Update dependency tar to v7 [SECURITY] by renovate[bot] · Pull Request #22 · Web-Dev-Collaborative/Lambda-Final-Backup

renovate · 2026-10-25T03:30:16Z

This PR contains the following updates:

Package	Change	Age	Confidence
tar	`^2.2.1` → `^7.0.0`

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Some dependencies could not be looked up. Check the Dependency Dashboard for more information.

Arbitrary File Overwrite in tar

CVE-2018-20834 / GHSA-j44m-qm6p-hp7m

More information

Details

Versions of tar prior to 4.4.2 for 4.x and 2.2.2 for 2.x are vulnerable to Arbitrary File Overwrite. Extracting tarballs containing a hardlink to a file that already exists in the system, and a file that matches the hardlink will overwrite the system's file with the contents of the extracted file.

Recommendation

For tar 4.x, upgrade to version 4.4.2 or later.
For tar 2.x, upgrade to version 2.2.2 or later.

Severity

CVSS Score: 7.5 / 10 (High)
Vector String: CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N

References

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

Arbitrary File Creation/Overwrite due to insufficient absolute path sanitization

CVE-2021-32804 / GHSA-3jfq-g458-7qm9

More information

Details

Impact

Arbitrary File Creation, Arbitrary File Overwrite, Arbitrary Code Execution

node-tar aims to prevent extraction of absolute file paths by turning absolute paths into relative paths when the preservePaths flag is not set to true. This is achieved by stripping the absolute path root from any absolute file paths contained in a tar file. For example /home/user/.bashrc would turn into home/user/.bashrc.

This logic was insufficient when file paths contained repeated path roots such as ////home/user/.bashrc. node-tar would only strip a single path root from such paths. When given an absolute file path with repeating path roots, the resulting path (e.g. ///home/user/.bashrc) would still resolve to an absolute path, thus allowing arbitrary file creation and overwrite.

Patches

3.2.2 || 4.4.14 || 5.0.6 || 6.1.1

NOTE: an adjacent issue CVE-2021-32803 affects this release level. Please ensure you update to the latest patch levels that address CVE-2021-32803 as well if this adjacent issue affects your node-tar use case.

Workarounds

Users may work around this vulnerability without upgrading by creating a custom onentry method which sanitizes the entry.path or a filter method which removes entries with absolute paths.

const path = require('path')
const tar = require('tar')

tar.x({
  file: 'archive.tgz',
  // either add this function...
  onentry: (entry) => {
    if (path.isAbsolute(entry.path)) {
      entry.path = sanitizeAbsolutePathSomehow(entry.path)
      entry.absolute = path.resolve(entry.path)
    }
  },

  // or this one
  filter: (file, entry) => {
    if (path.isAbsolute(entry.path)) {
      return false
    } else {
      return true
    }
  }
})

Users are encouraged to upgrade to the latest patch versions, rather than attempt to sanitize tar input themselves.

Severity

CVSS Score: 8.2 / 10 (High)
Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N

References

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

Arbitrary File Creation/Overwrite on Windows via insufficient relative path sanitization

CVE-2021-37713 / GHSA-5955-9wpr-37jh

More information

Details

Impact

Arbitrary File Creation, Arbitrary File Overwrite, Arbitrary Code Execution

node-tar aims to guarantee that any file whose location would be outside of the extraction target directory is not extracted. This is, in part, accomplished by sanitizing absolute paths of entries within the archive, skipping archive entries that contain .. path portions, and resolving the sanitized paths against the extraction target directory.

This logic was insufficient on Windows systems when extracting tar files that contained a path that was not an absolute path, but specified a drive letter different from the extraction target, such as C:some\path. If the drive letter does not match the extraction target, for example D:\extraction\dir, then the result of path.resolve(extractionDirectory, entryPath) would resolve against the current working directory on the C: drive, rather than the extraction target directory.

Additionally, a .. portion of the path could occur immediately after the drive letter, such as C:../foo, and was not properly sanitized by the logic that checked for .. within the normalized and split portions of the path.

This only affects users of node-tar on Windows systems.

Patches

4.4.18 || 5.0.10 || 6.1.9

Workarounds

There is no reasonable way to work around this issue without performing the same path normalization procedures that node-tar now does.

Users are encouraged to upgrade to the latest patched versions of node-tar, rather than attempt to sanitize paths themselves.

Fix

The fixed versions strip path roots from all paths prior to being resolved against the extraction target folder, even if such paths are not "absolute".

Additionally, a path starting with a drive letter and then two dots, like c:../, would bypass the check for .. path portions. This is checked properly in the patched versions.

Finally, a defense in depth check is added, such that if the entry.absolute is outside of the extraction taret, and we are not in preservePaths:true mode, a warning is raised on that entry, and it is skipped. Currently, it is believed that this check is redundant, but it did catch some oversights in development.

Severity

CVSS Score: 8.2 / 10 (High)
Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N

References

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

Arbitrary File Creation/Overwrite via insufficient symlink protection due to directory cache poisoning

CVE-2021-32803 / GHSA-r628-mhmh-qjhw

More information

Details

Impact

Arbitrary File Creation, Arbitrary File Overwrite, Arbitrary Code Execution

node-tar aims to guarantee that any file whose location would be modified by a symbolic link is not extracted. This is, in part, achieved by ensuring that extracted directories are not symlinks. Additionally, in order to prevent unnecessary stat calls to determine whether a given path is a directory, paths are cached when directories are created.

This logic was insufficient when extracting tar files that contained both a directory and a symlink with the same name as the directory. This order of operations resulted in the directory being created and added to the node-tar directory cache. When a directory is present in the directory cache, subsequent calls to mkdir for that directory are skipped. However, this is also where node-tar checks for symlinks occur.

By first creating a directory, and then replacing that directory with a symlink, it was thus possible to bypass node-tar symlink checks on directories, essentially allowing an untrusted tar file to symlink into an arbitrary location and subsequently extracting arbitrary files into that location, thus allowing arbitrary file creation and overwrite.

This issue was addressed in releases 3.2.3, 4.4.15, 5.0.7 and 6.1.2.

Patches

3.2.3 || 4.4.15 || 5.0.7 || 6.1.2

Workarounds

Users may work around this vulnerability without upgrading by creating a custom filter method which prevents the extraction of symbolic links.

const tar = require('tar')

tar.x({
  file: 'archive.tgz',
  filter: (file, entry) => {
    if (entry.type === 'SymbolicLink') {
      return false
    } else {
      return true
    }
  }
})

Users are encouraged to upgrade to the latest patch versions, rather than attempt to sanitize tar input themselves.

Severity

CVSS Score: 8.2 / 10 (High)
Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N

References

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

Release Notes

isaacs/node-tar (tar)

Dependencies

cc4e0dd #343 bump minipass from 3.3.6 to 4.0.0

`v6.1.12`

Compare Source

Bug Fixes

57493ee #332 ensuring close event is emited after stream has ended (@webark)
b003c64 #314 replace deprecated String.prototype.substr() (#314) (@CommanderRoot, @lukekarrys)

Documentation

f129929 #313 remove dead link to benchmarks (#313) (@yetzt)
c1faa9f add examples/explanation of using tar.t (@isaacs)

Configuration

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Update dependency tar to v7 [SECURITY]

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Update dependency tar to v7 [SECURITY] - #22

Update dependency tar to v7 [SECURITY]#22
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renovate Bot commented Oct 25, 2026

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renovate Bot commented Oct 25, 2026

Arbitrary File Overwrite in tar

Details

Recommendation

Severity

References

Arbitrary File Creation/Overwrite due to insufficient absolute path sanitization

Details

Impact

Patches

Workarounds

Severity

References

Arbitrary File Creation/Overwrite on Windows via insufficient relative path sanitization

Details

Impact

Patches

Workarounds

Fix

Severity

References

Arbitrary File Creation/Overwrite via insufficient symlink protection due to directory cache poisoning

Details

Impact

Patches

Workarounds

Severity

References

Release Notes

Dependencies

Bug Fixes

Documentation