NEURONIX OS follows the active upstream NixOS channel lifecycle. Security updates and CVE mitigations are delivered through upstream nixpkgs and distribution modules.
| Version | Supported | Maintenance Phase |
|---|---|---|
| 1.0.x (Current) | Yes | Active Security, Testing, & Subsystem Hardening |
| < 1.0.0 | No | End of Life (Superseded) |
The NEURONIX security team takes vulnerabilities seriously. If you discover a security flaw or vulnerability within NEURONIX OS (including installer generator scripts, system modules, or CLI utilities), please report it responsibly.
- Do not open a public issue. Please report security issues privately via GitHub Security Advisories at https://github.com/adamriofc/NeuronixOS/security/advisories/new.
- Alternatively, report directly by email to:
adamriofc@protonmail.comwith the subject tag[SECURITY: NEURONIX]. - Please provide:
- Description of the vulnerability and its potential impact.
- Minimal reproducible steps or proof-of-concept (PoC).
- Target component (e.g., installer engine, PAM/PolKit configuration, memory shield, micro-VM isolation).
- We will acknowledge receipt within 48 hours and coordinate a patch and CVE disclosure timeline.
NEURONIX implements defensive engineering across its operational layers:
The entire package hierarchy (/nix/store) is mounted read-only at the kernel level. Package paths are derived from cryptographic SHA-256 hashes of their dependency closures. The immutable, hash-addressed store architecture prevents ordinary in-place mutation or tampering of existing store paths.
- Administrative actions require explicit authentication via PolKit or wheel-restricted sudo.
- Non-root CLI operations (
neuronix run,neuronix dev) execute inside unprivileged Linux user namespaces without requiring raw root access.
The neuronix sandbox simulation framework (alias: neuronix try) runs untrusted or candidate system configurations inside an ephemeral QEMU micro-VM in RAM (/dev/shm). Host storage access is strictly restricted to read-only 9P filesystem mounts of /nix/store.
- Automatic CPU microcode updates are enabled by default for Intel and AMD platforms to mitigate transient execution flaws (Spectre, Meltdown, Zenbleed).
- Secure Boot integration is supported via signed
shimbootloaders utilizinglanzaboote.