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🛡️ Sentinel: [CRITICAL] Fix Path Traversal in Config Validation #83

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🛡️ Sentinel: [CRITICAL] Fix Path Traversal in Config Validation #83

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4 changes: 4 additions & 0 deletions .jules/sentinel.md
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Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
## 2024-04-04 - Fix Path Traversal in Config Validation
**Vulnerability:** User-controlled socket path passed to `expandingTildeInPath` without verifying it remains within the `~/.cacheout/` boundary.
**Learning:** Resolving a path does not natively sandbox it against traversal attacks (e.g., passing `../../etc/passwd`).
**Prevention:** Securely validate user-supplied file paths by resolving them, standardizing, and enforcing directory boundaries using `.hasPrefix()` against a canonical allowed absolute path with a trailing slash.
18 changes: 14 additions & 4 deletions Sources/Cacheout/Headless/StatusSocket.swift
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Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -474,14 +474,24 @@ public final class StatusSocket: @unchecked Sendable {
}

let expandedPath = (path as NSString).expandingTildeInPath
let standardizedPath = (expandedPath as NSString).standardizingPath

let allowedPrefix = NSHomeDirectory() + "/.cacheout/"
guard standardizedPath.hasPrefix(allowedPrefix) else {
sendSuccessResponse(fd: fd, data: [
"valid": false,
"errors": ["Path traversal detected. File must be within \(allowedPrefix)"],
] as [String: Any])
return
}

// lstat to reject symlinks to special files, FIFOs, devices, etc.
var sb = Darwin.stat()
let statResult: Int32 = lstat(expandedPath, &sb)
let statResult: Int32 = lstat(standardizedPath, &sb)
guard statResult == 0 else {
sendSuccessResponse(fd: fd, data: [
"valid": false,
"errors": ["File not found: \(expandedPath)"],
"errors": ["File not found: \(standardizedPath)"],
] as [String: Any])
return
}
Expand All @@ -490,7 +500,7 @@ public final class StatusSocket: @unchecked Sendable {
guard (sb.st_mode & S_IFMT) == S_IFREG else {
sendSuccessResponse(fd: fd, data: [
"valid": false,
"errors": ["Not a regular file: \(expandedPath)"],
"errors": ["Not a regular file: \(standardizedPath)"],
] as [String: Any])
return
}
Expand All @@ -505,7 +515,7 @@ public final class StatusSocket: @unchecked Sendable {
}

do {
let fileData = try Data(contentsOf: URL(fileURLWithPath: expandedPath))
let fileData = try Data(contentsOf: URL(fileURLWithPath: standardizedPath))
let errors = AutopilotConfigValidator.validate(data: fileData)
sendSuccessResponse(fd: fd, data: [
"valid": errors.isEmpty,
Expand Down