feat(l1): opt-in for plaintext RPC to trusted private hosts#21
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The provider rejected any non-HTTPS RPC whose host wasn't literal loopback, which broke reaching a node over a private container network (Docker/K8s service name, host.docker.internal, private-VPC IP) — e.g. `http://anvil:8545`. Plaintext there is normal and safe; anvil doesn't speak TLS at all. Add `--allow-insecure-rpc` / `CARTESI_SEQUENCER_ALLOW_INSECURE_RPC` (default false) on setup/run/flush-mempool. The default stays secure — remote plaintext is refused — but an operator can explicitly opt in for a trusted private network. The opt-in is loud (warn!) and auditable (shows up in args/env), and is threaded through every provider constructor so no path can silently downgrade. Also harden the loopback check: classify the parsed `url::Host` with `Ipv4Addr/Ipv6Addr::is_loopback()` instead of matching literal strings. This drops the `[::1]` bracket hack and fixes a latent bug where the whole 127.0.0.0/8 block except 127.0.0.1 was wrongly rejected.
Address PR review feedback: spell out that `CARTESI_SEQUENCER_ALLOW_INSECURE_RPC` is not pinned into the DB at `setup` — it must be set on every L1-dialing subcommand (`setup`, `run`, `flush-mempool`), and omitting it on `run` after a successful `setup` fails loud (`remote RPC must use https`) by design, not a bug. Add a Docker Compose snippet showing it in the shared environment.
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The provider rejected any non-HTTPS RPC whose host wasn't literal loopback, which broke reaching a node over a private container network (Docker/K8s service name, host.docker.internal, private-VPC IP) — e.g.
http://anvil:8545. Plaintext there is normal and safe; anvil doesn't speak TLS at all.Add
--allow-insecure-rpc/CARTESI_SEQUENCER_ALLOW_INSECURE_RPC(default false) on setup/run/flush-mempool. The default stays secure — remote plaintext is refused — but an operator can explicitly opt in for a trusted private network. The opt-in is loud (warn!) and auditable (shows up in args/env), and is threaded through every provider constructor so no path can silently downgrade.Also harden the loopback check: classify the parsed
url::HostwithIpv4Addr/Ipv6Addr::is_loopback()instead of matching literal strings. This drops the[::1]bracket hack and fixes a latent bug where the whole 127.0.0.0/8 block except 127.0.0.1 was wrongly rejected.