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chore: propagate changes from main into development - #1307

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⚠️ This propagation touches sensitive paths that need manual review before merging: docs/plans/current_spec.md

Automated PR to propagate changes from main into development.

Triggered by push to main.

Wikid82 and others added 14 commits September 8, 2026 02:40
Extract the caddy-builder and crowdsec-builder Dockerfile stages into a
digest-pinned, multi-arch ghcr.io/wikid82/charon-toolchain image so the
~14-min xcaddy compile runs once per security-relevant change instead of
on every CI image build (currently forced via --no-cache-filter in 7
places, the root cause of the PR #1298 build-job timeout cancellations).

Rev 2 incorporates the supervisor review: alternatives decision record,
corrected security-refresh baseline, withdrawn overstated recurrence
claim, pinned xcaddy plugins, guard-never-inert commit slicing,
fork-reachable timeout preservation, and a failure-closed freshness guard.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01KXA4x9LrA2AsnLrvdHMZbS
Extract the custom Caddy + CrowdSec build recipe into a separately-versioned
prebuilt image so ordinary app builds stop recompiling xcaddy / CrowdSec on the
hot path (spec docs/plans/current_spec.md §12 Commit 1).

- scripts/lib/dockerfile-stage.sh — shared `extract_stage` (N9), sourced by both
  key scripts.
- scripts/toolchain-key.sh — deterministic content-addressed tag
  (caddy-crowdsec-<hex>) over the two inline stage bodies + consumed version ARGs
  (incl. the two now-pinned xcaddy plugins) + the xx / digest-pinned golang base
  lines + .trivyignore + a SCHEMA_VERSION.
- scripts/verify-toolchain-pin.sh — failure-closed freshness guard (B7): on a
  trusted same-repo run a missing regctl / missing GHCR_READ_TOKEN /
  unresolvable :$KEY / digest mismatch each exit 1; only a fork degrades to
  tag-only with a ::warning::.
- scripts/tests/*.bats — determinism + sensitivity + failure-closed matrix (§7);
  wired into quality-checks.yml as a non-blocking job for now.
- .github/workflows/toolchain-image.yml — daily schedule + workflow_dispatch +
  pull_request(paths) + workflow_call; multi-arch $BUILDPLATFORM cross-compile
  (no QEMU) of --target toolchain-runtime, GHCR publish on same-repo, Trivy
  CRITICAL/HIGH gate (blocking off-PR, report-only on PR) + SARIF. The
  sync-pin-on-pr / open-bump-pr jobs land in Commit 3.
- Dockerfile:
  * rename caddy-builder -> caddy-inline, crowdsec-builder -> crowdsec-inline;
  * digest-pin the golang:${GO_VERSION}-alpine base of both (N4) and feed the
    digest line to the key;
  * pin the two loose xcaddy plugins — CADDY_GEOIP2_VERSION (full pseudo-version,
    caddy-geoip2 has no semver tags) and CADDY_RATELIMIT_VERSION=0.1.0 (B4) —
    and feed both to the key;
  * delete the dead crowdsec-fallback stage and the now-unused
    CROWDSEC_RELEASE_SHA256 ARG (N1);
  * add the toolchain-runtime assembly stage (binaries at identical paths) with
    an io.charon.toolchain.key provenance LABEL;
  * add temporary aliases `FROM caddy-inline AS caddy-builder` /
    `FROM crowdsec-inline AS crowdsec-builder` so the app build is byte-identical
    this commit (selector + prebuilt-image consumption land in Commit 2).
- Retarget every --no-cache-filter / no-cache-filters value from
  caddy-builder,crowdsec-builder to caddy-inline,crowdsec-inline across
  docker-build.yml, security-pr.yml, supply-chain-pr.yml, e2e-tests-split.yml,
  nightly-build.yml, and the build-charon-image composite doc comment — so the
  CVE-recurrence guard keeps invalidating the real RUN layers through the rename
  (B5). Full removal is Commit 4, after the freshness guard is live (Commit 3).

Plugin/base versions are best-effort here; the exact baked CADDY_GEOIP2_VERSION
is confirmed from the first toolchain-image CI run's xcaddy log and re-pinned.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01KXA4x9LrA2AsnLrvdHMZbS
The default app-build path now COPY --from's the digest-pinned prebuilt toolchain
image instead of compiling xcaddy / CrowdSec; the inline stages become the
selectable fork / bootstrap / offline fallback (spec §12 Commit 2).

- Dockerfile:
  * CHARON_TOOLCHAIN_DIGEST set to the first published manifest-list (OCI index)
    digest sha256:56ea3568… for ghcr.io/wikid82/charon-toolchain
    :caddy-crowdsec-1efe7f19fa52a512 (multi-arch: linux/amd64 + linux/arm64
    confirmed). Baked plugin versions confirmed from the toolchain build's xcaddy
    log: caddy-geoip2 v0.0.0-20260623062220-3675c6e7e63d, caddy-ratelimit v0.1.0
    — unchanged from Commit 1's pins.
  * add CADDY_BUILDER_SRC / CROWDSEC_BUILDER_SRC selector ARGs (default
    toolchain-prebuilt).
  * add the toolchain-prebuilt stage
    (FROM ${CHARON_TOOLCHAIN_IMAGE}@${CHARON_TOOLCHAIN_DIGEST}) and replace the
    temp aliases with FROM ${CADDY_BUILDER_SRC} AS caddy-builder /
    FROM ${CROWDSEC_BUILDER_SRC} AS crowdsec-builder. The unreferenced
    alternative is pruned — a fork build never pulls the image.
  * add org.opencontainers.image.source to the toolchain-runtime LABEL so the
    GHCR package links to the repo.
- .github/actions/build-charon-image: new `builder-src` (prebuilt|inline) and
  `ghcr-token` inputs; a srcsel resolver step maps them to the two build-args;
  a GHCR login step (skipped for inline) so BuildKit can pull the private image.
- Every app-image build path passes the selector + a fork-detection expression
  (`head.repo.full_name != '' && != github.repository` -> inline):
  * docker-build.yml build-amd64 / build-arm64 (raw buildx, via job env);
  * nightly-build.yml (hardcoded prebuilt — same-repo only);
  * e2e-tests-split.yml build job (+ GHCR login + packages: read);
  * security-pr.yml / supply-chain-pr.yml / the 4 *-integration.yml workflows
    (via the composite `builder-src` + `ghcr-token`, + packages: read).
  The retargeted `--no-cache-filter caddy-inline,crowdsec-inline` stays for now:
  a no-op on the prebuilt path (stages pruned), live on the inline fork path
  (B5). Full removal is Commit 4, after the freshness guard is required (Commit 3).
- Makefile: `build-offline` target (--build-arg *_BUILDER_SRC=*-inline).

Local gate: `docker buildx build --target caddy-builder` on the default path
pulls the toolchain image (40 MB) with NO xcaddy / go build step; the pulled
caddy lists http.handlers.{rate_limit,crowdsec,geoip2} + geoip2 and reports
v2.11.4. `docker build --check` clean; toolchain-key unchanged.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01KXA4x9LrA2AsnLrvdHMZbS
Spec §12 Commit 3 (+ Rev 2.1 determinism amendment, see docs/plans/current_spec.md
§3.4.3 — flagged for supervisor re-review).

- quality-checks.yml:
  * `toolchain-key-tests` (bats) is now BLOCKING (dropped continue-on-error).
  * new REQUIRED `verify-toolchain-pin` job — installs regctl
    (iarekylew00t/regctl-installer, SHA-pinned) and runs
    scripts/verify-toolchain-pin.sh with GHCR_READ_TOKEN=secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN
    and head.repo.full_name mapped into env (B7). Failure-closed on same-repo
    runs.
- toolchain-image.yml:
  * DETERMINISTIC build (fixes a self-perpetuating sync-pin bot-commit loop):
    `--provenance=false --sbom=false`, a fixed `SOURCE_DATE_EPOCH=1700000000`,
    and `--output type=image,"name=…",push=true,rewrite-timestamp=true`. Two
    independent builds now produce an identical manifest-list digest. The
    toolchain image is an internal build input; the app image's provenance/SBOM
    (docker-build.yml) is separate and unaffected.
  * SKIP-IF-ALREADY-PUBLISHED: on any non-forced event, if `:$KEY` resolves in
    GHCR the job reuses that digest and skips the build/push entirely. Only
    schedule / workflow_dispatch force_rebuild / workflow_call rebuild+repush.
  * `sync-pin-on-pr` — idempotent + self-trigger-safe: guarded
    `github.actor != 'github-actions[bot]'`, and no-ops unless
    `git diff --quiet Dockerfile` shows a real change. Pushes the two-line
    TAG/DIGEST bump onto the PR head branch (::notice:: to re-run the check).
  * `open-bump-pr` — off the PR path only (schedule / workflow_dispatch /
    workflow_call); opens `bot/bump-toolchain-image` against base `development`
    (peter-evans/create-pull-request, SHA-pinned) titled `feat(security): refresh
    bundled proxy toolchain image`; on failure opens a tracked issue.
- Dockerfile N5 — after the final-stage COPY --from=caddy-builder / crowdsec-builder:
  * assert the toolchain caddy binary exposes http.handlers.{rate_limit,crowdsec,
    geoip2,waf} (the 4 recipe plugins; the WAF module is `http.handlers.waf`);
  * assert cscli runs and emits its recognisable version block (CrowdSec 1.8.x
    prints an empty `version:` field regardless of the -X ldflag).
  A wrong-arch / rolled-back digest fails the app build here, not only at
  toolchain-build time.
- docker-build.yml merge-and-publish: new "Verify pinned toolchain image matches
  the recipe (N5)" step — pulls the digest-pinned toolchain image and asserts
  its io.charon.toolchain.key LABEL == scripts/toolchain-key.sh.
- renovate.json: packageRules entry — the charon-toolchain digest is bot-owned,
  not Renovate-tracked (N7), disabled there.
- docs/plans/current_spec.md §3.4.3: Rev 2.1 amendment documenting the three
  determinism / loop-prevention fixes above.

Local: full `docker build .` (default prebuilt path) passes both N5 assertions;
two independent deterministic multi-arch builds produce identical manifest-list
digest sha256:6575f4c6a9f76074870c64df9dd4c9ebee812342f37f52ae5ef8f511ba9f8f00
(pinned in Commit 2); `docker build --check` clean; toolchain key unchanged
(caddy-crowdsec-1efe7f19fa52a512).

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01KXA4x9LrA2AsnLrvdHMZbS
Spec §12 Commit 4. Now safe: (a) the default app-build path never compiles the
inline stages, (b) verify-toolchain-pin is a live required check enforcing
pin<->digest freshness per PR (Commit 3), (c) the daily toolchain rebuild +
blocking Trivy gate covers base-image drift, (d) the N5 assertions catch a
wrong digest in the app build.

- docker-build.yml: remove the four `--no-cache-filter caddy-inline` /
  `crowdsec-inline` lines from build-amd64 / build-arm64; reword the retry-block
  comment.
- security-pr.yml / supply-chain-pr.yml: drop the `no-cache-filters:` override
  (and its justification comment) from the build-charon-image `with:` block.
- e2e-tests-split.yml / nightly-build.yml: drop the `no-cache-filters:` input.
- build-charon-image composite: delete the `no-cache-filters` input declaration
  and its `docker/build-push-action` passthrough; rewrite `description:` to state
  the binaries come from the digest-pinned toolchain image and every stage is
  layer-cached.

`grep -rn no-cache-filter .github/` is clean. actionlint + lefthook green.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01KXA4x9LrA2AsnLrvdHMZbS
Spec §12 Commit 5 / §3.4.4.

security-weekly-rebuild.yml no longer builds a throwaway
`charon:security-scan-YYYYMMDD` app image that nothing consumes. Instead:

- `toolchain-rebuild` job — `uses: ./.github/workflows/toolchain-image.yml`
  (workflow_call, force_rebuild: true). This drives the same deterministic
  `--no-cache --pull` rebuild + publish + BLOCKING Trivy CRITICAL/HIGH gate +
  `:trivy-toolchain` SARIF + (if the digest moved) `bot/bump-toolchain-image` PR
  as the daily schedule. N6: the job grants `contents: write`,
  `pull-requests: write`, `issues: write` (plus packages / security-events) so
  the reusable workflow's open-bump-pr job has the perms it needs — a
  workflow_call'ed workflow cannot request perms the caller did not grant.
- `extended-report` job — pulls the rebuilt toolchain digest and produces the
  fuller weekly artefacts: a MEDIUM/LOW Trivy JSON artifact (90-day retention)
  and an installed-package table in the step summary. No second SARIF upload
  (the reusable workflow already owns the `:trivy-toolchain` category).
- toolchain-image.yml gains `workflow_call` `outputs.key` / `outputs.digest` so
  the caller can reference the rebuilt digest.

actionlint + lefthook green.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01KXA4x9LrA2AsnLrvdHMZbS
…ale comments

Spec §12 Commit 6 / §3.9 / §9.

Timeouts (§3.9):
- docker-build.yml build-amd64: 15 -> 20 (job + nested nick-fields/retry). No
  compile on the hot path; 20 gives headroom for a cold GHA cache miss on the
  fast stages + cache export + push. build-arm64 stays 25; merge-and-publish
  stays 10; e2e build stays 60.
- security-pr / supply-chain-pr / the 4 *-integration jobs KEEP timeout-minutes:
  20 (B6 — fork-reachable, they run the ~14-min inline compile). Comments only.

Stale-comment sweep:
- docker-build.yml: reworded the build-split comment; dropped the dangling
  `docs/plans/current_spec.md §1.1` cross-ref (pointed at the retired uptime
  spec) and the QEMU-emulated-compile framing (both builder stages were always
  $BUILDPLATFORM cross-compiled).
- e2e-tests-split.yml: fixed the malformed `# v4uses: docker/setup-buildx-action@…`
  comment mash on the Set up Docker Buildx step.
- Integration + CVE-gate timeout comments reworded to describe the prebuilt vs
  fork-inline paths.

Docs (§9):
- ARCHITECTURE.md: Infrastructure table row; new "Prebuilt toolchain image"
  subsection under Deployment Architecture / Multi-Stage Dockerfile; Directory
  Structure note (new scripts/workflow, crowdsec-fallback removed, stage
  renames); Security Architecture / Layer 2 supply-chain-hardening note with the
  precise §3.8.3 scope; Local Development Setup build note + make build-offline.
- SECURITY.md: new "Build Integrity — Bundled Caddy / CrowdSec Toolchain"
  section (daily deterministic rebuild + blocking Trivy + failure-closed
  verify-toolchain-pin; unpinned-transitive-MVS gap stated verbatim, no
  overclaim).
- CONTRIBUTING.md: fork PRs compile the toolchain from source; make build-offline.
- new docs/ci/toolchain-image.md: operator/maintainer runbook (how the key
  works, determinism, triggers, force-rebuild, respond to the failure issue /
  verify-toolchain-pin failure, rollback, one-time bootstrap notes).

Ignore-file check (CLAUDE.md): `Dockerfile: COPY scripts/` does copy the new
shell scripts into the runtime image (a few KB), consistent with the dozens of
scripts/*.sh already shipped — no .dockerignore change. .gitignore: source files
that must be committed, no glob match. .codecov.yml: shell/bats/YAML carry no
Go/TS coverage — no change. Recorded in docs/ci/toolchain-image.md and the PR.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01KXA4x9LrA2AsnLrvdHMZbS
…ge context

`Dockerfile` `COPY scripts/ /app/scripts/` copies the whole scripts directory
into the runtime image. The toolchain helpers added by this PR are used only by
.github/workflows/toolchain-image.yml and the quality-checks.yml
verify-toolchain-pin / bats jobs from a plain checkout — never from inside a
built container — so `.dockerignore` now excludes:

  scripts/tests/
  scripts/toolchain-key.sh
  scripts/verify-toolchain-pin.sh
  scripts/lib/dockerfile-stage.sh

Verified via a scratch `COPY scripts/` probe: those paths are absent from the
build context while runtime scripts (e.g. db-recovery.sh) remain. `.dockerignore`
uses blacklist semantics with no `!scripts/…` re-includes, so the plain excludes
take effect.

Also corrects the stale premise in docs/plans/current_spec.md §2.5 that claimed
`scripts/` is not copied into the image.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01KXA4x9LrA2AsnLrvdHMZbS
…ntext exclusions

- docs/ci/toolchain-image.md: the "one-time bootstrap notes" paragraph predated
  the `.dockerignore` follow-up and still said the new build-only scripts ship in
  the runtime image. Corrected: `scripts/toolchain-key.sh`,
  `scripts/verify-toolchain-pin.sh`, `scripts/lib/dockerfile-stage.sh` and
  `scripts/tests/` are excluded from the image build context via `.dockerignore`.
- docs/security.md: added a one-line pointer from the novice-facing security doc
  to the new "Build Integrity" section in SECURITY.md.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01KXA4x9LrA2AsnLrvdHMZbS
Adds .github/workflows/integration-tests.yml, which builds the Charon image
a single time via the shared build-charon-image composite action, uploads it
as a 1-day run-scoped artifact, then fans out to parallel per-suite test jobs
(cerberus / waf / rate-limit / crowdsec) that `docker load` that image instead
of rebuilding it. Replaces four near-identical standalone workflows that each
paid the image-build cost independently.

Each suite job keeps its own test steps, debug-dump-on-failure and cleanup
verbatim (each inspects different containers/ports/volumes). Job/check names
are preserved so the diff is reviewable, but they now live under one workflow.

Also guards the unconditional `docker build` in scripts/crowdsec_integration.sh
behind a `docker image inspect charon:local` check, matching the sibling
scripts (crowdsec_startup_test.sh, cerberus/waf/rate_limit_integration.sh) so
the crowdsec job actually consumes the pre-built artifact rather than
rebuilding the image a second time.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01KXA4x9LrA2AsnLrvdHMZbS
Points docs and instructions that named the four deleted workflow files
(cerberus-integration.yml / waf-integration.yml / rate-limit-integration.yml /
crowdsec-integration.yml) at .github/workflows/integration-tests.yml and its
per-suite jobs instead.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01KXA4x9LrA2AsnLrvdHMZbS
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@github-actions

github-actions Bot commented Sep 8, 2026

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✅ Supply Chain Verification Results

PASSED

📦 SBOM Summary

  • Components: 1769

🔍 Vulnerability Scan

Severity Count
🔴 Critical 0
🟠 High 0
🟡 Medium 0
🟢 Low 0
Total 0

📎 Artifacts

  • SBOM (CycloneDX JSON) and Grype results available in workflow artifacts

Generated by Supply Chain Verification workflow • View Details

@codecov

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Codecov Report

✅ All modified and coverable lines are covered by tests.

📢 Thoughts on this report? Let us know!

Reverts 6f38be5, a stray `sync-pin-on-pr` push from the bot-authored
main -> development propagation PR #1307. That job checked out the PR head
branch — which for a propagation PR IS `main` — recomputed the toolchain
key against the merge ref (which pulls in development's gRPC 1.83.2 bump,
a toolchain-key input) and committed the resulting
`caddy-crowdsec-9eb9862f44b9e769` pin directly onto `main`.

`main`'s actual recipe still has `GRPC_VERSION=1.83.1`, whose key is
`caddy-crowdsec-1efe7f19fa52a512` (@ sha256:6575f4c6…), the digest #1300's
docker-build actually pulled. The mismatch fails `verify-toolchain-pin` on
every PR against `main`.

Verified on this branch:
  - scripts/toolchain-key.sh          -> caddy-crowdsec-1efe7f19fa52a512
  - imagetools inspect <that tag>     -> sha256:6575f4c6a9f76074870c64df9dd4c9ebee812342f37f52ae5ef8f511ba9f8f00

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01KXA4x9LrA2AsnLrvdHMZbS
The `sync-pin-on-pr` job in toolchain-image.yml pushes a recomputed
TAG/DIGEST pin onto `github.event.pull_request.head.ref`. Its only guard
against unwanted runs was `github.actor != 'github-actions[bot]'`, which
does not fire for the main -> development auto-propagation PR (#1307):
that PR's `pull_request` event runs under a non-bot actor even though the
PR itself is bot-authored and its head ref is `main`. Result: the job
recomputed the key against the propagation merge ref (which drags in
development's gRPC bump) and committed `caddy-crowdsec-9eb9862f44b9e769`
straight to `main`, breaking `verify-toolchain-pin` repo-wide (see the
companion revert in this PR).

Adds three guards to the job `if:`:
  - refuse any protected head ref (main / development / nightly /
    feature/beta-release) outright — this job has no business rewriting a
    long-lived branch in place;
  - also skip when the PR *author* is github-actions[bot], not just when
    the triggering actor is;
  - (existing actor guard retained).

Legitimate toolchain-key moves on `development` are still handled by the
`open-bump-pr` job, which opens a reviewed bot PR rather than pushing in
place. No workflow-`if:` test harness exists in-tree (bats covers the
scripts, not YAML guards); actionlint passes.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01KXA4x9LrA2AsnLrvdHMZbS
Wikid82 and others added 3 commits September 8, 2026 09:40
1-day retention breaks "Re-run failed jobs" on a run older than 24h now that
the suite jobs depend on the upstream build job's artifact instead of building
the image themselves. 3 days covers realistic re-run windows at negligible cost.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01KXA4x9LrA2AsnLrvdHMZbS
The `open-bump-pr` job in toolchain-image.yml opened its daily
digest-refresh PR with a `feat(security):` title and commit message.
`feat:` makes release-please cut a minor release on every merge to
`main`, so a routine toolchain-digest refresh was bumping the version
each time. Switch the bot PR title and commit-message to
`chore(docker): refresh bundled proxy toolchain image`, matching the
sibling `sync-pin-on-pr` commit style (`chore(docker): sync toolchain
image pin to …`). The `security` label is kept; only the
conventional-commit prefix changes.

Also updates docs/plans/current_spec.md so its bot-PR example and
commit-convention note no longer contradict the workflow.

Affects future bot PRs only.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01KXA4x9LrA2AsnLrvdHMZbS
@Wikid82
Wikid82 marked this pull request as ready for review September 8, 2026 15:36
@Wikid82
Wikid82 merged commit 11b133d into development Sep 8, 2026
110 of 114 checks passed
Wikid82 added a commit that referenced this pull request Sep 9, 2026
`development` carries c32e611 (gRPC 1.83.2), a toolchain-key input that
`main` does not have yet, so the toolchain pin propagated into
`development` by #1307 (caddy-crowdsec-1efe7f19fa52a512 @ sha256:6575f4c6…,
computed for main's gRPC 1.83.1 recipe) is stale here: the recipe on this
branch recomputes to caddy-crowdsec-9eb9862f44b9e769, failing
verify-toolchain-pin.

Bumps the two ARG lines to the key/digest that match development's recipe.
This is the manual equivalent of the daily open-bump-pr bot (now using the
chore(docker): convention).

Verified on this branch:
  - scripts/toolchain-key.sh                -> caddy-crowdsec-9eb9862f44b9e769
  - imagetools inspect <that tag>           -> sha256:b41e571d5951bbfc3daa3dccdca033ad9dee535a8e720ac7e3b0bce338f223b2

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01KXA4x9LrA2AsnLrvdHMZbS
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