the chain is Abstract	Caution: works until Abstract shuts down on 15 Dec 2026	the owner, until then
An EIP-7702 delegation on this chain or another (0xef0100 + 20 bytes)	Safe: still a key wallet; its key works everywhere	the owner
No code here, but transactions sent from it here or on another chain	Safe: a key wallet	the owner
A Safe on this chain	Safe	its owners
The token's own contract on this chain	Stop: tokens sent to it usually stay stuck	usually nobody
Another contract on this chain	Caution: it must be a wallet that can move funds	depends on the contract
A Safe on other chains only	Stop: reachable only if the same Safe is created here; for some older Safes a stranger can do it first (Wintermute lost 20M OP this way in 2022)	maybe
Another contract on other chains only	Stop	usually nobody
Never used on any chain checked	Can't tell: a new key wallet and an undeployed smart wallet look the same; send a small test	unknown

A safe answer is about whether funds can be reached, not about who the address belongs to.

The Abstract wallet archive

data/abstract/ holds every Abstract Global Wallet deployed on Abstract (chain 2741), so the check keeps working after Abstract shuts down.

• Source. Every AGW is created by one factory, 0x9b947df6…6c1a (SMART_ACCOUNT_FACTORY_ADDRESS in @abstract-foundation/agw-client 1.12.3; the AGW registry's only FactorySet, block 76,852, never unset). EraVM logs each deployment as ContractDeployed(deployer, bytecodeHash, contractAddress) from the ContractDeployer system contract (0x…8006), all indexed. scripts/archive-abstract.mjs scan reads those logs from block 76,851 to a pinned finalized block through Abstract's public RPC, in windows that shrink when the RPC refuses more than 10,000 results. It checkpoints after every window, so it resumes, and a later run reads only the new blocks.
• Format. agw/<xx>.bin holds the wallets whose address starts with 0x<xx>: sorted, distinct 7-byte records (address bytes 2–8). A lookup matches on the first 8 bytes. With millions of wallets, a wrong match needs a 64-bit collision, about 1 in 3 trillion per lookup; the page fetches only the one shard it needs (about 150 KB). manifest.json records the block range, the pinned block's hash, the wallet count, the code hashes seen and a SHA-256 for every shard.
• Checked. scripts/verify-abstract.mjs picks wallets at random from the scan and confirms each one is registered in the AGW registry, has code on Abstract and is found in the shards; it also confirms random addresses are not found.
• Not covered. A counterfactual AGW (an address computed from a signer but never deployed) is not in the logs, so it is not in the archive. While Abstract runs, the registry covers deployed wallets the archive missed.

Data sources

Public JSON-RPC endpoints without keys, two per chain where available, all answering browsers (CORS), checked on 26 Oct 2026: Ethereum, BNB Chain, Base, Arbitrum One, OP Mainnet, Avalanche C-Chain, Linea, ZKsync Era, Scroll, Gnosis, Unichain, Robinhood Chain, Abstract, Sonic, Celo, Mantle, Blast, Berachain, HyperEVM and Ink (src/chains.js). Polygon PoS is missing: none of its keyless endpoints answered. dRPC and 1RPC are never used. The endpoints are rate limited and offered as is.

Licence

MIT. A Cryppit tool. The chain logos in logos/ are from web3icons (MIT), unmodified; see logos/LICENSE.