hublane is a local MITM relay proxy. To intercept HTTPS it generates and installs a self-signed "hublane Local Relay CA" into your system/browser trust store, then presents per-session leaf certificates for the hosts you visit through the proxy.
- Only install the generated CA certificate on machines you own and trust.
- The CA private key is generated locally on your machine at install time
and is never transmitted anywhere. It lives only in the install
directory (e.g.
/opt/hublaneon Linux,%LOCALAPPDATA%\hublaneon Windows). - Do not share your generated
ca.key/server.keywith anyone. - Remove the CA from your trust store (and the install directory) when you stop using hublane.
- The metrics panel /
/status//pacbind to127.0.0.1by default, where no token is required (the OS loopback boundary is the isolation). - Binding
metrics_hostto any non-loopback address requiresmetrics_token; configuration validation refuses to start otherwise. When a token is set, pass it as theX-Hublane-Tokenheader or?token=.... - The token grants read access to health data (including verified IPs and upstream names). It does not grant any control over the proxy.
/healthzis intentionally unauthenticated and returns onlyok.
By default hublane authenticates nobody: any process (and any user) that can reach
127.0.0.1:8899 can relay traffic through it, including through the MITM path.
Treat the listening port as a local trust boundary, and note that a Windows service
(--service, LocalSystem) makes the proxy reachable to every session on the machine.
Since v0.1.0 you can require credentials:
proxy_token— HTTP clients sendProxy-Authorization(Basic base64(user:token)), failures get407 Proxy Authentication Required; SOCKS5 clients must use username/password auth (method 0x02, password = token). Client写法:http://hublane:<token>@127.0.0.1:8899,curl -x ... --proxy-user hublane:<token>.proxy_uid_whitelist(Linux/WSL) — only the listed uids may use the proxy (SO_PEERCRED); empty list means no restriction.
These are safeguards for shared machines, not a substitute for not exposing the port.
- No private key (
server.key,ca.key) or generated certificate (server.crt,ca.crt) is committed to this repository. They are produced by the install scripts on the user's machine. - If you find a committed key/cert, treat it as a leaked secret: report it immediately and rotate.
- Key files should be
0600(and owned by the account that runs the proxy). Install scripts set this on POSIX;hublane.pyalso logs a warning at startup when the key is group/world readable.
Please report security issues privately using GitHub Security Advisories for this repository. Do not open public issues for security vulnerabilities.
We aim to acknowledge reports within 72 hours.